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RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURES BASED ON EXTRATERRITORIAL
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AN ANALYSIS UNDER ALLOCATION OF
REGULATORY JURISDICTION AND TRANSACTION COSTS

ABSTRACT: Are states entitled to take unilateral or collective trade measures in cases
of extraterritorial human rights violations? Are states obligated to do so? The debate is
often blurred by a multitude of legal, political, economic, and moral arguments that have,
so far, produced many misunderstandings. On one hand, the human rights community
alleges that the superiority of human rights resolves any conflict. On the other hand, the
trade community fears the intrusion of human rights language and power within the trade
regime, including multilateral regimes like the World Trade Organization.
While exploring the above issue, this dissertation unfolds in three parts. First, using
traditional legal analysis, I demonstrate that, in reality, states have not embraced any
robust doctrine (in the general, trade and human rights branches) permitting states to
apply restrictive trade measures as countermeasures against human rights violations
abroad.
Second, I use the framework of allocation of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ) and
transaction costs (TCs) to explain why the rules across those doctrinal branches reach the
same end point. This framework is based on law and economics literature on property
rights, which is transposed and expanded to problems of international law. The two
primary suggested categories of TCs involved in ARJ are sovereignty and cognitive
costs. Sovereignty costs increase because of extraterritorial allocations, and cognitive
costs increase because of the two different domains or communities (trade and human
vi

rights) involved in the issue. I then apply this framework to three case studies: Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, the World Trade Organization Diamond Waiver, and the trade and
labor rights “linkages.” These case studies indicate that international law has not
embraced any robust doctrine concerning the extraterritorial links between trade and
human rights because of the above TCs.
Third, I argue that, because of the heightened sovereignty and cognitive costs of public
international law, human rights advocacy in connection with international trade is
actually gaining traction in other ways. This phenomenon has been generally described as
transnational new governance (TNG) and involves initiatives such as voluntary codes of
conduct, social certification, and labeling. These initiatives directly target the behavior of
companies and, at the same time, use international conventions as their normative basis.
TNG initiatives do not incur the same TCs (though they bear different types of costs). In
addition, these initiatives may have the potential to change the calculation of state’s
interests in the long run.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ch1
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
I. Issue ................................................................................................................................ 1
II. Importance of the Topic .............................................................................................. 2
III. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 5
IV. Terminology ................................................................................................................ 6
V. Distribution of Chapters .............................................................................................. 7
VI. Disclaimers .................................................................................................................. 9
A. Effectiveness of Trade sanctions.............................................................................. 10
B. The Double-Game Argument ................................................................................... 11
C. No Specific Government, No Pro-Trade, and No Pro-Human Rights Advocacy .... 12
Ch2
The Traditional Legal Analysis in International Law .................................. 13
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 13
I. Jurisdiction and Extraterritoriality in Public International Law .......................... 14
A. The Concept of Jurisdiction in Public International Law ........................................ 14
B. Regulatory Jurisdiction and Extraterritoriality......................................................... 17
II. General International Law ....................................................................................... 21
A. Extraterritoriality and CIL ....................................................................................... 21
1. The Lotus Case ..................................................................................................... 22
2. The Restatement Third .......................................................................................... 25
B. Extraterritoriality and Jus Cogens ............................................................................ 26
1. Barcelona Traction ................................................................................................ 28
2. The Draft Article on State Responsibility of the ILC ........................................... 31
C. Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII..................................................... 34
D. Humanitarian Intervention ....................................................................................... 36
1. Responsibility to Protect ....................................................................................... 38
E. The Broader Picture in General International Law .................................................. 40
III. The WTO Regime..................................................................................................... 40
A. “Human Rights” in the Normative Floor ................................................................. 42
1. Human Rights as a Public Moral .......................................................................... 43
2. Human Rights and Protection of Human Life and Health .................................... 44
3. Human Rights and Prison Labor ........................................................................... 45
4. Human Rights as a Security Exception ................................................................. 46
5. Preliminary Remarks ............................................................................................ 49
B. Extraterritoriality in the Normative Floor ................................................................ 50
1. Prison Labor and Article XXI ............................................................................... 50
2. Public Morals ........................................................................................................ 51
3. Protection of Life (and animal life - Tuna and Shrimp) ....................................... 51
4. Extraterritoriality and PPMs ................................................................................. 55
5. Extraterritoriality in the GSP case ........................................................................ 59
6. Preliminary Remarks ............................................................................................ 61
C. Additional Tests Imposed by the WTO Normative Floor ........................................ 62
1. Necessity Test ....................................................................................................... 62
2. Chapeau Test ......................................................................................................... 63
viii

D. The Broader Picture of Extraterritorial Measures in the WTO................................ 64
IV. Human Rights Regimes ............................................................................................ 65
A. A Note on the Types of Obligations in Human Rights ............................................ 65
B. Extraterritoriality in Human Rights Regimes........................................................... 67
C. Trade in Human Rights Regimes ............................................................................. 71
D. The Broader Picture in Human Rights Regimes ...................................................... 72
Concluding Remarks ...................................................................................................... 73
Ch3
The Traditional Legal Analysis Explained in Terms of Allocation of
Regulatory Jurisdiction and Transaction Costs........................................................... 75
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 75
I. Justification of L&E as a Methodology and the Positive Approach....................... 76
II. L&E Methodology: Property Rights and Allocation of Regulatory Jurisdiction 79
A. Property Rights in Domestic L&E ........................................................................... 79
B. Transposing the Property Rights Concept to the International Context .................. 82
C. Transaction of Property Rights and Transactions of Regulatory Jurisdiction ......... 84
III. Allocation of Regulatory Jurisdiction (ARJ) ......................................................... 85
1. The ARJ function of General International Law .................................................. 88
2. The ARJ function of the WTO.............................................................................. 88
2.1. Negative Rules ................................................................................................... 89
2.2 Positive Rules...................................................................................................... 91
3. The ARJ function of Human Rights Regimes ...................................................... 92
IV. Strategies of ARJ ...................................................................................................... 93
A. Strategies of ARJ ..................................................................................................... 94
B. Transaction Costs (TCs) ........................................................................................... 96
V. Highlighted Transaction Costs (TCs)....................................................................... 98
A. Sovereignty Costs .................................................................................................... 98
B. Cognitive Costs ...................................................................................................... 102
VI. Limitations of the Adopted Framework ............................................................... 105
A. State-Centric Model ............................................................................................... 105
B. Constraining Effects of International Law v. Non-Compliance ............................ 107
VII. Case Studies Using the ARJ and TCs Methodology .......................................... 108
A. UN-SC Powers Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter .......................................... 108
B. Diamond Waiver .................................................................................................... 110
1. Sovereignty Costs ............................................................................................... 112
2. Cognitive Costs ................................................................................................... 113
C. Trade and Labor Linkage ....................................................................................... 114
1. Sovereignty Costs ............................................................................................... 115
2. Cognitive Costs ................................................................................................... 117
Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................... 120
Ch4 Transnational New Governance: Overcoming Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs
......................................................................................................................................... 122
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 122
I. The Plethora of TNG Initiatives............................................................................... 123
A. A Note on Acronyms ............................................................................................. 123
ix

B. General Characteristics .......................................................................................... 124
C. Classification of Initiatives Based on the Share of Actors’ Participation .............. 126
D. Type of Mechanisms employed by the Initiatives ................................................. 127
II. Case Studies on Selected TNG Initiatives .............................................................. 129
A. Voluntary Codes of Conduct: the United Nations Global Compact ...................... 129
1. Background ......................................................................................................... 129
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? ............... 130
3. Criticisms ............................................................................................................ 131
B. Social Certification: Social Accountability International (SAI) and SA 8000 ...... 132
1. Background ......................................................................................................... 132
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? ............... 133
3. Criticisms ............................................................................................................ 136
C. Social Certification and Labeling: FLO and Fair Trade ........................................ 137
1. Background ......................................................................................................... 137
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? ............... 138
3. Criticisms ............................................................................................................ 139
D. A Hybrid Initiative: the KPCS ............................................................................... 139
1. Background ......................................................................................................... 139
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs? ............... 141
3. Criticisms ............................................................................................................ 142
E. Latest Developments .............................................................................................. 143
1. Government Procurement ................................................................................... 143
2. ISO 26000 ........................................................................................................... 145
III. Points For a Research Agenda .............................................................................. 147
Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................... 149
Ch5 Conclusion: The Rational Structure of International Law in an Irrational
World ............................................................................................................................. 151
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 157
Books & Journals ........................................................................................................ 157
Dictionaries ............................................................................................................. 165
Primary Sources .......................................................................................................... 165
Treaties/Conventions .............................................................................................. 165
ICJ/PCIJ Cases ........................................................................................................ 166
WTO Cases ............................................................................................................. 166
WTO Decisions ....................................................................................................... 166
Other Sources .............................................................................................................. 167
UN System .............................................................................................................. 167
NGO Most Relevant Documents ............................................................................ 167
Domestic Legislation .............................................................................................. 168
Other ....................................................................................................................... 168
Acronyms ....................................................................................................................... 169
BIOS ............................................................................................................................... 171

x

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Legal Analysis under General international law................................... 40
Table 2 –Human Rights in the WTO Normative Floor ........................................ 50
Table 3 – Extraterritoriality in the WTO normative floor .................................... 62
Table 4 – Legal Analysis under the WTO normative floor .................................. 65
Table 5 –Legal Analysis under Human Right Regimes........................................ 73
Table 6 - Pairing of Concepts ............................................................................... 82
Table 7 – Three Types of Allocations................................................................... 94
Table 8 – Four Types of Allocations .................................................................... 95
Table 9 – Comparison of the KPCS and Diamond Waiver Language ............... 113
Table 10 – Comparison of the Declaration Referring to Trade and Labour
Linkages .......................................................................................................................... 118

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – Property Rights and Jurisdiction ......................................................... 84
Figure 2 – The New Governance Triangle (Simplified) .................................... 127

xi

Ch1

Introduction

I. ISSUE
Are states entitled to take restrictive trade measures in cases of human rights
violations occurring outside their territory? Are states obligated to do so? While
exploring this issue, this dissertation develops in three main parts.
First, by using traditional legal analysis, I posit that trade and human rights
regimes in international law have not incorporated any vigorous doctrine permitting
states to apply restrictive trade measures in response to human rights violations in other
countries. The interesting question turns out to be why rules across these regimes reach
the very same end point.
Second, I review and adopt a law and economics (L&E) framework of allocation
of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ) and transaction costs (TCs), which is systematically
presented in Chapter 3.1 A fundamental idea in this framework is that international
regimes, to different degrees, delimit the discretionary power of states through allocation
of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ). As the name indicates, ARJ involves two elements: a
dynamic of allocation, and regulatory jurisdiction. “Allocation” refers to the dynamic
process of assigning valued assets (in this case, regulatory jurisdiction) among players
(states), taking into account transaction costs (TCs). “Regulatory jurisdiction” refers to
the right to make a state’s law applicable to certain conduct. Three case studies are
1

I employ a positive framework instead of making a normative claim or recommendation. See
infra Chapter 3.I on positive and normative approach.

1

presented to sustain the proposition that the ARJ of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction
regarding trade and human rights is permeated by escalated sovereignty and cognitive
costs. Sovereignty costs increase because of extraterritorial allocations. Cognitive costs
increase because of the two different domains or communities (trade and human rights)
involved in the issue.
Third, the ARJ and TCs methodology is also useful for explaining why human
rights advocates are attempting to advance links between trade and human rights through
transnational new governance (TNG) initiatives. One reason is that these initiatives do
not incur the TCs found in the classic model of trade sanctions.2 Examples of these
initiatives include voluntary codes of conduct, social certification, and labeling. They are
also presented in four case studies: the United Nations Global Compact (voluntary code
of conduct); SA 8000 (social certification); fairtrade (labeling), and the Kimberley
Process of Certification Scheme. I propose that these initiatives may be precursors of a
long-term change in the calculation of states’ interests. For further investigation, it is
asked whether some recent developments in TNG initiatives, such as government
procurement with social and the elaboration of ISO 26000, may indicate that this change
is in progress.

II. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC
Since the late 1990s, a debate involving international trade and its impact on
human rights has taken place in many institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the

2

See infra Chapter 4 on TNG.
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World Trade Organization (WTO), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
academia. Lang summarizes key moments of that debate as it has unfolded to date.3
Lang recalls that the United Nations (UN) initiated a work programme and a
series of reports were produced by UN human rights institutions that addressed the
impact of the international trade system on the enjoyment of human rights.4 NGOs also
entered the debate. Academia followed suit; numerous conferences and seminars were
organized by, among others, the European Journal of International Law and the American
Society of International Law.5 WTO officers participated as panelists or contributed with
papers to some of those events.
But if one expects those efforts would bring coherence to the relationship between
trade and human rights, reaching common ground has proved difficult. Apparently, one
historical reason for polarization instead of consensus is the distinct evolution of trade
institutions and human rights institutions. On one hand, to talk about human rights in the
trade arena could politicize the trade negotiations and jeopardize, instead of facilitate, the
functioning of the trade regime. On the other hand, the international human rights
institutions speak and advocate their own language of rights without further elaboration
3

Although he recognizes that the “social history of the trade and human rights debate is yet to be
written.” See Andrew T. F. Lang, Re-thinking Trade and Human Rights, 15(2) TULANE J. INT’L AND
COMPARATIVE L. 335, 336 (2007).
4

The “nightmare” reports are the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on the
Promotion & Prot. Of Human Rights, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Preliminary Report, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (June 15, 2000) (prepared by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama); ECOSOC,
Sub-Comm. on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full
Enjoyment of Human Rights, Progress Report, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (Aug. 2, 2001)(prepared
by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama); ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. On the Promotion & Prot. of Human
Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, Final Report, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14 (June 25, 2003)(prepared by J. Oloka-Onyango & Deepika Udagama). Id. fn.3.
5

Lang, supra note 3, at 337-40.

3

on the trade side.6 Institutionally speaking, there is neither a Committee on Human Rights
at the WTO nor a Committee of Trade at the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).7
The debate is thorny and some argue that there should not even be a debate. An
open trading system like the one advanced by the WTO produces higher rates of
economic growth. This growth generates money to “fund” human rights that need
resources to be implemented. This logical inference can be reasonably accepted if one
assumes that human rights implementation depends, of course, on money and also that
the trade regime, itself, is free of and does not contribute to human rights violations.
Nonetheless, the literature also points to collisions. As Alan Sykes puts it,
“everything we know points to a generally favorable relationship [between trade and
human rights] . . . [then] the question [turns to be]: how to address occasional tension.”8
Examples of this tension are found everywhere, as exploitation of labor conditions
overseas by multinational corporations and trade of conflict diamonds are often cited.

6

See infra Chapter 3.V.B on the translation of this aspect into the language of transaction costs.

7

It should be noted that both institutions and some of their respective officers have produced
reports or analysis about the linkages, though not in an institutionalized framework. Indeed, as Petersmann
acknowledges, “[g]iven the widespread bias among human rights lawyers vis-à-vis economics and WTO
law, and the agnostic attitude of many trade specialists vis-à-vis human rights, it is an important task of
academics to promote more dialogue and better understanding among these different communities of trade
specialists and human rights advocates . . .” (original emphasis). See Ernst Ulrich-Petersmann, Time for a
United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations:
Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 8, 35 (2002). Regarding WTO officers’ analysis in
their individual capacity, see Gabrielle Marceau, A Call for Coherence in International Law, 33(5) J.
WORLD TRADE 87 (1999). See also Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13(4)
EUR. J. INT’L L. 753 (2002). In the area of intellectual property, see Robert D. Anderson & Hannu Wager,
Human Rights, Development, and the WTO: the Cases of Intellectual Property and Competition Policy,
9(3) J. INT'L ECON. L. 707 (2006).
8

Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 69, 73 (Frederick
M. Abbott, Christine Breining-Kaufmann, and Thomas Cottier eds., University of Michigan Press, 2005).
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Indeed, I suggest that this tension occurs most of the time with an extraterritorial factor;
that is to say, the importing states and the state where the violation of human rights is
taking place are not identical.
In sum, the intersections of international trade and human rights will be on the
agenda of governments, international organizations, NGOs, companies, and other
stakeholders for years to come. For instance, the recent remarks of Pascal Lamy, Director
General of the WTO, in the Public Forum of 2008 (Trading into the Future) point in that
direction. Lamy acknowledges the responsibility of the multilateral trading system for
human rights as one of the complex issues on which the public forum was expected to
trigger a frank and open debate.9 And while there is much uncertainty as to how this
linkage will develop in the multilateral trade regime, non-state initiatives dealing with the
linkage has been increasing considerably.

III. METHODOLOGY
I dedicate considerable effort to reviewing current literature and proposing a
novel analytical framework. Essentially, I adopt a combination of methods in the
following order:
•

I use traditional legal analysis to conclude that general international law, trade
law and human rights law do not embrace a robust doctrine allowing
restrictive trade measures to deal with human rights violations abroad;

•

Using L&E analysis, I explain why norms of international law (in all of the
examined regimes) reach this same end point;

9

See http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum08_e/public_forum08_e.htm.
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•

Still using L&E analysis, I explain why human rights advocates are directing
their efforts to innovative forms of global governance initiatives that do not
incur the same TCs that exist in the classic use of trade sanctions.

IV. TERMINOLOGY
I employ “regimes” in the sense found in international relations literature, as
envisaged by Krasner. 10 When I refer to “members,” I mean WTO members. If I refer to
members of other organizations, the respective acronym will precede “members” (e.g.
UN members).
Though footnotes and a list of acronyms will take care of particular terminology, I
use the acronym ARJ to refer to allocation of regulatory jurisdiction. This is not a term of
art, nor a common abbreviation found in existing literature. I use it, nevertheless, to avoid
repetition of the lengthier expression.
The immense quantity of declarations, treaties, agreements, amendments and
similar references in the trade and human rights literature precluded me from using
general references such as “Declaration” or “Agreement.” Thus, where no widely known
acronym exists, I try to shorten names while giving some meaning to them. In any

10

“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decisionmaking procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”
See generally Stephen Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen Krasner ed. 1983). Principles are beliefs of fact,
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules
are specific prescriptions or proscriptions of action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices
for making and implementing collective choice. Id. at 2. For the application of the concept as to “trade,”
see Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime
Dynamics and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 273, 276, 313 (Stephen Krasner ed. 1983). For the
application of the concept as to “human rights,” see JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 128 (2d 2003).

6

circumstance, the first reference of a shortened name will always be made in the full
form.

V. DISTRIBUTION OF CHAPTERS
This dissertation has five chapters, distributed as follows:
Chapter 1 is this introductory chapter that lays down the issue, the methodology
and gives a general overview of the dissertation. It should be noted that I assume that the
reader possesses familiarity with public international law and the specific regimes
(general, trade and human rights). In this chapter I also delimit the scope of the research
by noting that some parallel issues, such as effectiveness of trade sanctions and doublegame argument, are related to the issue but are not developed in this work.
Chapter 2 encompasses the traditional legal analysis of restrictive trade sanctions
taken in response to human rights violations abroad. I analyze several of the sources that
are often quoted as legally justifying those measures. From general international law, I
analyze, among others, customary international law (CIL), jus cogens, UN Security
Council powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, humanitarian intervention, and
responsibility to protect. From WTO law, I scrutinize the general and security exceptions
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the product-process method
debate, and the general system of preferences. From international human rights law, I
investigate conventions dealing with, among others, genocide, child labor, slave trade. In
all of these sources, no solid pattern of lawful extraterritorial incursions on another state’s
sovereignty is found. In reality, it can be argued that international law is hostile to the
exercise of extraterritorial legal powers in any context and, therefore, the lawful

7

situations contemplating the use of restrictive trade measures addressing human rights
violations abroad are very exceptional.
Chapter 3 aims at explaining the consistency detected in Chapter 2. It begins by
explaining in detail the L&E model that I employ (drawn from property rights theory in
existing literature). In this model, the regulatory jurisdiction of states is akin to the
concept of property (control over something). International law, and its different regimes,
is presented fundamentally as a device allocating this property, or as I suggest,
performing or transacting ARJ. These transactions occur as a function of TCs.
Fundamentally, depending on how costly the transaction is, rights and obligations
encompassed by a certain transaction (the international law norm) will be more clear, less
clear, or left open for ex-post allocations. Two types of TCs are explored as essential in
these types of allocations: sovereignty costs and cognitive costs. The hypothesis put
forward in this chapter is that TCs increase in allocations dealing with trade sanctions. To
demonstrate this proposition, the chapter applies the approach to three examples: the UN
Security Council powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; the Diamond Waiver
decision of the WTO; and the trade and labor debate.
Chapter 4 starts by describing some innovative forms of global governance that
have been pursued by human rights advocates to tackle the same problem that trade
sanctions allegedly handle. I explore four case studies concerning these initiatives. The
first is a voluntary code, the UN Global Compact initiative; the second is the SA 8000, a
form of social certification; the third is the fairtrade initiative, an example of labeling; the
fourth is the KPCS, a hybrid of voluntary codes and certification. Two other recent
developments are pinpointed as relevant for further research: government procurement

8

policies referring to human rights and labor rights standards and ISO 26000. Another
inquiry is whether these developments have the potential to change the traditional cost
structure of international law. Overall, however, the main point of the chapter is to show
that these initiatives do not incur the same TCs that exist in the classic model of trade
sanctions. These initiatives have their own costs, but those costs are not in the same form
or have the same intensity as the sovereignty and cognitive costs.
Chapter 5 summarizes the whole dissertation to conclude that: first, states have
not embraced any robust doctrine permitting states to apply restrictive trade measures as
countermeasures against human rights violations in other countries; second, L&E
analysis shows sovereignty and cognitive costs are the likely cause of this lack of
doctrine; and third, L&E analysis also helps explain why human rights advocates are
attempting to advance the trade and human rights linkages under TNG initiatives.

VI. DISCLAIMERS
I envisaged this dissertation keeping in mind that the reader has basic knowledge
of the relevant regimes. Recurrent terms found in general international law (e.g. CIL, jus
cogens), the trade regime (e.g. chapeau, rounds, like-products), and in human rights
regimes (e.g. obligation to protect, respect and fulfill) are assumed to be part of the
vocabulary of the reader. This dissertation is therefore not an inventory of general
international law, the WTO regime, or human rights regime, but a presentation of

9

complex questions related to the examined issue.11 Nonetheless, as necessary, footnotes
will take care of key points and specific vocabulary in need of clarification.
In addition, the “trade sanctions” subject evokes many parallel issues that are not
treated in this dissertation. For instance, the question of effectiveness of sanctions and
double-game arguments are not considered. The points that follow are noted as
references, though they are not developed to the deserved extent.
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE SANCTIONS
I do not touch questions of effectiveness regarding restrictive trade measures that
address violations of human rights. Those questions might include: are the concerned
people better off when trade measures are applied? What are the costs imposed by
economic sanctions on individuals who may have little to do with the perpetuation of the
violations? Do targeted states change their behavior when affected by those measures?
There is substantial disagreement on those questions, with assessments pointing in both
directions.12

11

Available resources on each specific regime cover their respective area with much more
detailing. It would be fruitless to reproduce them here.
12

For an earlier assessment, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED 92-105 (2d ed. 1990) (reckoning that although it is not true that sanctions “never work,”
they are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy goals that depend upon compelling the target country
to take actions it stoutly resists). For a recent assessment in the specific context of Europe, see Yaraslau
Kryvoi, Why European Union Trade Sanctions Do Not Work, 17 MINNESOTA J. INT’L L. 209 (2008). See
also Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights 30 (John M. Olin L. & Econ., Working Paper No.
394, 2008) (noting that “pressure on authoritarian states reliably results in transitions to democracy.
Although this proposition seems intuitive plausible, the evidence is even weaker than it is for the first
proposition. The experience with Iraq provides a cautionary tale. Economic sanctions on Iraq during the
1990s did not weaken the authoritarian system; and the recent war in Iraq has not delivered a democracy”)
(emphasis added), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105209. But see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human
Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593 (2005)
(analyzing the issue in the context of preferential trade agreements (PTAs); assessing that PTAs have come
to play a significant role in governing state compliance with human rights. Especially when PTAs supply
hard standards that tie material benefits of integration to compliance with human rights principles, PTAs
are more effective than softer human rights agreements in changing repressive behaviors).
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B. THE DOUBLE-GAME ARGUMENT
I do not build, moreover, on criticisms about the mismatch of “internal” human
rights policies of countries imposing sanctions and the human rights policies they are said
to protect abroad. Some could argue, for instance, that the usual imposers of unilateral
sanctions play a double game.13
The United States has been recently criticized in the light of its own policy
regarding detention of prisoners, torture,14 and lack of ratification of International Labor
Organization (ILO) conventions.15 Similarly, one could highlight the inconsistencies of
the European Union (EU) foreign policy to demand ratification of human and labor rights

13

An interesting episode concerning the United States, China and Singapore occurred during the
Clinton administration. As Jackson describes it, the United States began giving Most-Favored Nation
(MFN) treatment to Chinese goods in 1980. This treatment was relatively non-controversial until 1989,
when the Chinese government suppressed pro-democracy demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square.
President Clinton was pressured for considering not extending MFN treatment to China in light of the
episode. The Prime Minister of Singapore was quoted as suggesting that if the United States was to
withdraw the MFN treatment to China, “the Chinese may one day threaten to withhold MFN status from
the United States unless it does more to improve living conditions in Detroit, Harlem, and South Central
Los Angeles.” JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES,
MATERIAL, AND TEXT, 1028-32 (4th ed. 2002). This type of double-game reactions appear, undoubtedly,
not only in the context of trade sanctions. I had the opportunity to attend a workshop in the University of
Chicago concerning the definition of an agenda of research in relation to financial globalization and human
rights. During the workshop, participants discussed whether it would be interesting to pressure the United
States government to advance strict rules on sovereignty wealth funds (e.g., SWF investments in U.S.
bonds should be monitored to allow money coming only from countries that condemn torture in theory and
practice). The proposal, however, sparked at least some interesting reactions from professors indicating the
incongruence between such policy and recent episodes of the United States administration. Workshop on
Financial Globalization and Human Rights: Defining the Research Agenda (Ginsburg, Ochoa, and Keenan)
University of Chicago Law School, February 16, 2008.
14

It is far from the objective here to provide guidance on these debates, but for a summarization of
arguments in the torture context, see Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COL. J. TRANSNATIONAL L.
811 (2005).
15

As to the lack of ratification of ILO conventions, as of December of 2008, it should be noted
that the United States has not ratified six out of eight “core labour standards” (CLS) conventions. The
United States has ratified only Convention 182, regarding worst forms of child labor, and the Convention
105, regarding abolition of forced labor.. The status of ratification of ILO conventions can be checked at
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.
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conventions from beneficiaries of certain trade schemes while many EU members have
not ratified those conventions themselves.16
Though these points appear to be valid and require attention, they are not my
focus. It would be interesting to observe whether the double-game argument could be
analyzed as amounting to some sort of TC, although they are not specifically taken into
account as such in this dissertation.
C. NO SPECIFIC GOVERNMENT, NO PRO-TRADE, AND NO PRO-HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY
As a final disclaimer, if the reader feels that I am taking any government stand by
mentioning Brazil or the United States with more frequency to illustrate some point, this
perception is probably misleading. References to those countries merely reflect some
knowledge about the legal systems with which I am most familiar. However, my aim is to
present the issue with consideration to no particular government position.
The same observation is true regarding any perception that my quest is to advance
a biased “pro-trade” or “pro-human rights” agenda. My comments on the adopted
positive methodology are expected to support my claim of scientific research and
neutrality, to the extent such aspirations are ever fully attainable.17

16

See infra Chaper 2.III.B.5 on GSP schemes.

17

See infra Chapter 3.I.
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Ch2

The Traditional Legal Analysis in
International Law

INTRODUCTION
The issue in this chapter is whether trade measures addressing human rights
violations abroad are lawful. Using traditional legal analysis, I examine the three main
regimes related to the above issue: general international law, the WTO regime, and
human rights regimes.
In general international law, I analyze the claims that CIL, jus cogens, UN
Security Council (UN-SC) powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, humanitarian
intervention, and responsibility to protect, among others, would justify those measures. In
the WTO law, I focus on the same question in relation to GATT general exceptions
(article XX) and security exceptions (article XXI). In human rights law, I dedicate
attention to some of the conventions often brought to the debate (e.g. genocide, torture,
and child labor, among others).
In general, a remarkable consistency emerges: none of the regimes reveal a
vigorous doctrine permitting states to apply restrictive trade measures as countermeasures
against human rights violations in other countries. But before getting to this conclusion,
this chapter begins by clarifying the concept of extraterritoriality and regulatory
jurisdiction that will be used throughout the dissertation.
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I. JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW
A. THE CONCEPT OF JURISDICTION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jurisdiction is a term with multiple connotations. The terminology found in
prominent public international law books is dissonant. Oppenheim’s praised work on
international law highlights that jurisdiction, as pertaining to states,18 may take various
forms:
a state may regulate conduct by legislation; or it may, through its courts, regulate
those differences which come before them, whether arising out of the civil or
criminal law; or it may regulate conduct by taking executive or administrative
actions which impinges more directly on the course of events, as by enforcing its
laws or the decisions of the courts.19

Oppenheim, nonetheless, does not advance a specific terminology for those types
of jurisdiction. Shaw, in turn, enumerates legislative, judicial, and executive as categories
of jurisdiction that seem to match that classification. For Shaw, the first category of
jurisdiction refers to the ability of a state to make its law applicable to persons and things
within its territory and, sometimes, abroad. Judicial and executive jurisdictions, in turn,
correspond, respectively, to the power of a state to subject persons or things to its courts
and to the capacity of a state to enforce its law.20 Brownlie, furthermore, recalls that
jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty and refers to the legislative, judicial, and
administrative competences associated with those manifestations of jurisdiction.21

18

I say “pertaining to states,” because I am not analyzing jurisdiction as pertaining, for instance, to
an international court.
19

1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 136 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.

20

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 464, 572-578 (5th ed. 2003).

1999).
21

IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297 (6th ed. 2003). Harris also uses the term
“enforcement jurisdiction” in regard to the executive and judicial jurisdictions and points out that
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It should be noted that the branch or the origin of the organ that is exercising the
jurisdiction is not the determinative factor to indicate the type of jurisdiction being
exercised. The Restatement Third of Foreign Relations illustrates this point clearly, while
distinguishing, again, among three types of jurisdiction: prescriptive, judicial and
enforcement. Prescriptive jurisdiction is the state’s power
to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the
interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order,
by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court.22

I am concerned with precisely that sense of jurisdiction: prescriptive.
Nevertheless, I adopt regulatory jurisdiction as my main terminology because jurisdiction
to prescribe pertains to a common law nomenclature. Legislative jurisdiction, in turn,
seems to misguide the reader exclusively to the legislative branch of government.
In most circumstances, a state adopts regulatory jurisdiction regarding just the
conduct occurring inside its territory. This point is made clear by authoritative doctrine.
Frederick A. Mann, for instance, reviewing twenty years of international doctrine of
jurisdiction (1964-1984), puts forward that
[l]aws extend so far as, but no further than the sovereignty of the State which
puts them into force nor does any legislator normally intend to enact laws which
apply to or cover persons, facts, events or conduct outside the limits of his State’s
sovereignty. This is a principle or, perhaps, one should say, an observation of
universal application (emphasis added).23

jurisdiction may be concurrent with other states’ jurisdiction or may be exclusive. See D. J. HARRIS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 264 (1998).
22

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §401 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement Third]. I
use the Restatement Third here because it provides a useful taxonomy of types of jurisdiction. But see infra
Section II.A.2 on criticism of the Restatement Third as a source of international law.
23

Frederick Alexander Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty
Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS 19, 20 (1984 III).
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In other circumstances, the regulatory jurisdiction reaches extraterritorial limits,
such as when states prescribe law that reaches conduct occurring outside their physical
territory.24 As Brownlie says, the starting point is that, at least as a presumption,
jurisdiction is territorial, but this territoriality principle has been refined in the light of the
experience and the law, so that the field is unsettled.25
With this differentiation in mind, I emphasize that the problem of regulatory
jurisdiction in this dissertation is not to be associated with – though they are related to –
jurisdictional issues that increasingly appear before national courts. True, domestic courts
play a fundamental role. Much of the law relating to jurisdiction has been developed
through the decisions of national courts applying the laws of their own states, as
Oppenheim and Mann point out.26 In that context, courts may have to answer whether or
not they have jurisdiction over a case and develop the criteria for jurisdiction: tests of
minimum contacts, effects, comity considerations, forum non conveniens, personal

24

Traditionally, rules of jurisdiction can be grouped on territoriality, nationality, or effects criteria.
I do not enter into descriptions of each of these rules here. The choice of law literature is illustrative of
these types of rules, normally by analyzing rules from a point of view of domestic law. The Restatement
Third exemplifies many of those rules. For instance, the United States would have jurisdiction to prescribe
law with respect to: “conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes places within its territory [a territorial
rule]”, “the activities, interests, status, or relations of its national outside . . . its territory [a nationality
rule]”, or “conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory
[an effects rule]”. Restatement Third, at §402. See other examples in Don Wallace, Jr., Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction, 15 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1099 (1983). See also Harold G. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in
Customary International Law in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64, 78-9
(Meessen ed. 1996) (suggesting that the idea that sovereign authority is limited by territorial boundaries is
far from dead, but considering that it is a question of degree, since its abuse can be intrusive and “what may
sound like a truism is actually not deprived of important implications”).
25

Brownlie, supra note 21, at 297.

26

Oppenheim, supra note 19, at 457. Mann contends that “jurisdiction in international law has
nothing to do with the question of municipal [domestic] law whether certain State organs have jurisdiction
in a given case, whether, for instance, a Court has jurisdiction to entertain certain proceedings, or whether
an Inspector of Taxes has jurisdiction to set aside an assessment. See Frederick Alexander Mann, The
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 9 (1964 I).
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jurisdiction (or jurisdiction rationae personae), subject-matter jurisdiction (or jurisdiction
rationae materiae), among others, are part of that legal conundrum.27
Here, I deal with regulatory jurisdiction in relation to states and international law.
I assume a view that international law affects state’s jurisdiction, a point made by
(public) international lawyers.28
Finally, another sort of problem that is often thought of in terms of extraterritorial
jurisdiction concerns the responsibility of states when governments, or their agents, act
abroad. This question may arise, among others, in the situation of military occupation,
control over the territory, and arrest and detentions cases. I do not touch these issues, but
they are noted here for reference purposes.29
B. REGULATORY JURISDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
As noted, the notion of extraterritoriality refers to situations where one state
addresses behavior occurring outside of its own territory. Slaughter and Zaring describe
three shifts reflecting deep international economic and political forces as being peculiar
to the proliferation of extraterritorial laws in the twentieth century. First, the rise of the
regulatory state shifted the extraterritoriality debate from the mere application of private
27

The debate, furthermore, is one leg of the discipline “conflicts of law” (in common law) or
“private international law” (in civil law). It involves the analysis of overlapping jurisdictions among
domestic and foreign courts and also among domestic courts within the same State (such as in federal
systems like the United States or Brazil). See also Hannah Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation,
46 VA. J. INT'L L. 251 (2005-2006) (referring to the debate about the role of national courts in addressing
global harms, which focused on the application by domestic courts of international law - for instance, in
civil actions brought in U.S. courts to enforce human rights law).
28

Oppenheim, supra note 19, at 456. A landmark case regarding this aspect of regulatory
jurisdiction was decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) as early as 1927: the Lotus
case. See infra Section II.A.1 on Lotus.
29

For those interested in that problem, a useful start point is Damira Kamchibekova, State
Responsibility for Extraterritorial Human Rights Violations, 13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87 (2007)
(revisiting the paradigmatic cases found in the European context and in general international law).
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law to the imposition of public power by states; second, the United States arose as a
superpower that made extensive use of legal means to achieve economic ends; third,
globalization intensified global production and interdependence, not only in terms of
vulnerability, but also in terms of interconnectedness.30
An example to contextualize extraterritoriality dealing with international trade
and human rights regimes is useful. For instance, assume that state “A” gives market
access to imports of product “P” coming from state “B.”31 At some point, state “A”
imposes a ban in the importation of product “P,” reasoning that product “P” is produced
with forced labor within the territory of state “B.” The typical questions raised about the
example are: what is the law regulating these facts? Can state “A” impose trade sanctions
(restrict access to its market) against state “B,” the territorial space where human rights
violations are taking place?
This example of extraterritorial jurisdiction seems to be distinct from what is
perceived as “intraterritorial” jurisdiction. For instance, consider now the situation in
which state “A” bans the importation of product “P,” alleging the harmfulness of product
“P” to “A”’s own population. The typical questions raised in international law are: what
is the applicable law? What are the thresholds by which state “A” can restrict access to its
market?
However,

in

practice,

the

distinction

between

extraterritoriality

and

intraterritoriality can be blurred. Compelling literature suggests that the extraterritorial
30

Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Extraterritoriality in a Globalized World 2 (1998),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=39380.
31

I am not saying that tariffs are not being charged on product “P.” I just suggest that state “B”
can export to state “A” and, most likely, duties are being charged by the customs authorities of state “A.”
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nature of some categories of trade related problems are, in fact, intraterritorial problems.
This has been discussed particularly in the trade and environmental linkages that find
analogy in the trade and human rights intersections.
Other matters can be said to be less controversial in this debate. The mere
existence of effects and impacts abroad is not sufficient to characterize extraterritoriality
as unlawful exercise of regulatory jurisdiction. In a world of global production and
interconnectedness,

almost

any

domestic

regulation,

normally

understood

as

intraterritorial in nature, will have some sort of effect or impact abroad.
It is appropriate to recall two recent matters to illustrate this point. The first one
regards contaminated milk in China and the second one concerns a new EU chemical
regime named REACH (Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals) that is
expected to be adopted by the European Commission in 2009. In the first case,
contaminated powder milk killed several children and sickened thousand others in China
in September 2008. The international media gave broad coverage of the contamination
and many importing states implemented bans on milk and dairy products coming from
China. Without entering the discussion of the requirements of trade measures involved in
food safety matters, one can barely deny that these bans protect the regulating state’s
population instead of protecting the Chinese population. In the second case, although the
details of the European regulation have not been made public, it seems that it is a
stringent regulation banning or restricting substances of “very high concern,” such as
those that cause cancer. Again, an argument can be made that this regulation protects the
European members’ population.
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In both cases, extraterritorial effects will be felt abroad. Respectively, the dairy
exporters in China will, most likely, experience decreased sales. The exporters of “very
high concern” products found in the REACH lists may bear, similarly, decreasing sales.
Put simply, the mere presence of effects abroad cannot be an appropriate basis to
distinguish between lawful extraterritorial and intraterritorial measures.
Thus, what seems more appropriate at this point is not to look for a conception of
extraterritoriality to assess whether a measure is of that nature or not. It is necessary to
investigate when, absent a definition of what constitutes valid exercises of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, international law has brought sense out of the “extraterritoriality”
phenomena, and given it life, relevance, and meaning. This means that I will look for the
circumstances in which the international law prescribes the extraterritorial phenomenon
as either lawful or unlawful.
As Jalles acutely describes,
[the question of extraterritorial trade measures] is not more than the natural
consequences of the abuse of the extraterritorial criteria used in the upmost
limits. It should be recognized, in fact, that the imagination of the political man
in the service of a certain policy is much stronger and determinative than one
could imagine; the jurists, in turn, have launched themselves in theories more or
less sophisticated about phenomenon that were in their origin, of an essential
political nature [ . . .].32

A final observation about the extraterritorial and intraterritorial terminology: first,
the trade literature makes use of other terms to grasp a possible differentiation.
Charnovitz, for instance, while discussing the use of trade measures to protect the morals
of persons in or outside their own countries, uses respectively “inwardly-directed” and
32

Isabel Jalles, Extraterritorialiedade e Comércio Internacional: um Exercício de Direito
Americano [Extraterritoriality and International Trade: an Exercise of American Law] 45 (1988) (Port.).
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“outwardly-directed” measures (or just inward and outward measures). Charnovitz also
acknowledges that Robert Hudec used the term “externally-directed” and, that in the
GATT 1947 jurisprudence, references to extrajurisdictional and extraterritorial measures
are found.33 Notwithstanding these alternatives terminologies, I employ extraterritoriality
as the default one.
The next sections proceed to examine whether trade sanctions are justified under
general international law, trade law, and human rights law. Some of the often cited
sources to justify the examined trade measures are found in general international law
(CIL, jus cogens, UN-SC powers), trade law (GATT-WTO exceptions), and human rights
(human rights conventions). Each of these sources is examined separately.

II. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CIL
Bartels acknowledges that the lawfulness of the examined trade measures is
grounded in CIL.34 Specifically, since all states have a legitimate interest in promoting
human rights, Bartels posits that this type of extraterritorial entitlement is justified.35
Along his arguments, allusions to the exercise of this regulatory jurisdiction are made to
confirm state practice.

33

Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689, 695 (1997-

1998).
34

Lorand Bartels, Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 36 J.
WORLD TR. 353, 365-86 (2002).
35

Id. at 353, 371 n.82, 374 (recognizing, however, that such understanding is not a prevailing

one).
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There are, indeed, less controversial cases about the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction: states can regulate the conduct of their nationals abroad (because of a
national linkage) and states exercise this power over extraterritorial acts designed to
injure its governments or its integrity.
But there are also harder cases. Does CIL really provide a clear entitlement on
this matter? The discussion begins with the paradigmatic case of Lotus.36 This is one of
the few cases in general international law in which regulatory jurisdiction and
extraterritoriality were clearly addressed.
1. The Lotus Case
In short, the facts of the Lotus concern the collision occurred in 1926 between the
S.S. Lotus, a French vessel, and the S.S. Boz-Kourt, a Turkish vessel.37 The Boz-Kourt
was cut in two and, as a result, eight Turkish nationals who were on board perished.38
Some days after landing in (the former) Constantinople, the captains of the French
(Lieutenant Demons) and the Turkish (Mr. Hassan Bey) vessels were arrested. Joint
criminal charges were instituted against them and the case is much about the French
reaction against the imprisonment of its national, Lieutenant Demons. After diplomatic
efforts from France, both parties agreed to submit the case to the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ).39

36

S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 [hereinafter Lotus]. “S.S.” stands for
steam ships. See ROBERT MCKENNA, THE DICTIONARY OF NAUTICAL LITERACY (2003).
37

Id. at 12 (the vessels collided in high seas in a region called Cape Sigri).

38

Id. at 10.

39

Id. at 11. The League of Nations (1922-1946) and the PCIJ are respectively the predecessors of
the United Nations and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For the PCIJ history, see http://www.icjcij.org/pcij/index.php?p1=9.
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The issue that came out in this case was whether Turkey’s exercise of criminal
jurisdiction was in violation of any norm or principle of international law. In the words of
the PCIJ, “[t]he Court is asked to state whether or not the principles of international law
prevent Turkey from instituting criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons under
Turkish law.”40 The Court eventually decided for Turkey, reasoning that the Lotus
produced “effect” on the Turkish vessel, which is deemed to be Turkish territory because
of its flag. Thus, Turkey could exercise its criminal jurisdiction.41
The relevant part of this case, for my purposes, concerns the PCIJ assertion that
the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that
- failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is
certainly territorial; except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from
international custom or from a convention. It does not, however, follow that
international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place
abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.
. . Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide
measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules;
as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it
regards as best and most suitable (emphasis added).42

40

Id. at 15.

41

Id. at 25 (“[i]t follows that what occurs on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if
it occurred on the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies. If, therefore, a guilty act committed on the
high seas produces its effects on a vessel flying another flag or in foreign territory, the same principles must
be applied as if the territories of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be
drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects
of the offence have taken place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its
territory and prosecuting, accordingly, the delinquent.”) (emphasis added).
42

Id. at 18-19.
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Much has been written about the above passage.43 The case is famous for
establishing the “effects” doctrine. It seems, in addition, that the case can be interpreted
in two manners. First, Lotus would have confirmed discretion in the exercise of
extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction by states that can be limited by prohibitive rules .44
Or, on the contrary, Lotus would have confirmed limits on the exercise of regulatory
jurisdiction by States that can be expanded by permissive rules.
The more compelling arguments are perhaps found in the second interpretation.
As Meier points, it does not follow that states are free to interfere with each other’s
internal affairs whenever harmful local effects might justify such interference.45 Mann
argues that leaving up to states to delimitate their jurisdiction, instead of international
law, would be an unfortunate and retrograde theory.46 Pauwelyn, similarly, contends that
it is difficult to accept the principle of “what is not prohibited is allowed” as the default
rule of general international law.47 Finally, as Mann also adverts, the Lotus decision has
been overruled, the passage itself has been pointed out as having the status of obiter
dictum,48 and there is no certainty that it was contemplating the doctrine of jurisdiction in
43

Schutter points out that both the interpretation of this decision and its contemporary relevance
are debated. Olivier De Schutter, Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European Convention
on Human Rights, n.20 (Cellule de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Droits de l’Homme, Working Paper N.
4, 2005), http://cridho.cpdr.ucl.ac.be/en/publications/working_papers.php.
44

Oppenheim infers that international law establishes permissible limits unless because of
prohibitive rules. See Oppenheim, supra note 19, at n.2 456.
45

Maier, supra note 24, at 67, 69.

46

Mann, supra note 26, at 35.

47

JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 154-61 (Cambridge, 2003).
48

Obiter dictum (or “in dicta”) is a Latin expression used in common law systems and means “a
judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in
the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed. 2004).
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general or only the criminal law aspect of the specific case.49 I submit that Lotus is not a
strong paradigmatic case to establish a general authority for states to impose
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
2. The Restatement Third
Another source purportedly recognizing extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in
terms of CIL is the Restatement Third.50 Generally, as Cleveland reminds, the
Restatement Third reflects a rule of CIL recognizing that states ordinarily have
jurisdiction to interfere in the conduct of other sovereigns when the conduct has a nexus
with, or substantial effects in, the state’s own territory.51
Especially on human rights, a commentary to the Restatement Third posits that
[v]iolations of the rules stated in this section [customary international law of
human rights] are violations of obligations to all other states and any state may
invoke the ordinary remedies available to a state when its rights under customary
law are violated.52

Though no definition of “ordinary remedies available” is provided, one point
deserving attention is about the weight of the Restatement Third as a formal source of
international law. The Restatement Third consists of international law as it is interpreted
by the members of the American Law Institute (ALI) in the United States. No one doubts
its importance as a document produced by fine experts of international law, but the
49

The decision has been overruled by the Brussels Convention of May 10, 1952 (International
Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships) and the Convention on the High Seas of April 29,
1958. See Mann, supra note 26, n.46 at 34-35.
50

See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Trade Sanctions and Human Rights – Past, Present and Future,
6(4) J. INT’L ECO. L. 797, 814-15 (2003). By acknowledging a comment to the Restatement Third, Vázquez
recalls that when a state responds to violations of obligation owed to all states (erga omnes), by adopting
unilateral countermeasures, these measures are also justified. Id. n.9 at 800.
51

Sarah H Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: a Theory of
Compatibility, 5(1) J. INT’ ECON. L. 133, 160, n.112 160 (2002) (quoting § 404 of the Restatement Third).
52

Restatement Third, supra note 22, § 702, Comment, (o) (emphasis added).

25

Restatement Third is about how practitioners in the United States interpret the current
affair of international law.53 Naturally, because it reflects the United States practice on
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Restatement Third seems to allow great discretion in the
exercise of this type of regulatory jurisdiction.
But as a candidate of a source of international law, the Restatement Third is, at
best, a subsidiary source and must be counterbalanced.54 Moreover, perhaps the
organization that seems to have more authority to “restate” international law is the
International Law Commission (ILC).55 What the ILC has to tell about it is investigated
in the next section, as part of the jus cogens and state responsibility debate.
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND JUS COGENS
Jus cogens, obligations erga omnes, or peremptory norms, is a growing and
relevant topic of international law.56 Earlier in 1937, Verdross called attention to

53

See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 234-35
(2000) (recalling that “[t]hese Restatements are adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute, a
private organization not affiliated with the United States Government, whose membership consists of
judges, legal academicians, and lawyers involved in private practice and in government . . . it is ‘in no
sense an official document of the United States’ . . . [n]onetheless, despite this independence and nonofficial status, it is inevitable that a Restatement dealing with international law will in general reflect the
broad position take by the United States rather than, say, inconsistent or polar positions taken by other,
perhaps hostile states.”). They acknowledge, for instance, that Professor Louis Henkin was the chief
reporter for the Restatement Third. Id. at 235.
54

For instance, one could argue that the Restatement Third qualifies as “teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law.” See ICJ Statute art. 38(d). Only in this sense, and if read together with other equally highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, the Restatement Third could qualify as a subsidiary means for the
determination of the rules of law.
55

See Fragmentation Of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification And
Expansion of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,
A/CN.4/L.682 (April 13, 2006), at 256 [hereinafter ILC Report on Fragmentation] (proposing that the ILC
as an avenue of “restatement” of general international law in forms other than codification and progressive
development - not as a substitute but as a supplement to the latter).
56

I am using these three terms interchangeably, though some authors differentiate among them.
See M. Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J.
INT’L L. 211 (1997) (explaining that, in contrast to jus cogens rules, erga omnes rules may arise either as
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“forbidden treaties” in international law.57 Verdross identified, among others, jus cogens
as a general principle prohibiting states from concluding treaties contra bonos mores.58
In the mid-1960s, as George Abi-Saab advances, certain norms of the then current
international law appear to possess jus cogens character, with opinions diverging on its
content, source, and means of determination, and application of these norms.59 Shortly
after, the jus cogens concept was enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT), as a limitation on the content of treaties.60 Article 53 of the VCLT
provides that
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory
norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.61

customary rules or through treaties; a jus cogens or erga omnes rule could apply to only a limited number
of States; although jus cogens rules are necessarily erga omnes rules, erga omnes rules could exist which
were not of a jus cogens character). See also Pauwelyn, supra note 47, at 61 (acknowledging Crawford’s
view that erga omnes obligations are virtually coexistensive with peremptory obligations, which in turn
arises under norms of jus cogens).
57

Alfred Von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571, 572
(1937). See Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law 82(6) COLUMBIA L.
REV. 1110, 1131 (1982) (discussing an interesting episode about the prohibition on slave trade: “as late as
the final edition of Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, published in 1955, the author still found it ‘difficult to say’
whether a customary international law contains a prohibition against the international traffic in slaves . . .
but not long thereafter, the International Law Commission, commenting upon the jus cogens provision of
the new Vienna Convention on Treaties, found not only that customary international law prohibited
international slave trade but that this prohibition was ‘one of the most obvious and best settled rules of jus
cogens’”).
58

Id. at 572. Verdross also illustrated this idea by affirming that international law requires states
not to disturb each other in the use of the high seas and an international treaty between parties tending to
exclude other states from the use of high seas would be against a compulsory principle of general
international law. Id.
59

The quotation of Abi-Saab appears in ANDREAS PAULUS, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony
and Fragmentation - An Attempt at a Re-appraisal, 74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 297, 301 (2005).
60

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter

61

See also VCLT art. 64.

VCLT].
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The related concept of obligation erga omnes was then acknowledged as obiter
dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case.62
1. Barcelona Traction
The case, which concerned mainly a question of diplomatic protection,63 dealt in
dictum with one of the most commented, quoted, and debated passages in public
international law:
[] In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising visà-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the
former are the concern of al1 States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.64
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from
the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of
protection have entered into the body of general international law . . . others are
conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal
character.65

62

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, Judgment I.C.J.
Reports 1970[hereinafter Barcelona Traction], ¶¶ 33-4.
63

Schutter, supra note 43, at 31-32 (summarizing the case. The claim arose out of the adjudication
in bankruptcy by a Spanish Court of the Barcelona Traction, a company incorporated in Canada, but owned
mostly by Belgians. Belgium had initially instituted proceedings before the ICJ in 1958, by which it sought
reparation for the damaged suffered by Barcelona Traction as a result of acts allegedly committed by
organs of Spain in violation of international law. Three years later, Belgium announced the discontinuance
of the proceedings in order for the parties to settle the dispute out of the ICJ. The ICJ removed the case
from its list in 1961. After settlement failures, the case was then reinstated by Belgium (the “second phase”
judgment) with modifications. Belgium sought reparations for damages suffered by Belgian nationals who
were allegedly the owners of a substantial number of shares of the company. Spain filed four preliminary
objections. By a judgment delivered in 1970, at the end of the second phase, the ICJ upheld one of the
preliminary objections of Spain, namely that Belgium did not have legal standing to bring the action,
without pronouncing on any other aspect of the case).
64

Barcelona Traction, supra note 62, ¶ 33 (emphasis added).

65

Id. at ¶ 34 (emphasis added).
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Contemporarily, Ragazzi explored in great depth the concept of erga omnes in the
ICJ jurisprudence. I will refer to his work as a point of departure.66 As Ragazzi
elaborates, the dictum in Barcelona Traction identified two characteristics of these
obligations: (1) “universality,” in the sense that these obligations are binding on all states
without exceptions, and (2) “solidarity,” in the sense that every state is deemed to have a
legal interest in their protection.67 The point of my interest is about the consequences
following from the second characteristic (solidarity). 68
In the case of a violation of a jus cogens norm, does the legal interest of every
state in the protection of jus cogens norms translates into states’ right (or obligations) to
unilaterally prescribe law with extraterritorial reach? If yes, what sorts of rights or
obligations? Do they include a right or a duty specifically concerning restrictive trade
measures?
And as to those questions, as Simma recognizes, “viewed realistically, the world
of obligations erga omnes is still in the world of “ought” rather than of “is.”69 Brownlie’s
equally well-known comments in 1988 assessed that the regime of obligations and

66

MAURICIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (1997).

67

Id. at 17.

68

Though universality may also raise theoretical problems, since it appears difficult to reconcile
this element with the structure of a horizontal international society where law making is consensual. Id.
69

Bruno Simma, Does the UN Charter Provide an Adequate Legal Basis for Individual or
Collective Responses to Violations of Obligations Erga Omnes?, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT 125 (Delbrück ed., 1993).
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corollaries of erga omnes as “very mysterious indeed”70 and, fifteen years later, reassessed it as a concept “being explored.”71 As Andreas Paulus concludes,
the sweeping effects of jus cogens are still not matched by the clarity of its
contents. Its impact on concrete cases has remained limited. Its main function
appears to provide superior values to an inter-State system, to demonstrate that
States are not entitled to abuse their law-making power to justify the violation of
the most basic international norms, and to re-orient international law from purely
State towards community interests. But without a procedure for ascertaining its
content and applying it to concrete cases, jus cogens will continue to be more of a
mission statement than a practicable legal instrument.72

An example may help to illustrate the above points. There is wide support today
for the proposition that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Genocide Convention
are rights and obligations erga omnes.73 The immediate, and uncontroversial,
consequence that follows is that it binds all subjects of international law without any need
for the states to adhere to conventions. This is the “universal” character of the prohibition
of genocide flowing from its jus cogens nature. It also follows from the jus cogens nature
that states cannot “contract” a treaty with “genocide obligations.” But the jurisdiction to
punish and the obligations to enforce seemed to be different questions, even in respect to
genocide. As Ragazzi reminded, the obligations that follow from that prohibition, such as
prevention and jurisdiction to punish, were very problematic to spell out.74
70

Ian Brownlie, To What Extent Are the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still
Viable?, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING 66 (Weiler & Cassese eds. 1988).
71

Brownlie, supra note 21, at 490.

72

Paulus, supra note 59, at 330.

73

Ragazzi, supra note 66, at 94 (recalling that during the codification of the law of treaties, the
prohibition of genocide was in fact the most often cited examples of peremptory rule in the field of
international human rights).
74

Ragazzi, supra note 66, at 95-6. That is to say, the question whether all states, irrespective of
any links with the territory in which the offence occurred, may punish an individual responsible for
(extraterritorial) acts of genocide. Ragazzi acknowledges that while there was no universal jurisdiction to
punish under the Convention, certain judgments delivered by courts of different states provide support for
the proposition that universal jurisdiction to punish genocide is widely accepted as a principle of customary
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The discussion is similar in the criminal field. The jus cogens nature of the
prohibition of genocide did not necessarily translate into states’ rights or obligations to
punish. Though this conclusion may sound (morally) absurd, it reveals the state of the
law until recently. And I say until recently because new developments concerning
jurisdiction to punish came later with the establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and its universal jurisdiction to punish genocide.
But generally speaking, it is not clear what other types of rights and obligations
states have, such as prescribing restrictive trade measures, because jus cogens norms are
being violated abroad.
2. The Draft Article on State Responsibility of the ILC
Has the ILC Draft Article on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful
Acts (DASR), provided anything differently when erga omnes violations occur? 75 As an
outcome of the ILC work, the DASR reflects the “codification” or the “progressive
development” of international law.

law. He quoted the Restatement Third as the supportive reference. Id. n.16 at 95. See also Judge Oda’s
declaration in the Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serb. & Mont.)), Preliminary Objections,
I.C.J. Reports 1996 [hereinafter Genocide Case], well illustrating this distinction: “an absolutely binding
norm prohibiting genocide, it binds all subjects of international law even without any conventional
obligation. To that effect, and only to that effect, the concrete norm is of universal applicability (a norm
erga omnes) . . . The position is different, however, when it comes to the implementation or enforcement of
the norm of genocide prohibition.” Id. at 97.
75

See Draft Articles on States Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Adopted by the International Law Commission at its 53rd Session (2001) [hereinafter DASR]. Since 1949,
at its first session, the ILC selected state responsibility as one of the topics for codification without,
however, including it in the list of topics to which it gave priority. At its twenty-first session, in 1969, the
ILC examined the first report of the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago. It took 32 two years for the work to
be adopted by the Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the UN General
Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of that session. For all the relevant
documentation, see http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/9_6.htm.
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Under the DASR, a state “A” is entitled, as an “injured state,” to invoke the
responsibility of another state in two situations.76 The first one is when the obligation
breached is owed to state “A” individually.77 The second situation is when the obligation
breached is owed to a group of states, including state “A,” or the international community
as a whole.78 Moreover, the DASR deals specifically with serious breaches of obligations
under peremptory norms of general international law79 and has a full chapter on
countermeasures.80
As such, these provisions are a perfect match for the measures of this dissertation:
restrictive trade measures (countermeasures) based on extraterritorial human rights
violations (serious breach of an obligation under peremptory norms of international law).
The question, similarly to what I asked in the previous sections, would be: does the
DASR entitle states to unilaterally adopt extraterritorial measures of any sort?
Probably not. As Christian Tams thoroughly analyzes, the DASR deliberately
leaves open the question of countermeasures, or self-help, in response to erga omnes
violations.81 A previous version of one of the DASR articles, for instance, had expressly
recognized a right of all states to take countermeasures in response to serious breaches of

76

DASR art. 49-54.

77

DASR art. 42(a).

78

DASR art. 42, caput, (b). In this case, the breach of the obligation must either specially affect
state “A” or “is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the
obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation.” DASR art. 42(b)(i)-(ii).
79

DASR Part Two, Chapter III (arts. 40-41).

80

DASR Part Three, Chapter II (arts. 49-54).

81

CHRISTIAN TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241 (2005).
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obligations erga omnes.82 Along the sessions of the ILC, however, disagreement on such
a right was noted by the General Rapporteur and the final clause on this matter (article
54) was changed. After analyzing the content of more than fifteen government’s
communications, Tams says, nonetheless, that the disagreements were overstated.83 In
fact, Tams concludes that though article 54 was undoubtedly controversial, it was by no
means generally rejected. He acknowledges that the final modification of the DASR text
was caused rather by the need for a quick finalization, then by a demand of the majority
of the states. However, the commentaries of the ILC asserts that
[a]s this review demonstrates, the current state of international law on
countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest is uncertain. State
practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States. At present, there
appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States referred to in article 48
to take countermeasures in the collective interest. Consequently, it is not
appropriate to include in the present articles a provision concerning the question
whether other States, identified in article 48, are permitted to take
countermeasures in order to induce a responsible State to comply with its
obligations. Instead, chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the
position and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of
international law.84

As to these further developments, the DASR was included in the provisional
agenda of the UN-GA for 2010.85 But as it is now, as pointed above, the DASR is, at
best, another example in which extraterritorial legal powers is not clearly established.
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DASR art. 54: “[This is the current version] This chapter does not prejudice the right of any
State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful
measures against that State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured
State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.”).
83

Tams, supra note 81, at 242-43.

84

Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries
in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, at 139 ¶¶ 6-7 [hereinafter ILC
Commentaries on DASR] (emphasis added).
85

See Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the report of the Sixth Committee,
A/RES/62/61 (Jan. 8, 2008), ¶ 4 (deciding to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-fifth Session
[2010] the item entitled “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts” and to further examine,
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If CIL and the DASR (even in the case of jus cogens) seem not to be robust
enough to establish extraterritorial allocations, are there any situations in which
extraterritoriality is allowed? The answer in general international law comes from the
system of collective security of the UN, a classic topic of public international law.86
C. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII
Pursuant to article 39 of the UN Charter, the UN-SC has the power to order
enforcement action against a state whose conduct represents a threat to peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression. Article 39 is read together with articles 41 and 42, which
respectively refer to economic measures and military action.
Article 41 is of interest here since it clearly establishes that “the UN-SC may
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions . . . such measures . . . may include complete or partial interruption

within the framework of a working group of the Sixth Committee, the question of a convention on
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts or other appropriate action on the basis of the
articles).
86

As known, article 2.4 of the UN Charter establishes the prohibition on the use of force: “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.” But there are cases of self-defense: UN Charter, art. 51: “Nothing in the present Charter
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security [. . .].” Moreover, the UN-SC has powers to adopt binding decisions, under
the so-called Chapter VII (articles 39-51). It is fairly settled that the UN-GA’ power is at the level of
recommendations, since articles 10 and 14 of the UN Charter refer to UN-GA as “recommendations.”
Similarly, Chapter VI states that the UN-SC may “recommend” appropriate to remedy a situation that does
not yet threaten international peace but which is likely to endanger or disturb international peace. Dugart
suggest that Chapter VI is the “bark,” while Chapter VII is the “bite.” See JOHN DUGARD, SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE IN SANCTIONS AGAINST APARTHEID 113,
113-116 (Mark Orkin ed. 1989). See also ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 39-40 (2004).
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of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”87
As Higgins describes,
[w]hile there remains a general reluctance to impose the measures envisaged
under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, the rate of use of economic measures has
undoubtedly increased since the end of the Cold War. 1945 to 1990 saw just the
arms embargo against South Africa of 1977, and the comprehensive economic
and diplomatic sanctions mounted against Rhodesia from 1966-1979. Recently
we have seen wide-ranging sanctions against Iraq from 1990; an arms prohibition
on the totality of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, an arms embargo against
Somalia from 1992, broad economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
from 1992, an arms embargo against Liberia in 1993, selectively tailored
sanctions against Libya from 1992, economic measures directed against Haiti in
1993, and the UNITA held areas of Angola in the same year.88

Thus, the UN-SC can resort to mandatory sanctions as an enforcement tool to
restore peace.89 The understanding today is that the UN members will have not only the
right, but the duty to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in pursuance of the mandatory
economic embargo. This is not only a right, but an obligation, and these resolutions may
have trade implications, such as trade bans and arms embargoes.
Surely, there are a myriad of issues related to the exercise of the Chapter VII
power (the permanent members’ veto power being the most notorious). But what interests
me here is that these measures can encompass trade measures in response to
extraterritorial human rights violations. History has plenty of examples, and the regime of
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UN Charter, art. 41. See also art. 42: “Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members
of the United Nations.”
88

Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and Security: Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 445, 455
(1995)(emphasis added).
89

Decisions adopted under articles 41 and 42 are legally binding.
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sanctions towards the Apartheid system in South Africa is a much acknowledged one.90
Another important case, bearing close relation with the WTO regime and human rights, is
the trade ban imposed on the so-called “conflict diamonds” or “blood diamonds.”91
In sum, Chapter VII provides perhaps one of the few examples through which
international law provides clear rights to state exercise of extraterritorial authority by
means of economic restrictive measures directed to situations occurring abroad.
D. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Another potential type of extraterritorial authority in general international law
comes from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. This case is somewhat different
from the UN-SC powers discussed above, because the situation concerns the use of
unilateral force for humanitarian purposes, not the use of economic tools, such as
restrictive trade measures as coercive tools. But as extraterritoriality is an important
element of this doctrine, I shall analyze the doctrine.
It seems sufficient to acknowledge landmark discussions about the state of the law
concerning the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia that occurred in March 1999. The legality
of that action has been vastly debated.92 In one hand, Brownlie asserts that the position in
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See Dugard, supra note 86, at 113 (explaining that whether South Africa has violated
international law and the Charter of the UN by applying the policy of Apartheid is no longer a subject of
dispute. Remembering that the international community, acting through the United Nations, has repeatedly
rejected the argument of the South African government that its racial policies were a matter of exclusive
domestic concern).
91

See infra Chapter 3.VII.B on blood diamonds.

92

As Brownlie contextualizes, two models have appeared in the history: by the end of the
nineteenth century, through a vague doctrine, the majority of publicists admitted a right of humanitarian
intervention. A state which had abused its sovereignty by brutal and excessively treatment of those within
his power was regarded as having made itself liable to action. That doctrine was a cover for imperialism.
The second model emerges with the League of the Nations and has a recent landmark with the NATO
bombing in Yugoslavia commencing on March 1999. See Brownlie, supra note 21, at 710. See also UN
Charter art. 53(1)(“The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or
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1999 was that there was little or no authority and little or no state practice to support the
right of individual states to use force on humanitarian grounds in international law.93 In
sum, reliance on right of individual intervention is placed upon a number of ambiguous
episodes presaging a change in CIL which either ignore the conditions for the formation
of new principles of CIL or propose that the element opinion juris be relaxed.94
As Cassese summarizes
[a]dmittedly, strategic, geopolitical or ideological motivations may have also
contributed to prompting NATO to threaten and then take military action against
the FRY. From the angle of law, what primarily counts, however, are the logical
grounds adduced by NATO countries to justify their resort to force. Their main
justification has been that the authorities of FRY had carried out massacres and
other gross breaches of human rights as well as mass expulsions of thousands of
their citizens belonging to a particular ethnic group, and that this humanitarian
catastrophe would most likely destabilize neighboring countries . . . any person
of common sense is justified in asking . . . faced with such an enormous humantragedy and given the inaction of the UN-Security Council . . . should one sit idly
and watch[?]. . . my answer is that from an ethical viewpoint resort to armed
forces was justified. Nevertheless, as a legal scholar I cannot avoid in the same
breath that this moral action is contrary to current international law.95

agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under
regional arrangements [such as NATO] or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security
Council [. . .]). It is worthy reminding that the on April 29, 1999, the former Republic of Yugoslavia - FRY
(Serbia and Montenegro) instituted proceedings against NATO members, because of the bombardment of
its territory, in connection with the Kosovo crisis prevailing at the time. The FRY filed actually ten separate
applications against NATO members and the ICJ delivered eight separate, but virtually identical judgments.
These cases are known as the Legality of Use of Force cases. See Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Mont.
v. Belg.), Preliminary Objections, 2004 ICJ REP. 279 (Dec. 2005). See Yehuda Z. Blum, Was Yugoslavia
Member of the United Nations in the Years 1992-2000? 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 800, 805-06 (2007)
(summarizing the cases and indicating that, because Serbia and Montenegro was not a member of the UN,
the Court unanimously found that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of Yugoslavia).
93

Moreover, Brownlie asserts that the Ministerial Declaration produced by the meeting of Foreign
Ministers of the Group of 77 held three months later after the NATO is frequently disregarded. The key
passage of the Declaration is that the Minister “rejected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention,
which has no basis in the UN Charter or international law. The quotation is the paragraph 69 of the
Declaration. See Brownlie, supra note 21, at 712.
94

Id. at 712. See also Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) (affirming that “only a thin red line separate NATO’s action in Kosovo from
international illegality”).
95

Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community? 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25 (1999). The
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Though as said, humanitarian intervention has probably less to deal with
restrictive trade measures, the case shows again that extraterritoriality concerns are hardly
the case or the general rule, even in problems of humanitarian intervention. Finally, a
related topic to humanitarian intervention should be noted: the doctrine of responsibility
to protect.96
1. Responsibility to Protect
The “responsibility to protect” doctrine appeared in connection with a broader
reform proposal for the UN that was grounded in the idea of a “larger freedom.”97 The

Latin expression can be translated as “rights cannot grow out of injustice” or “illegal acts cannot produce
legal results or rights.” See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: the
Continuing Importance of State Autonomy in Politics, Values and Functions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW THE
21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR LOUIS HENKIN 443 (Charney et al. eds., 1997). See contra
Jonathan I. Charney, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 834 (1999).
96

Another related point is about the duty of act arising from natural catastrophes. It does not,
however, require much analysis. Whether the duty exists or not, the main discussion of this dissertation
refers to situations where a state applies restrictive trade measures because of violation of human rights
occurring in another country. In the natural catastrophe hypothesis, violation is occurring, by definition,
because of natural events. It is unlikely that individual states would address the problem by means of
restrictive trade measures. Yet, it should be noted that an interesting question may arise: assuming that the
obligation exist (a duty to act in natural catastrophes), what happens if a state denies the acceptance of
international aid, alleging the non-intervention principle? Could the states willing to act apply trade
restrictions to force the affected states to accept international aid? I pose this question from a purely
theoretical perspective and I could not find literature addressing the issue (perhaps because the situation is
very peculiar and implausible).
97

As Feinstein and Slaughter contextualize: “In the wake of Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and
Kosovo, a halting process of revising old rules [of collective security] to meet today's threats has begun. In
the fall of 2002, Secretary-General Kofi Annan repeated a challenge he first made to UN members in 1999,
urging the Security Council to discuss ‘the best way to respond to threats of genocide or other comparable
massive violations of human rights.’ Although the Security Council has yet to heed Annan's call, the
Canadian government did, appointing former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and Annan's
Special Adviser Mohamed Sahnoun to head a distinguished global commission of diplomats, politicians,
scholars, and nongovernmental activists. In December 2001, the commission issued a report, titled ‘The
Responsibility to Protect,’ that took on nothing less than the redefinition of sovereignty itself. The EvansSahnoun Commission argued that the controversy over using force for humanitarian purposes stemmed
from a ‘critical gap’ between the unavoidable reality of mass human suffering and the existing rules and
mechanisms for managing world order. To fill this gap, the commission identified an emerging
international obligation -- the ‘responsibility to protect’ -- which requires states to intervene in the affairs of
other states to avert or stop humanitarian crises.” See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to
Prevent, FOR. AFFAIRS (Jan/Feb 2004). Drawing from this assessment, the authors then propose a corollary
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concept was later incorporated in a General Assembly (UN-GA) resolution as the
outcome of the 2005 UN World Summit.98
Responsibility to protect is perhaps a statement touching the same question of
rights and obligations of potential unilateral intervention grounded on humanitarian
causes. The 2005 UN World Summit report posits that
[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate,
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United
Nations in establishing an early warning capability.99

The statement clearly identifies the responsibility of states to protect its own
population. It also appears to try to shift some responsibility to the international
community. However, it does not seem to establish any individual duty (or right) of states
to act unilaterally (putting aside the legal nature of the resolution as a source of
international law itself). In fact, the paragraph following the above quotation posits that
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect

principle in the field of global security: a collective “duty to prevent” nations run by rulers without internal
checks on their power from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Id. See also Report of the
Secretary-General: In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, UN Doc.
A/RES/60/l (2005), ¶¶ 25-152 [hereinafter UN SG Larger Freedom Report] (discussing three freedoms:
freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity; discussing the challenges of the
international community in the light of the concepts of development, the Millennium Development Goals,
environmental sustainability, terrorism, human rights, and weapons of mass destruction, among others. The
former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, is credited as mainstreaming the concept under the UN).
98

GA Res 60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/l (2005), ¶¶ 138-40 [hereinafter UNGA Resolution on the 2005 World Summit].
99

UN-GA Resolution on the 2005 World Summit (2005), at ¶ 138.
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populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.100

As one commentator summarizes, “in essence, all the eggs of responsibility to
protect have been thrown [again] into the Security basket, a basket that has proven to be
full of holes in the past . . . [and] the articulation of a candidate norm [such as the
responsibility to protect] is but an incomplete success.”101
E. THE BROADER PICTURE IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
The following table summarizes the above analysis. The only situation in which is
clearly established that states have a right (and a duty) to impose restrictive trade
measures (addressing human rights and other concerns) are those in accordance with
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Aside from this case, I suggest that CIL (the Lotus case
and the DASR) do not clearly establish such right. Similarly, the paradigms of
humanitarian intervention and responsibility are not robust enough to justify
extraterritorial authority.
Source

Authority

CIL (Lotus Case, Restatement)

Weak

CIL (DASR)

Weak

Chapter VII Resolutions

Strong

Humanitarian Intervention

Weak

Responsibility to Protect

Weak

Table 1 – Legal Analysis under General international law

III. THE WTO REGIME
Let me now continue with the inquiry about the lawfulness of the examined trade
measures in light of the WTO regime. This part divides the investigation in terms of the
100

Id. at ¶ 139.

101

Juita Brunnée & Stephen Toope, Norms, Institutions and UN Reform: The Responsibility to
Protect, 2(1) J. INT’L L. & INT’L RELATIONS 121, 136-37 (2006).
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“human rights” and the “extraterritorial element.” I will demonstrate that both concepts human rights and extraterritoriality - are not directly found in this regime, except for very
few exceptions.
Among the WTO covered agreements,102 much of the literature has focused on the
general (Art. XX of the GATT) and the security exceptions (Art. XXI of the GATT) as
the bases of analysis. The relevant part of the general exceptions reads:
[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
[. . .]
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
[. . .]
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;

As public morals, protection of life, and prison labor are expressly protected in
article XX, these exceptions have been pointed out as possible avenue for linkages with
human rights.

102

The WTO covered agreements:
The WTO Agreement – Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO
Annex 1A –Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994)(read together with GATT 1947)
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
[. . .]
Annex 1B - General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS);
Annex 1C - Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS);
Annex 2 - Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU);
Annex 3 - Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM);
Annex 4 - Plurilateral Trade Agreements.
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The security exceptions of Article XXI of the GATT, in turn, allow members to
justify trade restrictive measures in terms of security interests. The relevant parts of the
clause provide that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
...
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials . . .
(ii) relating to the traffic of arms . . .
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international
peace and security.103

The clause has two provisions relevant to our discussion: first, article XXI(b)(iii),
dealing with a security exception, and second, article XXI(c), referring to the UN
Charter. Similarly to the general exceptions, article XXI has been pointed out as a
possible linkage for human rights concerns.
A. “HUMAN RIGHTS” IN THE NORMATIVE FLOOR
This could be, in fact, a very short section: the WTO covered agreements and
jurisprudence do not contain any express references to “human rights.” That is to say, the
WTO normative floor does not use human rights language in any of the covered
agreements. Likewise, the WTO adjudicative bodies have not expressed any of their
decisions in terms of human rights language.
The question then shifts to the level of interpretation: what kind of trade measures
addressing human rights concerns could be supported or inferred by the covered
agreements. I am not looking for the “extraterritoriality” element, but only to the “human

103

GATT art. XXI (emphasis added).
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rights” element in the WTO. A possible route of analysis is to review the efforts that
academics and human rights bodies have taken in suggesting interpretations of WTO law
in light of human rights law.
1. Human Rights as a Public Moral
Charnovitz published a detailed study of trade policy concerning the moral
exception (article XX(a) of the GATT).104 The author scrutinized the legislative history
of the article, concluding that, overall, the negotiating history from 1945-1948 does not
provide a clear answer to “what” and “whose” morality is covered by the provision.105
A case addressing “public morals” (and the unique case so far in the WTO), was
later adjudicated in 2004 involving cross border supply of gambling services (a matter
covered by the GATS) between Antigua and Barbuda and the United States.106 Article
XIV (a) of GATS, similarly to article XX(a) of GATT, allows restrictive trade measures
to be justified if they were “necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public
order.”107 The Appellate Body (AB) upheld the panel findings that the “the term ‘public
morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a

104

See in general, Charnovitz, supra note 33.

105

The negotiation history of GATT investigated by Charnovitz comprises the negotiations of the
U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment. Id. at 703. He also goes in depth on the prior treaties with
moral exceptions, although, as he recognizes “this pre-1946 history is not part of the official preparatory
work for the GATT, [but] provides context for understanding the rationale for article XX(a).” Id. at 717.
106

Antigua and Barbuda challenged United States legislation that limited the cross-border supply
of gambling and betting services as violations of GATS provisions. In its defense, the United States
evoked, inter alia, article XIV(a) of GATS (the analogous “moral” provision of article XX of GATT).
While article XX(a) of GATT reads “necessary to protect public morals.”
107

GATS art. XIV(a)(emphasis added).
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community or nation.”108 Moreover, public order “may be invoked only where a genuine
and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of society.”109
An argument can be made that, as human rights are standards of right and wrong
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or fundamental interests of society,
the human rights concept can be accommodated (by interpretation) in such exception.110
Though, such interpretation has never materialized in a actual case, it is submitted here
that this is a (weak) possibility, and that “human rights” can be interpreted as falling
within this exception.
2. Human Rights and Protection of Human Life and Health
Article XX(b) provides the exception for the protection of, among others, human
life and health. This is another exception that has been frequently pointed out as fitting
human rights language.
For instance, Caroline Dommen argues that in the case of the health programme
of Brazil challenged under the TRIPS agreement by the United States in the later 1990s,

108

Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted April 20, 2005[hereinafter US-Gambling], at
¶¶ 298-99.
109

See GATS article XIV(a), n.5. It seems that the AB deferred to members to determine what
falls within the scope of “public morals” and/or “public order,” though the AB did not differentiate between
the two terms.
110

See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights, 3 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (1999) (presenting an earlier version of his writings for the inclusion of
international labor standards in WTO through public morals exception). See also Jeremy C. Marwell, Trade
And Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception after Gambling, 81 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY REV. 802,
815 (2006) (pointing out that difficulty of defining “public morals” is evident from both policy and textual
perspectives. Amongst the WTO membership, “public morals” could mean anything from religious views
on drinking alcohol or eating certain foods to cultural attitudes toward pornography, free expression,
human rights, labor norms, women’s rights, or general cultural judgments about education or social
welfare. Concluding that given that this is highly subjective, geographically localized, and diverse across
political boundaries, states should be able, pursuant to certain evidentiary requirements, to define public
morals based solely on their internal circumstances.)
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Brazil could have invoked a provision similar to article XX(b) in the TRIPS agreement111
for the protection of life.112 Howse concurs with this possibility, since the idea of human
security, embodied by the WTO normative floor, is acknowledged by the AB: WTO law
must be interpreted and applied in light of the notion that the “preservation of human life
and health” is a value that “is vital and important in the highest degree.”113
As the ability of those provisions to support human rights action has never been
tested, it is submitted here that, in theory, human rights can be subsumed through this
exception, though yet as a “weak” possibility.
3. Human Rights and Prison Labor
The prison labor exception has never been tested in the trade system in any
context. The preparatory work indicates that the main concern of the drafters of the
GATT was potential unfair competition coming from prisoners’ work (as prison labor
products can be exported at very low prices).
Some commentators indicate that the function of this exception is to permit
“ban[ning] the importation of goods that have been produced by prisoners.”114 Others

111

TRIPS, art. 27(2): “members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality,
including to protect human, animal or plant life or health [].”(emphasis added).
112

See Caroline Dommen, Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Treasure Chest
of Support for Developing Countries ‘Concerns in the WTO’, in 5 Bridges Between Trade and Sustainable
Development Monthly (January-April 2001)(discussing how the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights could serve as a “treasure chest” of support for developing countries concerns).
See also Caroline Dommen, Raising Human Rights Concerns in the WTO – Actors, Processes and Possible
Strategies, 24(1) HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (2002).
113

Robert Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, Beyond the Divide: the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the World Trade Organization in 30 Dialogues on Globalization 10 (2007) (referring to
the EC - Asbestos case judged by the AB).
114

PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:
TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 615 (2005).
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recall the potential use of this exception to accommodate human rights concerns,
especially if the prison labor exception is expanded to encompass forced labor or modern
forms of slavery. Again, I will assume that this interpretation is possible, though the
preparatory work of the text indicates a different purpose of the clause. Therefore, this is
another case of a “weak” interpretation.
4. Human Rights as a Security Exception
One last exception that has been raised as suitable for human rights interpretation
is the security exception of Article XXI. Recall that the exception contains two subparagraphs relevant to our discussion: first, article XXI(b)(iii) dealing with “any action
which [a member] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;”115 and art. XXI(c),
referring to measures taken in pursuance of the obligation taken under the UN Charter.
As to article XXI(b)(iii), in theory, the only requisite of the clause is the
existence of a connection between the measure, a security interest, and the existence of an
emergency in international relations.116 In this sense, a member can justify a restrictive

115

Emphasis added.

116

The discretion of the members in relation to article XXI(b)(iii) is well described in the GATT
SECRETARIAT, GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 557-60 (6th ed. 1995)(In
sum, in 1949, the US imposed export control over Czechoslovakian products. Czechoslovakia requested
information under Article XIII: 3 on the export licensing system. The US replied that under “[a]rticle XXI .
. . a contracting party shall not be required to give information it considers contrary to its essential security
interests.” In 1961, Ghana imposed a boycott on Portuguese goods and justified it under Article XXI(b)(iii).
The Ghana communication highlighted the discretion of each Contracting Party as the “sole judge” of what
is necessary in its essential security interests and “that a country’s security interests might be threatened by
a potential as well as an actual danger.” In 1962, the US imposed an embargo on trade with Cuba. The
Cuban government notified the Contracting Parties about the US measure in the inventory of non-tariff
measure. The US invoked article XXI as justification for its action. In 1970, the Arab League boycott
against Israel and the accession of the United Arab Republic to the GATT was at stake (the UAR was
formerly the union of Egypt and Syria). The UAR reminded the working party on accession about “the
extraordinary circumstances to which the Middle East area had been exposed” and the “state of the war …
of a major political issue,” concluding on the unreasonableness of asking the UAR to “do business with a
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trade measure based on a security exception (and the human rights element can come “in
the package”). In practice, two episodes with the above pattern appeared in the WTO
system but - perhaps because of the political factors involved - were never adjudicated:
Helms-Burton117 and Massachusetts-Burma.118

firm . . . [of] an enemy country.” In November 1975, evoking the need to maintain a minimum domestic
production capacity in vital industries, the Swedish government introduced a global import quota for
certain footwear. Sweden mentioned the decrease in domestic production as a critical threat to emergency
defense situations as an integral part of the country’s security policy. Followed by discussion at the GATT
council and delegations, the quota system was terminated in July 1977. In April 1982, the European
Community, Canada and Australia suspended indefinitely Argentinean exports into their territory. The
banning measure was justified in the light of the situation addressed in the UN-SC Resolution 502,
concerning the Falklands and Malvinas. Argentina alleged violation of various provision of GATT and
sought the interpretation of legal aspects of Article XXI. As a result, later in November 1982, paragraph
7(iii) was included in the Ministerial Declaration providing that “. . . the Contracting Parties undertake,
individually and jointly: . . . to abstain from taking restrictive trade measures, for reasons of a noneconomic character, not consistent with the [GATT].” Another significant episode involving article XXI
made its way on May 7, 1985, when the United States notified the Contracting Parties of an US Executive
Order prohibiting all imports of goods and services of Nicaragua origin. Similarly to the Argentinean case,
Nicaragua alleged that the US violated GATT provisions and that “this was not a matter of national security
but one of coercion.” Nicaragua argued that the measure could not be applied in an arbitrary fashion: “there
had to be some correspondence between the measures adopted and the situation giving rise to such
adoption.” Although a panel was established to hear the case, the term of the reference of the panel
expressly prohibit it to rule on the legality of the US invocation of article XXI. The panel report was never
adopted and the embargo on Nicaragua was lifted in 1990.
117

The Helms-Burton Act was passed in the United States in 1996, after Cuba shot down two
planes flown by anti-Castro members domiciled in the United States. See Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996)[hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]. The HelmsBurton Act restricted access to the United States markets by imposing the prohibition of the allocation of
any of the sugar quota to a country that is a net importer of sugar unless that country certifies that it does
not import Cuban sugar that could indirectly find its way to the United States; and the denial of transit by
vessels of states through ports in the US that carry goods or passengers to or from Cuba. The Act
acknowledges the “continuing violations of fundamental human rights” as a factor that served to isolate the
Cuban regime as the only completely nondemocratic government in the Western Hemisphere. See HelmsBurton Act at §6021(4). The Act recognizes that situations in which systematic violations of human rights
occur may constitute a ‘‘threat to peace,’’ justifying international action under Article 39 of the UN
Charter. The act cites the cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, as ones in
which sanctions were imposed as a response to violations of human rights. Id. at §6021(24). The European
Community claimed to have its trade benefits infringed by Helms-Burton. A panel was established in that
year by the request of the European Community against the United States and, following diplomatic
negotiations, the European Community requested the panel to suspend the proceedings. See WT/DS38/5
(April, 25 1997).
118

In June 1996, the State of Massachusetts adopted a law restricting the procurement by public
authorities of that state of goods or service from a person, whether a United States citizen or a foreign
national, doing business with Myanmar (formerly Burma). See An Act Regulating State Contracts with
Companies Doing Business with or in Burma (Myanmar), Annotated Laws of Massachussets ch. 7 § 22G22M (Lexis 1998)[hereinafter The Massachusetts-Burma Act]. The Massachusetts-Burma Act itself did not

47

As Jackson and Lowenfeld analyze (in relation to Helms-Burton),
[to give] a broad interpretation [of the security exception] could undermine the
whole WTO treaty and impair the security and stability of the world trading
system for which the WTO has been created. . . on the other hand, national
security is obviously extremely important to all nations, and for an international
organization to disregard the importance of this subject and to easily override
national concerns and policy conclusions relating to it, could lead powerful
trading nations to ignore or disregard the rules of such organization.119

In sum, members have a great deal of discretion to justify many extraterritorial
measures in terms of security. The literature has acknowledged this possibility in order to
accommodate human rights.120
Article XXI(c), however, does not seem to add much. Article 103 of the UN
Charter establishes that, in case of conflict of obligations, obligations under the UN
Charter shall prevail over obligations in any other agreement. Arguably, Article XXI(c)

employ human rights language as the basis for it, except for some indications on its legislative history.
Because “doing business with Myanmar” was broadly defined in that act. On September 9, 1998, The
European Community requested the establishment of a WTO panel, arguing that the Massachusetts-Burma
Act nullified or impaired the benefits accruing to the European Community On the same day and in a
combined action, Japan, which joined for consultation with the United States and the European
Community, requested the establishment of a panel. See United States - Measure Affecting Government
Procurement: Request for Establishment of a Panel by Japan, WTO, WT/DS95/3 (Sep. 9, 1998). In
accordance with a request from both plaintiffs, a single panel was established. The panel, though,
suspended its work in February of the following year because the United States Supreme Court invalidated
the Act under United States domestic law. On February 10, 1999, the European Community and Japan
asked for the suspension of the case in a Communication to the Chairman of the Panel.
119

John H. Jackson & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Helms-Burton, the US, and the WTO, ASIL Insights
(March 1997), http://www.asil.org/insights/insight7.htm. An example of a too broad interpretation is
expressed with irony by Jackson and Lowenfeld: “[a]fter all, any product can be linked to national security:
Premier Khrushchev, mocking U.S. export controls, once suggested an embargo on buttons, because they
can be used to hold up soldiers' trousers. It has seriously been argued that a shoe industry deserved
protection from imports because an army must have shoes.” Id.
120

Cleveland posits that the article would be a “potentially attractive” one, though she recognizes
that it is a somewhat “awkward basis” for human rights sanctions, as that article primarily concerns a
security exception. See Cleveland, supra note 51, at 133, 186. See Vázquez, supra note 50, at 797. Vázquez
seems to agree with Cleveland that the security exception of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 may be the
best option for general sanctions and the safety valve for the most egregious human rights violations. Id. at
830.
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merely reproduces the type of situation in which the UN acts for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
5. Preliminary Remarks
This section summarizes the above points. Recall that I looked for the “human
rights” element in the WTO normative floor and jurisprudence, but I found no literal
reference to human rights there. Nevertheless, by interpreting WTO law, it is, in theory,
possible to pursue human-rights interpretations of the WTO provisions. But even human
rights bodies, such as the OHCHR, acknowledge this possibility with some reluctance.
The OHCHR says that, in relation to some of article XX exceptions,
[b]ecause the definition of “public morals”, “public order” and “human life or
health” is so broad, because they have yet to be defined precisely in WTO case
law, and because human rights arguments have never been raised so that their
scope can be clarified in this regard, there is no direct and conclusive evidence
for human rights usage of these terms. There are, however, a number of strong
arguments to be made in favour of the conclusion that member States’
international human rights obligations towards their own populations could fall
within the compass of the “public morals”, “public order” and “human life or
health” exceptions.121

As to Article XXI, provided that the human right element is within a security
issue, there is also a possibility of using the exception to justify that action. All of those
options, however, seem to represent weak choices. In sum:

121

OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD TRADE
AGREEMENTS: USING GENERAL EXCEPTION CLAUSES TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (2005)[hereinafter
OHCHR Report on Human Rights and Trade], at 8.
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Provision

Human Rights “Element”
122

Public Morals and Public Order

Possible (weak)

Protection of Human Life or Health123

Possible (weak)

Prison Labor124

Possible (weak)

Security Exception125

Possible (weak)

Table 2 –Human Rights in the WTO Normative Floor

B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE NORMATIVE FLOOR
I now move to an investigation of extraterritoriality in the WTO normative floor.
Similar to the human rights element that I investigated before, there is no literal
expression of such concept in the WTO covered agreements. However, some clauses can
be interpreted as comprising extraterritorial authority, such as the prison labor (article
XX(e)) and the security exception (article XXI). In addition, the doctrine and
jurisprudence also has tackled a possible interpretation of this element in other clauses.
1. Prison Labor and Article XXI
Extraterritoriality can be logically inferred from the prison labor exception. As
Charnovitz puts it, article XX(e) of GATT would seem to be “‘outwardly-directed’ in that
it would allow governments to condition the entry of imports on the production method
used in another country.”126
Arguably, extraterritoriality can be also inferred from article XXI. This is because
measures taken for the protection of essential security interests can be taken due to “other
emergency of international relations” or “in pursuance of its obligations under the United
122

GATT art. XX(a), GATS art. XIV(a) and TRIPS art. 27.2.

123

GATT art. XX(b), GATS art. XIV(b), and TRIPS art. 27.2.

124

GATT art. XX(e).

125

GATT art. XXI.

126

In dicta, the panel in US-Tuna II seems to have recognized the nature of that clause, by saying
that “[article XX(e) is an example of an exception] with respect to things located, or actions occurring,
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.” See US-Tuna II at ¶5.16 (emphasis
added), See infra Section III.B.4 on the case.
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Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.” By definition,
these are situations occurring outside the jurisdiction of the member taking the measure.
Therefore, I submit that extraterritoriality element is found in both article XX(e) and
XXI, as logical inferences of those clauses.
2. Public Morals
As to whether article XX(a) could encompass extrajurisdictional (outwardlydirected) measures, Charnovitz notes that a more likely scenario is that “a panel would . .
. find that article XX(a) will not validate an import ban to force higher morality onto the
exporting country.”127 The OHCHR also deemed this exception as very unlikely to cover
extraterritorial measures.128 It is submitted that the public morals exception does not
allow the exercise of extraterritorial authority.
3. Protection of Life (and animal life - Tuna and Shrimp)
As Howse and Regan indicate, even individuals not acquainted with the trading
system are likely to have heard about the Tuna-Dolphin and the Shrimp-Turtle cases.129
In a nutshell, these cases were adjudicated in the GATT and the WTO dispute settlement
system and concerned United States measures (environmental legislation) that restricted
the imports of tuna and shrimp coming from a variety of states.130 One of the main things
that these cases provoked was a controversial debate about extraterritoriality.
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Charnovitz, supra note 33, at 723. It should be noted that extraterritoriality was an issue in the
US-Gambling case, which interpreted the equivalent provision of public morals found in GATS.
128

OHCHR Report on Human Rights and Trade (2005), supra note 121, at 8 (mentioning
“towards its own population”).
129

Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction – an Illusionary Basis for
Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 250 (2000).
130

Aside from the distinguishable pairs of harvested/endangered sea creatures on those cases
(Tuna/Dolphin and Shrimp/Turtle), the cases bear many similarities. The United States adopted legislation

51

Some

initial

clarifications

are

necessary.

First,

the

cases

discussed

extraterritoriality in environmental cases, not “human rights” cases, in terms of articles
XX(b) and XX(g) (respectively, the protection of animal life and the conservation of
natural resources). Second, there are actually two Tuna cases with contradictory
outcomes. Third, the Tuna cases were never adopted; and to be unadopted means that the
report did not bind even the litigants of the dispute. Finally, the Shrimp case, as the latest
outcome of this discussion, can be actually interpreted to have circumvented the
extraterritoriality issue.
Let me begin with US - Tuna I.131 Having found that United States legislation,
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act – (MMPA), violated Article XI of the
GATT, the panel proceeded to analyze whether the MMPA could be justified under
Article XX(b) (necessary to protect animal life) or XX(g) (relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources). By recalling the preparatory work of the GATT-1947, the
panel held that the United States could not apply its environmental provisions
banning imports because, in the first case, the harvesting of tuna harmed dolphins and, in the second case,
because the harvesting of shrimps harmed turtles.
131

Panel Report, United States – Restriction on the Import of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155 (Sep 3,
1991), unadopted. In that case, Mexico alleged that the US ban on importation of tuna violated GATT
provisions. The trade measure at issue was the MMPA, which regulated, inter alia, the harvesting of tuna
by United States fisherman. The MMPA required that, in order to reduce the killing of dolphin incidental to
the harvesting of fish, certain techniques should be used. A maximum cap of incidental taking of dolphins
per year by United States vessels was established. US-Tuna I, at ¶5.1. The MMPA required that the United
States government ban the importation of commercial fish or products caught with commercial fishing
technology that results in the incidental killings or serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of the United
States standards. As a condition of access to the United States market of yellow fin tuna, each country had
to prove that its overall regulatory regime was comparable to that of the United States.131 In accordance
with the facts presented, dolphins were frequently killed in the course of tuna-fishing operations in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) due to the use of a large net, suspended from floats, that is used to
encircle surface and sub-surface fish (purse-seine nets). These nets are intentionally deployed to encircle
dolphins. Tuna is harvested in that way because of the particular nature of the association between dolphins
and tuna observed only in the ETP. US-Tuna I, at ¶ 5.43. An important step of the panel analysis was the
determination of the character of the US law either as an “internal regulation”– the US thesis, or a
“quantitative restriction” - the Mexican thesis. This is a point I make about PPMs (see infra).
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extraterritorially to protect animal life and health or to conserve exhaustible natural
resources.132
Later on, after the United States modified the MMPA, the European Community
challenged the modified statute as a violation of Article XI of GATT.133 Again, the
extrajurisdictional issue appeared in connection with the interpretation of articles XX(g)
and XX(b).134 The panel in US - Tuna II, however, seems to have disagreed with the US –
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As to article XX(b), the panel decided to analyze the issue in the light of the drafting history of
article XX(b). The panel concluded that “the concerns of the drafters of article XX(b) focused on the use of
sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the
importing country.” (emphasis added). US-Tuna I, at ¶ 5.26. As to article XX(g), the panel did not resort to
its drafting history but to a logic inference that Article XX(g) was intended “to permit contracting parties to
take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on production or consumption within
their jurisdiction.” US-Tuna I, at ¶ 5.31.
133

After US – Tuna I, two events occurred in 1992. In June, the United States, Mexico, and ten
other countries negotiated an international agreement under the auspices of the preexisting Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission (IAFFC). The signatories agreed to reduce dolphin mortality below 5000 by
1999. However, In October, the US Congress amended the MMPA and the dispute was revived as TunaDolphin II in 1994. See Panel Report, United States – Restriction on the Import of Tuna, DS21/R-39S/155
(Jun. 16, 1994), unadopted. Again, the panel was called to determine if the US measures fell under Article
III or XI analysis. The PPM discussion was again an issue in the case.
134

As to Article XX(g), the panel observed that the text of article XX(g) suggested a three-step
analysis: whether the measure (i) fell within the range of policies to conserve exhaustible natural resources;
(ii) was “related to” the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, (iii) passes the conditions of the
chapeau of article XX. During the first step of the analysis, the panel observed that the “text of Article
XX(g) does not spell out any limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resources to be
conserved.” This analysis was also previously used in GATT history with no distinction made between fish
caught within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting party. US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.15. The
measure passed the first step of the test. US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.20. However, the US measure failed the second
step of the analysis. Thus, the panel never reached the third step. The panel observed that “relating to”
means “primarily aimed.” As to article XX(b), the panel tracked a similar approach. The three-step analysis
involved whether the measure (i) was a policy to protect human, animal, or plant life or health; (ii) was
“necessary;” (iii) passes the chapeau requirements. US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.29. As with the article XX(g)
analysis, the panel stressed that the text of article XX(b) does not address “any limitation on the location of
the living things to be protected.” Also that historic documentation did not clearly support any specific
contention of the parties “to the location of the living thing to be protected under Article XX(b).” US-Tuna
II, at ¶ 5.31. However, if Article XX(b) were interpreted to allow contract parties to impose trade
embargoes so as to force other countries to change their policies, the objective of the GATT would be
seriously impaired (US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.38). Thus, the measure failed the second step of Article XX(b) tests.
In essence, the panel in US - Tuna II initially addressed the amendments to the United States legislation in a
very similar way to the issues raised in US - Tuna I. Although not citing the unadopted report as an
authority, the Tuna II panel agreed with the reasoning of US-Tuna I that the United States measures were
not to be scrutinized as “internal measure” under Article III of the GATT.

53

Tuna I panel, finding that the history of the GATT was “not to indicate in an absolute
manner” the prohibition of measures related to “things or actions” outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the party taking the measure.135 Similarly, the panel stressed that the text
of article XX(b) does not address “any limitation on the location of the living things to be
protected.” The panel also stated that the GATT preparatory work did not clearly support
any specific contention of the parties as “to the location of the living thing to be protected
under Article XX(b).”136
The case that follows, US-Shrimps, does not help much on the extraterritoriality
issue.137 The issue seems to be less relevant in that decision because the AB did not have
to go through the extrajurisdictional aspect of Article XX. The AB merely upheld the
panel’s findings that based on scientific evidence, “turtles are highly migratory animals,”
and that “there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and endangered marine
populations involved and the United States for purposes of article XX(g).”138 The AB,
indeed, explicitly admitted that “[w]e do not pass upon the question of whether there is an
implied jurisdictional limitation in article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that

135

US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.16.

136

US-Tuna II, at ¶ 5.31.
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See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted Nov. 6, 2008. In a nutshell, a panel was established in 1997 to analyze
the complainants of India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand against a United States legislation demanding
vessels harvesting shrimps to use a certain type of device (Turtle Excluder Devices – TED) aimed at
reducing the mortality of sea turtles. US –Shrimp contains many relevant issues. One of them was whether
turtles could be considered “exhaustible natural resources” for the purposes of article XX(g). As to that
point, the AB mentioned that the term “exhaustible natural resources” was “actually crafted more than 50
years ago.” Id. at ¶ 129. Based on principles of “evolutionary” and “effectiveness” in treaty interpretation,
the AB ruled that “measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may
fall within Article XX(g).” (emphasis in original). Id. at ¶ 130-31.
138

US-Shrimp, at ¶133. This has been a highly controversial interpretation.
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limitation.”139 In sum, as the unique report touching extrajurisdictional issues in WTO
history, US-Shrimp is inconclusive either to admit or reject extrajurisdictional measures.
Interestingly, because of this interpretation, even the OHCHR asserts that the
justification of extraterritorial human rights measures in the WTO is a hard case. The
OHCHR reports concludes that
it does seem clear from the Appellate Body’s reasoning (here and elsewhere)
that, if the exception is being used for reasons occurring outside the jurisdiction
of that country, for instance to enforce labour standards in another State, it will be
far harder to justify than a situation where a State is invoking a general exception
in order, for example, to protect the human rights of its own population.140

For all these arguments, I suggest that the protection of human life, as found in
article XX(b) of the GATT, cannot be used to justify trade measures intended to affect
extraterritorial protection of human life.
4. Extraterritoriality and PPMs
The previous section explored the exception clauses of the GATT (mainly articles
XX and XXI of the GATT) in light of extraterritoriality. There is, however, a prior and
related question of whether the measures thought to be extraterritorial are, in fact, internal
regulations.141

139

Id.

140

OHCHR Report on Human Rights and Trade, supra note 121, at 8 (emphasis added). See also
Vázquez, supra note 50, at 818.
141

Howse and Regan, for instance, affirm that process-based restrictions do not directly regulate
any behavior occurring outside the border. Such measures are not extraterritorial because (i) process-based
measures may have policy rationales that do not depend on any expectation of influencing foreign conduct
(e.g. the protection of the environment or even a state preference not to be associated with what the
regulating state regards as wickedness) and (ii) even if those measure have that sort of intention, no norm
exists that makes such attempts illegitimate. In sum, all that the importing state is doing is prescribing an
environmentally friendly method of fishing as a condition for products to come into the country (the
condition also applies to its own fishermen’s fishing processes). Howse & Regan, supra note 129, at 27475.
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If some measures are considered internal regulation, they are analyzed under
article III of the GATT (the national treatment clause).142 Essentially, this clause requires
imported products to be treated no less favorably than “like products” of national origin.
In addition, pursuant to an interpretation of the ad note to article III, measures subject to
article III are not subject to article XI.143
The discussion had been epitomized under the so-called process-production
method (PPM) debate. It begins with a distinction developed in the trade literature
between “product-related processes and production methods” (PR-PPM) and “nonproduct related processes and production methods” (NPR-PPM). PR-PPM refers to
measures that distinguish between processes and production methods that affect the
characteristics of products; NPR-PPMs, on the other hand, entail measures that prescribe
processes and production methods that do not, or at least only negligibly, affect the
characteristics of the products.144
142

Pieter Themaat identifies non-discrimination clauses in the sense of national treatment as early
as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the context of the hanseatic leagues. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS n.2 at 397 (2d ed.
1997). In trade, the clause is another basic principle of non-discrimination. This time, however, not in
relation to a potential horizontal discrimination (state “A” discriminates between state “B” and “C,” such as
in the MFN), but in relation to a vertical relationship: nationals and foreign products or persons. In the
wording of Article IIII of the GATT, the NT clause obligates members to accord treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to “like products” of national origin. Take again as an example, Members “A”,
“B” and product “P.” Member “A” will accord national treatment to product “P” imported from member
“B,” if, in relation to “P,” member “A” applies treatment no less favorable than that applied to the national
like product “P.” The jurisprudence of the GATT-WTO developed a whole set of tests to determine what is
a “like-product” is and the general idea is that products that are in competition with each other are “likeproducts.” The clause aims at preventing domestic policies, such as taxation and regulatory practices, from
discriminating against imports. In the context of trade in services, see also GATS art. XVII.
143

See GATT ad art. III.

144

VAN DEN BOSSCHE ET AL., UNILATERAL MEASURES ADDRESSING NON-TRADE CONCERNS, at
xxxvii-xxxviii (2007), http://www.minbuza.nl/binaries/kamerbrieven-bijlagen/2007/09/u0417dgisceboekwt.pdf. See also WALTER GOODE, DICTIONARY OF POLICY TRADE TERMS 282 (2003). The acronym PPM is
sometimes used loosely in the literature, most of the time, the controversies involving PPMs are about
NPR-PPMs.

56

For instance, while a measure prohibiting the use of certain antibiotics in shrimp
farming would be a PR-PPM, a measure requiring that fishing vessels use turtle-friendly
methods, as in US-Shrimp, would be an NPR-PPM.145 In the first case (PR-PPMs), the
final product is affected, because shrimp not treated with antibiotics are “antibiotic free,”
while shrimp treated with antibiotics can carry residue of the medicines. In the second
case (NPR-PPMs), regardless of whether shrimps were harvested with turtle-friendly
nets, the final product would be the same.
If a measure discriminates between products on the basis of a PR-PPM, Article III
applies and all the tests developed in the GATT-WTO jurisprudence to determine if the
imported product and the national origin are “like products” and treated “no less
favorably” come into play. This jurisprudence reveals, for instance, that the likeness test
is a case-by-case analysis in which “like-products” are products that are in a competitive
relationship.146
The main controversy, however, is whether NPR-PPMs are covered by Article III.
As Trachtman summarizes,

145

This is just a point to distinguish PR-PPMs from NPR-PPMs. I am not discussing their legality
or which covered agreement applies to the dispute. For instance, in the case of the prohibition of imported
shrimp farmed with certain antibiotics, the SPS agreement, dealing with food safety, is likely the most
relevant.
146

See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, at ¶¶ 98-99 (Mar. 12, 2001)(explaining that a
determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and
extent of a competitive relationship between and among products. “In saying this, we are mindful that there
is a spectrum of degrees of ‘competitiveness’ or ‘substitutability’ of products in the marketplace, and that it
is difficult, if not impossible, in the abstract, to indicate precisely where on this spectrum the word ‘like’ in
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 falls. We are not saying that all products which are in some competitive
relationship are ‘like products’ under Article III:4.” See also the different interpretation of like-products
among the subparagraphs of Article III in the electronic GATT Analytical Index,
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_03_e.htm#fntext314.
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WTO jurisprudence has not yet clarified whether Article III “applies” to or
covers process-based regulatory distinctions. If Article III does not cover
process-based regulations [NPR-PPM], then . . . these regulations will be viewed
as border import restrictions (a ban of relevant products), controlled by Article
XI. If Article III covers process-based regulations, the Appellate Body’s
application of a competition-based test in Asbestos suggests that in many cases,
different PPMs would be insufficient to make products “un-like.” The test under
Article III would then prohibit treating like products differently on the basis of
process-based considerations.147

Why is this discussion relevant to restrictive trade measures concerning human
rights violations occurring abroad? For a significant reason: a trade measure can take the
form of a “human rights NPR-PPM.” For instance, in the labor context, let us assume that
foreign products “Pchild” were processed using child labor. Let us also assume that
domestic products crafted through adult labor exist: “Padult.”
Pchild and Padult, “as products, are the same product “P.” Therefore, if an importing
state wants to adopt a measure to block Pchild because of the process by which it was
produced, this is a type of NPR-PPM. Thus, if Article III covers NPR-PPM, the
competition-based test mentioned above applies. Moreover, because Pchild and Padult are
likely to be in competition, this leads to the conclusion that Pchild and Padult could not be
treated differently.
This is the reason that Trachtman puts forwards that “the product/process
distinction may often serve as a proxy to control the extraterritorial application of
national measures in which extra-territorial application is perhaps exceptionally permitted
under the circumstances set forth in Article XX.”148 That is to say, a restrictive trade
measure addressing the way a product was processed abroad would probably violate the
147

Joel Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10(3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 631, 635

(2007).
148

Id. at 635.
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national treatment obligation. Article XX would then apply as an ultimate test to justify
such type of measure.
5. Extraterritoriality in the GSP case
Finally, the question of extraterritoriality and human rights appears in the WTO
regime in relation to the General System of Preferences (GSP), regulated by the Enabling
Clause.149 The GSP dynamic is somewhat different from the other trade measures, since
GSP are systems of trade incentives. These schemes offer additional tariff reductions on
imports, a benefit for export countries, if GSP candidates comply with certain demands.
Because these demands were often seen as being of extraterritorial reach, these schemes
are worthy of analysis.
Overall, GSP schemes were historically understood to operate under the free
discretion of the granters. Those granters could add conditions, suspend and cancel
preferences at their will. GSP schemes were understood to be out of the GATT “fangs.”
Granters effectively used GSP as a carrot-stick mechanism, offering preferential
treatment (carrot) and withdrawing those preferences if states did not comply (stick) with
the conditions set by granters; for instance, compliance with human rights treaties.150

149

GSP schemes are preferential tariff agreements that were developed with the creation of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. Through these schemes,
developed countries can voluntarily offer preferential tariff treatment to developing countries, without
violating the MFN obligation. As exceptions to the MFN clause, GSP schemes were integrated in the
GATT-1947 by the Contracting Parties through a waiver known as the “Enabling Clause.” See Decision on
Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of Developing
Countries, GATT Document L/4903, 28 November 1979, BISD 26S/203[hereinafter Enabling Clause].
This waiver, as a decision of the Contracting Parties, was then incorporated into the WTO and is, thus,
legally binding. See GATT 1994 art 1(b)(iv).
150

Cleveland points out the termination or suspension of GSP status of Burma by the United
States, EC and Canada in 1989, 1996 and 1997 as general trade sanctions in response to that government’s
use of forced labor. See also the list of 13 countries (pre-1993), 6 countries (1993) and 1 country (2000)
targeted by the United States with removal or suspension from GSP for failure to comply with
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Nevertheless, grantors’ discretion to set conditions through the GSP schemes was
challenged in 2002 in the EC-Tariff Preference case.151 In the end, as Bartels comments,
it was unnecessary for the AB to determine whether the GSP scheme offered by the EC
(called “Drugs Arrangement”) meet possible constraints imposed by the Enabling Clause.
The GSP scheme was found in violation of the Enabling Clause because of administrative
procedures in the European regulation (i.e., the scheme was offered only to a closed list
of beneficiaries).152
After the EC-Tariff Preference case, the European Union changed the GSP
regulation. In the new regulation (called GSP+),153 conditions with strong extraterritorial
reach are blatant. For instance, to be eligible for GSP+, potential candidates have to ratify
a number of labor and human rights treaties.154

internationally recognized human rights. Cleveland, supra note 51, at n.38, 135, 142. If the withdrawal of
preferences was either a tool for protectionism or a political maneuver under the flag of human rights it is
not a question addressed here. But for an account of this issue, see Philip Alston, Labor Rights Provisions
in US Trade Law: "Aggressive Unilateralism”?, 15(1) HUM. RTS Q. 1, 21-22 (1993)(concluding that
“virtually all available analyses of the actual approach to implementation [of workers’ rights in the targeted
countries] have concluded that political factors are generally the overriding consideration in determining
the outcome of cases. Thus, one review of the Reagan administration's decisions to terminate GSP . . .
status for Nicaragua, Romania, Ethiopia, Chile, and Paraguay concluded that human rights factors had been
of only minor importance in the decisions taken” while “’strategic, or national security considerations’
were determinant.”)
151

To summarize a long and complicated case that involves burden of proof issues, India
challenged a GSP arrangement offered by the EU called “Drug Arrangement.” India’s main argument was
that the arrangement was not in accordance with the Enabling Clause requirements that preferences under
the Enabling Clause must be “generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory.” See Enabling Clause, ¶
2(a), n.3. Moreover, GSPs should be “designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the
development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.” See Enabling Clause, ¶ 3(c).
152

As a “closed list,” a clear violation of the non-discriminatory requirement set by the Enabling
Clause happened. See EC-Tariff Preferences, at ¶ 187-88.
153

In the GSP+, the EC grants tariff benefits to developing countries that are committed, among
other things, to human rights protection provided that they ratify and effectively implement the conventions
listed in Part A of the EC Regulation, which refers to nine human rights and six labor rights conventions.
See Council Regulation 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 [2005] OJ L169/1.
154

But perhaps reactions to the GSP+ scheme have not grabbed too much attention because GSP
schemes, from an economic point of view, have been losing their utility. This later point is supported by
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In sum, it seems plausible to imagine that the Enabling Clause defines additional
limits on the exercise of extraterritorial authority. But because GPS schemes are not
mandatory, granters may merely decide to cancel the schemes because, for instance, the
beneficiaries challenge the GSP demands as imposing unlawful extraterritorial
conditions. It is thus important to realize the fragility of the Enabling Clause as really
imposing prohibitions on the type of conditions.
As Zagel suggests, trade incentives do not infringe on another state’s sovereignty
and cannot be considered an interference with internal affairs. In addition, trade
incentives do have positive aspects, and they can better target the population’s needs than
trade sanctions.155
6. Preliminary Remarks
As to the extraterritorial element in the WTO normative floor, the prison labor
and the security exceptions are the only strong language to accommodate it. In all other
cases, the text of the agreements and the interpretation of related cases provide weak
support for extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction.

relevant economic literature. See Gene Grossman & Alan O. Sykes, A Preference for Development: The
Law and Economics of GSP, 4(1) WORLD TRADE REV. 41 (2005)(contending that the justification for GSP
schemes in the first instance – to promote growth and development – is unlikely to be served terribly well
by existing GSP policy). Bartels also scrutinized the GSP+ scheme and contended that because of similar
substantive criteria chosen by the EU to select GSP+ beneficiaries, among other factors, the scheme would
be in violation of WTO law. See Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+Arrangement, 10(4)
J. INT’L ECO. L. 869 (2007). See also Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General
System of Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of
Rights, 39(5) J. WORLD TRADE 977 (2005).
155

Gudrun Monika Zagel, WTO & Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting
Convergence 2(2) IDLO Voices Of Development Jurists Paper Series 1, 34 (2005)(citing Bruno Simma’s
assessment on this point).
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Provision

“Extraterritoriality” Element

National Treatment

Weak

Public Morals and Public Order

Weak

Protection of Life and Health

Weak

Prison Labour

Possible (Strong)

Security

Possible (Strong)

GSP

Not related

Table 3 – Extraterritoriality in the WTO normative floor

C. ADDITIONAL TESTS IMPOSED BY THE WTO NORMATIVE FLOOR
In addition to all the analysis already developed in terms of the “human rights”
and “extraterritoriality” elements in the WTO regime, it should be noted that additional
requirements for measures to be justified under Article XX are found in the normative
floor. Two of them are the “necessity test” and the chapeau of article XX.
1. Necessity Test
The “necessity” test appears under the wording of the exceptions for the
protection of public morals and the protection of human life.156 The “necessity” test has
been expressed, with variations, as the following question: “is there some other measure
less inconsistent with GATT that achieves the objective sought by the WTO member in
question that is reasonably available to such member?”157

156

In addition, it is fairly settled that the term “necessary” means the same thing in subparagraph
(a), (b), and (d). Moreover, it is settled that “necessity” is stronger than the term “relating,” as found in
subparagraph (e). The AB in US-Gasoline acknowledged the distinct meaning of terms used in Article XX
exceptions. The AB found that it does “not seem reasonable to suppose that the WTO Members intended to
require . . . the same kind or degree of connection or relationship between the measure under appraisal and
the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or realized.” The AB stressed that Article XX uses
different terms in respect of different categories: “necessary” appears in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d);
whereas “essential”, “relating to", “for the protection of,” “in pursuance of,” “involving” appear in others.
See Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 26, 1996), at 17.
157

US - Section 337, a GATT case, seems to be the base for the formation of the test. See GATT
Panel Report US – Section 337, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, adopted November 7,
1989, BISD 36S/345, ¶ 5.26.

62

After many developments of the test in the GATT-WTO jurisprudence, what the
current necessity test seems to constitute involves the balancing of the following
elements: (i) the absence of “less inconsistent” measures that achieves the objective
sought” by the WTO member in question; and (ii) the availability and reasonability of
those measures to such member.158 The point to be remembered here is that, if restrictive
trade measures addressing human rights violations occurring abroad are to be justified
under articles XX(a) or XX(b), those measures will have to pass the scrutiny of the
necessity test.
2. Chapeau Test
Finally, as the last component of article XX analysis, had a measure survived the
specific requirements of its subparagraphs, the scrutiny of the chapeau comes into play.
The chapeau requires that a measure not be applied in a manner that would constitute a
means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” The chapeau
analysis is not about the specific content of the measure, but rather the manner in which
that measure is applied. The purpose of this ultimate level of analysis is to prevent abuse
in the exercise of Article XX.159 Again, the point to make here is that if restrictive trade

158

Less inconsistent measures that achieve the objective sought would require the analysis of the
relative importance of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure, the contribution of the
measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it, and the restrictive impact of the measure on
international commerce. Reasonable availablity would require a comparison between the challenged
measure and possible alternatives.
159

The burden of demonstrating compliance with the chapeau rests on the party invoking the
exception. See US–Shrimp, at ¶ 150, US–Shrimp Article 21.5, at ¶ 118.
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measures addressing human rights violations occurring abroad are to be justified under
the chapeau, those measures will have to pass this test.160

D. THE BROADER PICTURE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES IN THE WTO
In relation to restrictive trade measures addressing human rights violations abroad,
this section investigated the lawfulness of those measures under the WTO regime. This
section unbundled the analysis in the “human rights” and the “extraterritoriality”
elements. The overall picture shows that there are two potential options for justifying
those measures: the prison labor and the security exceptions. I employ potential in the
sense that at least the extraterritorial element in those cases do not appear to represent an
issue. It should be noted that GSP schemes, to the extent that they are not mandatory, also
permit grantors discretion to establish extraterritorial conditions, whether or not related to
human rights, on beneficiaries.
In all other identified alternatives, because of less clarity and no cogent
interpretation of the clauses indicating otherwise, they seem to represent weak
alternatives.

160

An interesting aspect of the chapeau interpretation on “arbitrary and unjustifiable” is found in
the US-Shrimp, at ¶ 177. The AB noted that the certification process provided by the MMPA was shaped
without the participation of the exporting members. The AB ruled that a lack of serious effort to negotiate
with the objective of concluding bilateral and multilateral agreements for the achievement of a certain
policy goal as a ground to an unjustifiable measure. See US–Shrimp, at ¶¶ 171-72. The AB expressed a
clear repudiation of “unilateralism” in the application of a measure underscoring its “unjustifiability.” As
expected, this was a controversial holding.
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“Provision”

HR

Extraterritoriality

Additional Tests

Authority

National Treatment

---

Public Morals

Possible
(weak)

Weak

Competition

Weak

Weak

Necessity and
Chapeau tests

Weak

Human Life and Health

Possible
(weak)

Weak

Necessity and
Chapeau tests

Weak

Prison Labour

Possible
(weak)

Possible (strong)

---

Possible

Security

Possible
(weak)

Possible (strong)

---

Possible

GSP Schemes

Possible
(weak)

Possible (strong)

---

Possible

Table 4 – Legal Analysis under the WTO normative floor

IV. HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES
As the last step of this chapter, I now analyze the extraterritoriality and trade
elements of human rights regimes. It should be noted that, because there is an overlap
between the general system and human rights regimes, some points will be once more
acknowledged. Obviously, there is no need to develop any analysis of the human rights
element in this regime; it is its raison d’être. I begin by recalling some necessary
distinctions of the types of obligations found in human rights doctrinal analysis.
A. A NOTE ON THE TYPES OF OBLIGATIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS
Traditionally, in human rights doctrine, a first generation of rights prescribes
conduct that governments should not do (negative rights). A second generation prescribes
conduct that governments should take (positive rights). A third generation of rights, as
Ruppel summarizes,
has been distinguished from the other two categories of human rights in that its
realisation is predicated not only upon both the affirmative and negative duties of
the state, but also upon the behaviour of each individual. Rights in this category
include self-determination as well as a host of normative expressions whose
status as human rights is controversial at present. These include the right to
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development, the right to peace, the right to a healthy environment, and the right
to intergenerational equity.161

A well-known criticism of the generation categories is that it is hard to imagine
that civil and political rights demand only abstention of governments and that economic,
social and cultural rights demand only positive actions.162 Political rights can only be
attained when governments positively carry out some sort of task by creating the
institutional mechanisms to enforce those rights, for instance. Conversely, economic,
social, and cultural rights may include a negative component by requiring state
abstention.163
These issues may create confusion since for each human right there may be not a
single, but a set of state obligations of a positive or negative nature. As a consequence,
161

Oliver C. Ruppel, Third-Generation Human Rights and the protection of environment, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NAMIBIA 101, 103 (Bösl & Horn eds. 2008).
162

The “three-generation” language is a term attributed to Karel Vasak, a Czech jurist, who used it
in the late 1970s while explaining the evolution of human rights in the context of the French Revolution.
See FLÁVIA PIOVESAN, DIREITOS HUMANOS E O DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL INTERNACIONAL [HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 28 (1997)(Port.). See also Stephen P. Marks,
Emerging Human Rights: a New Generation for the 1980s? 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 439-52
(1981)(explaining that in the 1980s six areas were under consideration of a third generation of rights:
environment, development, peace, common heritage, communication and humanitarian assistance; pointing
out, as well, that the idea of proliferation of rights is dangerous, the term “generation” was already outdated
by that time, and the rights of the new generations are too vague to be justiciable). Another criticism of
generations refers to the fact that the categorization would break apart the “indivisibility” of human rights.
The indivisibility of human rights recognizes that all human rights share basic characteristics. The Vienna
Declaration, particularly, prescribes that the international community must treat human rights globally in a
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. See Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action: Note By The Secretariat, World Conference on Human Rights, Part I, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
163

One example is the right to education which, in accordance with one interpretation, includes
the freedom to teach and to establish schools, which is more than the positive duty of the state to establish
schools. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) arts. 13-14. See
also E. Vierdag, The Legal Nature of the Rights Granted by the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights 9 NETHS. YBK. INT. L. 69, 80 (1978). In human rights, as Steiner summarizes,
“[d]ifferent rights may point to different types of state duties. All depends on the nature of the right, on the
problems it was meant to overcome or to prevent. Some types of state duties [] are more prominent in the
ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], some in CEDAW [Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women], some in the [ICESCR].” See HENRY STEINER
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 186 (2008).
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rather than the positive-negative dichotomy, it may be useful to remember that states
obligations under international human rights law are categorized under three headings:
obligation to respect, to protect, and to fulfill.164
Obligation to respect requires states, and thereby all its organs and agents, to
abstain from doing anything that violates the integrity of the individual or infringes on
her or his freedom.165 The obligation to protect requires from the State and its agents the
measures necessary to prevent other individuals or groups from violating the integrity,
freedom of action, or other human rights of the individual.166 The obligation to fulfill
requires the State to take the measures necessary to ensure for each person within its
jurisdiction opportunities to obtain satisfaction of those needs, which are recognized in
the human rights instruments and cannot be secured by personal efforts.167
Surely, a connection exists between the three-level obligation and the negativepositive dichotomy. The obligation to respect is a type of negative obligation, while the
obligation to protect and fulfill are more positively-oriented.
Having this terminology and concepts now been clarified, the main proposition
here is whether obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfill defines anything in terms
of extraterritorial jurisdiction concerning restrictive trade measures.
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES
164

An earlier elaboration of the three levels of obligations has been attributed to Asbjorn Eide. See
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report on the Right to
Food as a Human Right, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987), ¶¶ 66-70, 112-14 [hereinafter
The UN Food Report]. A more refined division in five categories is found in Steiner et al. (2008), at 186190.
165

Id, at ¶ 66.

166

Id. at ¶ 67.

167

Id. at ¶ 68.
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Human rights advocates frequently cite the superior status of human rights to
justify broad exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The superiority of the UN Charter
obligations found in article 103 and the prescriptions of articles 55 and 56 are provisions
often invoked to support this view. Specifically, this authority would arise when these
articles are read together:
[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55 [including the universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion].168

As to the superior value of human rights, it has been noted that, aside from jus
cogens norms, no hierarchy among specialized regimes are found in international law.
And even when jus cogens violations are the case, it was shown that extraterritorial
authority is not clear established (unless, it is the case of UN-SC resolutions under
Chapter VII). Thus, the prescription to “take joint and separate action” in co-operation
with the UN can be hardly read as also authorizing extrajurisdictional authority.
But do human rights instruments establish anything different than that? A starting
point is to notice the usage of a common terminology among many of the human rights
instruments. This common language suggests that the contracting parties’ obligations are
oriented “within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction.”
The ICCPR, for instance, establishes that
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant [. . .].169

168

UN Charter art. 56. As to the text in brackets, see UN Charter art. 55(c).

169

ICCPR art. 2.1.
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The Torture Convention posits that
[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.170

The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) provides that the contracting
parties
[s]hall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedom defined
in Section I of this Convention.171

The ICESCR, although not employing “jurisdictional” language, prescribes that
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually
and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.172

Moreover, a comment about the discharge of parties’ obligations under the
ICESCR clarifies that “whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligation must
also take account of resource constraints applying within the country concerned.”173
Let me additionally consider some points about child labor, a frequent example
used throughout the dissertation. The Convention concerning the Prohibition and

170

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, art. 2.1 (emphasis added)[hereinafter Torture
Convention]. See also references to “under its jurisdiction” in arts. 5.1.1, 5.2, 11, 12, 13, and 16. But see,
article 2.1: “This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which
does or may contain provisions of wider application” and article 5.3, “[t]his Convention does not exclude
any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.”(emphasis added).
171

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3,
1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR], art. 1. See also American Convention on Human Rights, Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR], art. 1 (“States Parties to this
Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction”)(emphasis added).
172

ICESCR art 2.1.

173

General Comment 3, the nature of States parties’ obligations (Art. 2, par.1), CESCR, UN Doc.
E/1991/23 (Dec 14, 1990), ¶¶ 10, 13.
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Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO C182)
provides that “[e]ach Member which ratifies this Convention shall take immediate and
effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child
labor as a matter of urgency.”174 The convention does not replicate the jurisdictional
language. But the ILO recommendation specifying the action programme contains a
provision that can be interpreted as a recommendation towards the application of
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Under “other measures aimed at the prohibition and
elimination of the worst forms of child labour,” that document recommends the
contracting parties to
provid[e] for the prosecution in their own country of the Member's nationals who
commit offences under its national provisions for the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labour even when these offences are
committed in another country.175

Arguably, the concern in the clause is about criminalizing conducts of nationals
abroad, a typical exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. But apart from that, as one
commentator suggests, the convention “may simply require countries to make it illegal
for their citizens, or persons operating within their territory, to use child labour.”176 And
again, if one assumes that the prohibition of the use of child labor has reached jus cogens
status, the analysis that I developed before shows that no specific authority of
extraterritorial application emanates from the jus cogens status of the norms.

174

Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour (entered into force Nov 19, 2000)[hereinafter ILO C182], art. 1.
175

Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the
Worst Forms of Child Labour (June 17, 1999)[hereinafter ILO Recommendation 190], ¶ 15(d).
176

Vázquez, supra note 50, at 821.
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In sum, it appears more plausible that the obligations found in human rights
instruments (to protect, to respect and to fulfill) channel action within the territorial
jurisdiction of the contracting parties. Some exceptions authorize the prescription of
legislation with extraterritorial coverage. Cleveland notes, for instance, that some
instruments provide as such.177 The 1957 Slavery Convention obligates the contracting
parties to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction:
Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and
necessary legislative and other measures to bring about . . . the complete
abolition or abandonment of the following institutions [forced labour and other
slave-like practices], where they still exist [].178

Another example mentioned by her is the Genocide Convention.179 That
Convention would expressly recognize a type of extraterritorial jurisdiction because it
recognizes legal remedies against other states.180
C. TRADE IN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES
Though human rights conventions hardly address trade issues, it is possible to
find that subject in some of them. For instance, the Supplementary Convention on
Slavery dedicates an entire session to “the Slave Trade.”181
177

Cleveland, supra note 51, at 153.

178

Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, 7 September 1956, 266 UNTS (entered into force 30 April 1957)[hereinafter
Supplementary Convention on Slavery].
179

Cleveland, supra note 51, at 153. Cleveland also mentions the Apartheid Convention as another

example.
180

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78
UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951)[hereinafter Genocide Convention], art. IX: “Disputes
between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts
enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice.” See also Genocide
Convention art. V: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in article III.”
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That convention provides that the “States Parties shall take all effective measures
to prevent ships and aircraft authorized to fly their flags from conveying slaves;”182 it also
mentions that the “States Parties shall take all effective measures to ensure that their
ports, airfields and coasts are not used for the conveyance of slaves.”183
One can also infer from the ILO C182 trade situations. For instance, the definition
of the worst forms of child labor comprises the sale and trafficking of children, and the
use, procuring or offering of a child for, inter alia, prostitution or illicit activities.184
However, in contrast to the Slavery Convention, the ILO C182 does not enumerate the
types of trade measures that the contracting parties should take. The trade issue has to do
with what the definition of the worst forms of child labor is.
Apart from those cases, in which the “product” itself raises human rights concerns
(such as slaves or children), a comprehensive study indicating where to find trade
measures in human rights treaties is yet to be done and would be an interesting avenue of
research. This dissertation merely recognizes this avenue of research.
D. THE BROADER PICTURE IN HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES
In human rights instruments, state obligations to protect, respect and fulfill are
limited to the territorial limits of each state. Extraterritoriality is exceptional and, though
rare, it is possible to find human rights instruments dealing with trade measures.
181

See Supplementary Convention on Slavery Section II. Slave trade “means and includes all acts
involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts
involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale
or exchange of a person acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged; and, in general, every act of trade
or transport in slaves by whatever means of conveyance.” See Supplementary Convention on Slavery
Section IV art. 7(c).
182

See Supplementary Convention on Slavery art. 2(a).

183

See Supplementary Convention on Slavery art. 2(b).

184

ILO C182 art. 3(a)-(c).
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Source

Extraterritorial Element

Trade Element

Authority

ICCPR, ICESCR, ECHR

Weak

Weak

Weak

Torture Convention (SingleIssue)

Possible (in terms of criminalizing
conduct of nationals abroad)

Weak

Weak

Child-Labour, C182 (SingleIssue)

Possible (in terms of criminalizing
conduct of nationals abroad)

Not specific

Weak

1957 Slavery Convention
(Single-Issue)

Possible (in terms of criminalizing
conduct of nationals abroad)

Possible (strong)

Possible

Genocide (Single-Issue)

Possible (in terms of criminalizing
conduct of nationals abroad)

Not specific

Weak

Table 5 –Legal Analysis under Human Right Regimes

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter investigated the current state of international law regarding the
legality of the examined trade measures. Interestingly, the legal and doctrinal analyse of
general international law, WTO trade law, and human rights law reveal a common
pattern: international law has not embraced any robust doctrine permitting states to apply
restrictive trade measures because of human rights violations in other countries.
In the general international law, exceptions included measures taken in pursuance
of UN-SC resolutions in accordance with Chapter VII. This assessment demystifies
common ideas about what CIL and jus cogens prescribe and it demystifies the reach of
similar elaborations found in humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect). In
the WTO regime, the possibilities of justification of trade measures are more likely to be
found in the prison labor and the security exceptions of the GATT and corresponding
clauses in other covered agreements. In human rights regimes, though it was not
comprehensively explored, slavery was acknowledged as an example justifying
restrictive trade measures; because of the “trade” obligations specifically contained in the
relevant treaty, rather than the fact of belonging to the human rights family of convention.
These are again exceptional prescriptions since the human rights instruments impose
obligations on states in relation to individuals in their own territory. The question
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demanding attention is why such a consistency is found across different regimes. This is
the question addressed in terms of L&E methodology in the next chapter.
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Ch3

The Traditional Legal Analysis Explained in
Terms of Allocation of Regulatory
Jurisdiction and Transaction Costs

INTRODUCTION
The issue in this chapter is why one simply does not find, beyond some very rare
exceptions, that any of the relevant bodies of international law (general, trade and human
rights) embrace any robust doctrine of restrictive trade measures addressing
extraterritorial human rights violations.
To answer the why question, this chapter draws on positive L&E methodology.
This methodology is based on property rights theory transposed onto international law
problems. In this approach, international law is fundamentally thought of as a device of
allocation of regulatory jurisdiction (ARJ) that is dependent on transaction costs (TCs).
The two relevant costs identified herein as relevant ones are sovereignty costs (related to
the “extraterritorial” question) and cognitive costs (related to, among other things, the
communication barriers between trade and human rights communities).
This chapter engages in three case studies to illustrate the ARJ and TCs
methodology: (i) the UN-SC powers under Chapter VII, (ii) the Diamond Waiver of the
WTO, (iii) and the trade and labor rights linkage. In all of the cases, I try to orient the
reader to observe the heightened TCs involved, though the cases may initially mislead the
reader to think otherwise.
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I. JUSTIFICATION OF L&E AS A METHODOLOGY AND THE POSITIVE
APPROACH
Overall, L&E represents a search for a more scientific understanding about the
consistency trend detected in the previous chapter: the different regimes of international
law (general, trade, and human rights) do not buttress restrictive trade measures against
human rights violations.185
As noted, my aim is now to re-describe the examined issue using L&E theory,
while explaining the necessary distinctions and limitations. I believe that this
methodology offers a very useful framework of analysis and illuminates why rules look
like they do in terms of a specific variable, TCs. I begin by highlighting that my
methodology is developed in terms of a positive approach, as opposed to a normative
one.

185

By scientific, I just refer to a process of observation, elaboration of a hypothesis, clarifications
of assumptions and concepts, explanation of the framework used, and testing of the hypotheses for
conclusions. See Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 463 (2006)(answering the criticism of their book “The Limits of International Law;”
highlighting a major “generational change” underway where the scholarship pays great attention to the
social science virtues: methodological self-consciousness, empiricism, and theoretical rigor. In this process,
after observation, one (i) make assumptions explicit; (ii) address the limitations and criticisms of his/her
assumptions, (iii) separate positive and normative arguments; (iv) frame claims as testable hypotheses, (v)
address alternative hypotheses; (vi) choose case studies and other evidence carefully. Id. at 463. See also
Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of
Interdisciplinary Scholarship 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998). I assume that finding a theoretical framework
in a legal dissertation is not a rare dilemma among academics of different countries. In fact, I think that this
dilemma is accentuated in legal dissertations because the idea of a “scientific” legal analysis is rejected by
many. Put simply, one reason for the rejection of law as science comes from the (true) perception that a
legal system is value-laden. The (wrong, I would claim) conclusion is that, as science requires universal
application of certain assumptions and for the simple impossibility that legal decisions are universally
applicable, law is not science. Ulen, ironically, has already observed the absence of a Nobel Prize in Law as
a characteristic of the legal field. Thomas Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work,
and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 4 U. ILL. L.R. 875 (2002). Ulen points out, nevertheless, that
as the amount and breadth of legal empiric research increases, a core set of theoretical beliefs will emerge
in the law, and that increased empiricism in the law is vital the future of the law as science. Id.
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Positive and normative economics is a common distinction in the economics field.
Polinsky puts it very simply, saying that economic analysis is used to both try to explain
the legal system as it is and to recommend changes that might improve it; the first
function is positive (or descriptive) economics and the second normative (or
prescriptive).186
An example proves useful. Trachtman and Dunoff, while discussing the L&E of
humanitarian law violations in internal conflicts, suggest that the positive analyst would
decline to judge whether international law ought to hold individuals criminally liable for
human rights atrocities committed in internal conflict. In turn, the normative analyst
typically offers reforms designed to maximize “social welfare”. The first takes no
position on the lex ferenda. The second engages in lex ferenda.187
In my case, rather than telling the reader whether restrictive trade measures
addressing human rights violations abroad “should be” lawful or not, my concern is to
point out “what is going on” in terms of L&E language. Thus, I adopt a positive
approach. Surely, as Trachtman and Dunoff highlight, the distinction between positive
and normative is not clear cut; a positive description is often implicitly normative to the
extent that it identifies a mismatch between articulated goals and policy or institutional
186

A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS xvii (Aspen 3d ed.
2003). For the classic discussion, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953). See
also, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 24-26 (Aspen 6th ed. 2002)(explaining that the
positive role of economic analysis of law is the attempt to explain legal rules and outcomes as they are
rather than to change them to make them better; recalling that, often, the true ground of legal decisions are
concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Legal education consists
primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds, many of which may turn
out to have an economic character).
187

See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanitarian Law
Violations in Internal Conflict, 93(2) AM. J. INT’L L. 394, 396 (1999). Lex ferenda is a Latin expression
meaning “what the law ought to be", as opposed to lex lata, meaning what the “law is.”
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choice.188 This observation seems applicable to my work and I expect, therefore, that my
description serves to inform future institutional choices (though I do not indicate any
preferred route in this direction).
In sum, my approach is positive and, as expressed by Oliver Williamson, “rather
than being preoccupied with the imperative ‘[t]his is the law here’ [or this is what the law
should be], my question is ‘what’s going on here.’”189
As a final remark concerning L&E, it should be remembered this field of study
has been an expanding one as applied to the understanding of domestic law subjects
(mostly in common law jurisdictions). The application of L&E theories on international
law has been less effusive.190

188

Id. at 397.

189

OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 25 (1996)(discussing
methodological concerns of his dissertation involving a interdisciplinary work at Carnegie Hall dealing
with the alliance of law, economics and organization theories). Williamson describes his effort as an
“interdisciplinary combination of law, economics, and organization in which economics is the first among
equals.”Id. at 3. Because of his hierarchical choice, I do not subscribe to that part of his statement.
190

A look on the content of leading books in L&E, such as those from Posner or Polinsky, reveals
the application of L&E theories mainly to domestic law situations. The case studies provided by Posner
focus on common law subjects (such as property, contract rights and remedies, family law and sex law, tort
law, criminal law), plus public regulation of the market; law of business organization and financial markets;
law and the distribution of income and wealth; the legal process; and the constitution and the federal
system. See Posner, supra note 186, at vii. Scattered analysis of international law problems are found on his
work, nonetheless. Posner dedicates a subsection to “Treaties and Other International Agreements” in the
Contracts chapter and a subsection to “Dumping and the Free Trade Question” in the “Antitrust Law”
chapter. Id. at 136, 314. By the same token, in his introductory book, Polinsky provides eleven applications
of L&E: nuisance; breach of contract (twice); automobile accidents (twice); risk bearing and insurance; law
enforcement using imprisonment; competitive markets; pollution control; product liability; principal-agent
liability; and suit, settlement and trial. See Polinsky, supra note 186.
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In that context, Joel Trachtman, Jeffrey Dunoff, Andrew Guzman, and Alan
Sykes have been leading authors, among others, to transpose the domestic perspective of
L&E to the international field.191
The basic idea to be developed has the following three steps: (1) regimes, such as
general international law, the WTO, and human rights, are mechanisms of ARJ; (2) ARJ
depends on (or is a function of) transaction costs (TCs); and (3) with increased TCs, if
allocations occur, international law is unclear, uncertain, or, as it will be named, “muddy”
in its allocations of rights.
In the domestic setting of L&E, however, this dynamic is explained not in terms
of ARJ, but in terms of the property rights of individuals. Thus, my first effort is to
introduce and transpose this model of L&E as applied to international law.

II. L&E METHODOLOGY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ALLOCATION OF
REGULATORY JURISDICTION
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC L&E
Property rights, or entitlements, are evoked in the L&E literature to mean the full
range of legal entitlements of individuals.192 For instance, as proposed in the classic
article by Calabresi and Melamed, the idea of entitlement is not only the common

191

As this chapter draws from many of Trachtman’s papers, I will refer to them along other
footnotes. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law: An Invitation
and a Caveat (April 1998), http://ssrn.com/abstract=73688 (corroborating the vision that “curiously . . . the
law and economics revolution has, with few exceptions . . . bypassed international law; presenting an
Appendix containing relevant literature found until 1998). See Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New
Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2001-2002)(discussing a new paradigm on choice-of-law questions not
only in courts but also on international regulatory issues). ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL
LAW WORKS (2008). Alan O. Sykes, the Economics of Public International Law (John M. Olin L. & Econ.,
Working Paper N. 216, 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=564383.
192

Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 191, at n.59 17.
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perception of owning something, but also the entitlement to make noise, to pollute, to
breathe clean air, and to have children, among others.193
Before property rights appear, individuals behaving egoistically could lead to the
so-called “tragedy of the commons” in the exploitation of a common area. The tragedy is
described in the landmark article by Hardin in 1968:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to
keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work
reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease
keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the
long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent
logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy. As a rational being, each
herdsman seeks to maximize his gain . . . the rational herdsman concludes that the
only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And
another; and another . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (emphasis added). 194

This metaphor provides the basic explanation for the rise of property regimes. In
the commons, each person realizes only the benefits but not the costs of adding additional
sheep, so each herdsman adds too many sheep to the commons. Property rights assign, to
the same person, the allocation of benefits and costs in decision-making. If one divides
the commons into separate tracts (property), each tract owner perceives both the benefits

193

Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
194

The article was originally published as Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
Science 1243, 1244 (Dec 13, 1968). Hardin’s issue involved population growth to which he acknowledges
“no technical solution”. Id. at 1243. There are many reproductions of the “Tragedy”. See in LAW AND
ECONOMICS ANTHOLOGY 176-77 (Dau-Schmidt & Ulen eds., 1998).
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and the costs of adding sheep to his or her tract.195 In these types of collective action
problems, the L&E literature offers analytical tools to understand the different types of
allocation of rights.
In the domestic setting, this means understanding how property rights have been
allocated (positive approach), or recommending (normative approach) a way to
efficiently allocate those rights. Transactions on property will occur and, eventually,
disputes about property rights will arise. In other words, the process of reallocating
property can occur in at least two ways: voluntarily (market) and through adjudicative
proceedings (courts).196

195

Hardin does not advance which kind of property should arise: public, private, common or any
sort but simply that an allocation or property will occur. “We might sell them off as private property. We
might keep them as public property, but allocate the right to enter them. The allocation might be on the
basis of wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by some
agreed-upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-come, first-served basis,
administered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable possibilities. They are all objectionable.”
Hardin (1968), at 1243. See also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (Cambridge 1990)(commenting upon important points related to
Hardin’s work. First, Hardin was not the first to notice the tragedy; Aristotle - in the Politics, Hobbes’s
parable of man in state of nature, and Gordon’s classic in economics - the Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Research: the Fishery, 1954 -, to list a few, expounded similar reasoning. But the kind of problem
found in the tragedy of the commons have expanded since of much of the world is dependent on resources
that are subject to the possibility of a tragedy). As Ostrom postulates, “the tragedy of the commons, the
prisoner’s dilemma, and the logic of collective actions are closely related concepts in the models that have
defined the accepted way of viewing many problems that individuals face when attempting to achieve
collective benefits . . . [furthermore] these three models and their many variants are diverse representations
of a broader and still-evolving theory of collective action.” Id. at 6-7. The idea of “commons” in Ostrom is
explored under the concept of common-pool resource (CPR), which is also an alternative terminology
found in the literature. Id. at 29-57.
196

Reallocation may also occur by force, but in that case the injured party can resort to courts to
reestablish (or not) the original allocation. In addition, peculiar to the domestic context, there are situations
of inalienability that frustrates allocations. As Calabresi and Melamed explain, an entitlement is inalienable
“to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.” See Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 193, at 1092. Inalienability in property rights takes place when: (i) transaction
creates significant externalities (cost to third parties; for instance a rule that forbids someone close to
bankruptcy to transfer its assets); (ii) the external costs are non monetazible (“moralism”); and (iii)
situations of paternalism (contracts can be invalidated if signed under influence; minors are protected by
law). Id. at 1111-15.
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With this initial understanding of property rights and allocation, the next section
advances the transposition of these concepts to the international context.
B. TRANSPOSING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS CONCEPT TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The transposition process of L&E from the domestic to the international settings
requires some parsing. I begin by employing Trachtman’s analogy of four concepts, as
suggested below:197
Domestic L&E

International L&E

Individuals

States

Tragedy of the Commons

Anarchical System / Res nullius

Individual’s preferences

States’ preferences

Property rights

Regulatory Jurisdiction
Table 6 - Pairing of Concepts

The first possible pairing in this transposition is to compare individuals with
states. Individuals or groups of individuals are the central actors, but not the exclusive
ones, in domestic L&E analysis; states are similarly the central, and also not exclusively,
actors in international L&E.
Second, like the tragedy of the commons among individuals, states found
themselves in a primitive order. Maybe it is even better to say that instead of order,

197

See See Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L. L
1, 11-15 (2001-2002). It should be noted that Trachtman’s overall framework seems to draw from a blend
of research in both economics and political science, drawing from the acknowledged work of Oliver
Williamson and Douglass North elsewhere in his writings. Id. n.17-18 at 9, n.204 at 79.
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anarchy reigned.198 That is akin to the idea of “commons,” or a res nullius regime
manifested in the international society.199
Third, to the same extent that individuals have their own preferences, states also
have preferences in the form of policy decisions. An individual may value education or a
house by the seashore as the most important asset to the same extent that a state may
value the protection of environment or the expansion of its territory as cornerstone
policies.
Fourth, just as individuals have property rights (control over something; the right
of individual to control physical assets), states also have their property rights. Largely,
this idea of control over something (property) can be paired with the concept of
regulatory jurisdiction. As Trachtman puts it, property and jurisdiction “involve legallyconstructed packages of control of things of value.”200 I illustrate this analogy with the
following figure:

198

Here, I do not use the term anarchy in the technical sense of international relations theory, but
in the common sense of disorder. In international law, as Fidler explains, “anarchy is the opposite of
hierarchy – a political context in which the actors centralize power and create superior and inferior sources
of authority. Conceptually speaking, politics within a State are hierarchical, but politics among States are
anarchical.” David Fidler, A Theory of Open-Source Anarchy, 15(1) INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES
259, 262 (2008).
199

Res nullius is the Latin expression meaning “the property of no one.” See BALLENTINE'S LAW
DICTIONARY (3d ed., 1969). In the world commons, states could exercise regulatory jurisdiction with very
little limitations. Surely, I mean limitations set by treaties and CIL because they were very primitive at this
point of history. What limitations in domestic statutes or constitutions existed is another question.
200

Trachtman, supra note 197, at 11. Cf. D’Amato, supra note 57, at 1113 (employing the
“entitlement” language of Calabresi and Melamed in the human rights context).
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Figure 1 – Property Rights and Jurisdiction

C. TRANSACTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TRANSACTIONS OF REGULATORY
JURISDICTION
Recall that the idea of res nullius corresponds to the notion of nobody’s property
and it was previously employed in the property rights context. Also bear in mind that in
the domestic setting, L&E acknowledges the transition from the commons to the property
rights society.201 Similarly, international society evolved from the commons to a regime
of property rights set by international law.
The “commons” in international law is the world itself. When man was found in
the state of nature, they had little impact on the world and could survive without
international law. Once states (the political unit) were established, their individual action
(adding “sheep” to the common) begun to threaten the world and international law
became necessary.202

201

As Trachtman puts it: “as property of this type [increasing value to the legislating state of the
application of its jurisdiction] becomes more valuable, given that it is otherwise subject to appropriation,
we would expect the rise of property rights: in this context, ‘property rights’ or ‘entitlements’ would be
expected to be comprised of international or federal laws or legal principles allocating prescriptive
jurisdiction.” See Trachtman, supra note 197, at 14.
202

I am in debt to Professor Dau-Schmidt for helping in the elaboration of this analogy. See also
Trachtman explanation in terms of externalities: “When states regulate, they cause and encounter
regulatory externalities: costs are imposed on outsiders without commensurate benefit or without
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At this point, it is not relevant to understand which factors inform each
international law transaction. Agreeing with Dunoff and Trachtman, I assume that like
any society, international society is a “place where individual actors or groups of actors
encounter one another and sometimes have occasion to cooperate [and transact].”203
Surely, the types of transactions in the domestic and international settings are different.
Dunoff and Trachtman point out that the “assets traded in this international ‘market’ are
not goods or services per se, but assets peculiar to states: components of power.”204
And it is important to observe that these transactions take place in many forms: (i)
states can voluntarily “trade” their jurisdictional power (e.g. by a treaty); (ii) CIL,
functionally speaking, produces the same effect on the regulatory jurisdiction; and (iii)
international courts’ decisions can also affect regulatory jurisdiction of states when it
clarifies the meaning of international law. Ultimately, international law (treaty, CIL,
judicial decisions, etc.) is law that allocates regulatory jurisdiction, as the next section
establishes.

III. ALLOCATION OF REGULATORY JURISDICTION (ARJ)
In this section, I argue that international law – as contained in its many regimes is a device of ARJ. Recall that in the trade regime, the national treatment clause

legitimation by their consent or another basis. The outsiders may wish to come to an accommodation
regarding these costs, but in theory the parties will only agree if the accommodation enhances their
aggregate welfare. . . While all regulatory externalities will not be worth internalizing, due to transaction
costs, the existence of regulatory externalities suggests the evaluation of the utility of transactions in
regulatory authority. . . The point here is that states may wish to engage in transactions regarding both types
of externality.” Joel Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10(3) J. INT’L ECON. L. 631, 644-45
(2007).
203

Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 191, at 10.

204

Id. at 10.
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prescribes that an importing state should treat imported goods no less favorably than it
treats domestic like-products. The importing state, which is subject to the international
trade regime, relinquishes part of its autonomy to treat imported goods. Other regimes
produce similar effects. State parties to the core ILO conventions (or the ILO core labor
regime) are restrained by the obligations imposed by this regime. They relinquished their
regulatory authority to permit forced or compulsory labor in their territory; in fact, they
are actually compelled to take positive actions to eliminate it. Likewise, if one thinks
about international environmental law, the regime concerning the protection of the ozone
layer, with its many revisions, prescribes legally binding obligations phasing out the use
of halogenated hydrocarbons that have been shown to play a role in ozone depletion. The
parties of that regime handed over, once more, their discretion to, for instance, permit the
use of those types of substance.
Overall, the authority of states to regulate and prescribe law is the property being
restrained by those regimes. This is akin to asserting that regulatory jurisdiction is being
restrained. The idea is actually broad: international law can prevent a state to regulate in a
certain way or require a state to regulate in a certain way.
In the end, the international law system can be understood as a multilevel system
(horizontal and vertical) of allocation of regulatory jurisdiction.205 The terms horizontal
and vertical allocations denote, respectively, allocation among states and allocation
between international organizations (global or regional) and states.

205

See Joel P. Trachtman, The World Trading System, The International Legal System and
Multilevel Choice, 12(4) EUR. L. J. 469 (2006). See also Trachtman, supra note 202, at 634-38 (providing
three illustrations of ARJ problems in trade – not only concerning extraterritoriality).
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Interestingly, if one thinks of regimes and international law as a mechanism of
restraint, the idea that regulatory jurisdiction is being allocated may not be intuitively
grasped. It seems that, one could argue, restraints are just “limitations” on power, not
“allocations” of power. But one way to envision that allocation is occurring is to think
that before states agreed to these regimes, states had discretion to exercise their
regulatory authority at their will (without considering, at this point, limitations on this
exercise coming from general international law). Once bound by regimes obligations, this
authority is somewhat transferred (many times not totally, but partially). Another way to
see that allocation occurs is by thinking that breaches of obligations would barely
produce any effect on the violator before regimes existed. The violating state would not
be held accountable and no enforcement mechanism existed to compel compliance
(putting aside the issue of how much enforcement really exists in international law).
When regimes are created, to different degrees, states may be held liable, exposed to
criticism, and, depending on the regime at issue, subject to authorized countermeasures.
Regimes, thus, perform allocation of authority.
As Trachtman posits,
it can be argued that all WTO cases are concerned with allocation or regulatory
authority, just as all applications of international law are concerned with the
questions of whether the respondent state retained or transferred authority to
effect the measures at issue.206

Finally, the broad set of norms and regimes governing the international system
not only affect the formal allocation of authority, as Howse and Nicolaidis observe.207

206

Trachtman, supra note 202, at 633.

207

Howse & Nicolaids, Democracy Without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics
in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY,
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Ultimately, regimes affect how power is legitimized politically and how, and by whom, it
is exercised. Under this reading, international law functions as guiding norms for political
processes rather than institutional structures.208 Though consequences of that observation
are not explored here in terms of political science doctrine (legitimacy, democratic
deficit, etc.), this has been a growing issue raised in the literature.
1. The ARJ function of General International Law
In general, for international law, the point to note is that not only conventions, but
also CIL, perform ARJ. Functionally speaking, the obligations created by CIL are meant
to constrain and restrain regulatory jurisdiction, thus performing ARJ.
Some confusion may be created because an open-ended question is which norms
of international have attained CIL status.209 Although no precise response to this question
is found in the literature, once a norm is characterized as CIL, it produces the legal effect
(constraining and restraining) on the regulatory jurisdiction of states.
2. The ARJ function of the WTO

SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 165 (Broude & Shany eds. 2008)(discussing these concepts in the context
of European integration).
208

Id. at 165.

209

The traditional doctrine of CIL is that is made up of state practice and opinio juris. These two
elements are respectively known as the objective and subjective elements of the definition. The first is
about looking on actual practice and behavior of states. The second is the requirement that the particular
norm is observed out of a sense of legal obligation. See Brownlie (2003), at 6-10. As Ochoa summarizes,
the criticisms about this definition are classic and well-known: (i) it is a circular definition; (ii) the practice
(objective) element brings up questions of how much time and widespread consistency is necessary to
create CIL; (iii) in human rights, especially, a contradiction as to the formation of CIL is blatant: states,
including regular violators of human rights, are monopoly holders of the formal authority to create CIL. See
Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT. L. 119 (2007). See
also her differentiation of the terms usage, practice, custom, international custom, customary law, and CIL.
Id. 125-28.
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Overall, WTO rules will perform some allocation. Obligations in international law
can be grouped in rules of negative and positive obligations.210
2.1. Negative Rules
Let me begin with examples of negative rules: the NT clause (article I of the
GATT) and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions (article XI of the GATT).211 It is
probably useful to think about the allocation function of these clauses by simply
imagining a world where no NT and article XI exist.212
Concerning the NT clause, the immediate consequence of its disappearance would
give states unfettered discretion to treat imported goods the way they wanted. As odd as it
may sound today, a domestic statute in state “A” prescribing that imported goods “P”
coming from state “B” would be surcharged with a 100% tax as compared to the like
domestic good, would not be legally objectionable in terms of public or international

210

While referring to classic authors of public international law (e.g. Kelsen), Pauwelyn
distinguishes four functions of most norms of international law regarding states:
(1)
They impose an obligation on states to do something (positive, command);
(2)
They impose an obligation on states not to do something (negative, prohibition);
(3)
They grant a right to states not to do something (exemption)
(4)
They grant a right to states to do something (permission).
On the basis of norms of types (1) and (2), other states derive rights. On the basis of norms of
types (3) and (4), that is, those granting a right to states, other states derive obligations. See Pauwelyn,
supra note 47, at 153-58. In addition, norms of international law may empower organs, institutions or
individuals or regulate other norms (secondary norms, e.g. Hart). Id. See also Trachtman, supra note 205, at
469-70 (suggesting that rules of positive integration impose obligations on states to regulate in a certain
way – type “1” above, and rules of negative integration impose restraints, limitations on states regulatory
power - type “2” above).
211

Article XI of GATT targets, with a very broad prohibition, the use of instruments like quotas.
Its relevant part states that: “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party . . . .”GATT, art. XI.1. There are exceptions in the clause itself, such as in sub-paragraph
2 (export prohibitions to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other essential products), and along other
parts of the agreement, such as Article XII (restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments).
212

Maybe it would be better to say to imagine the world as it was before the World War II in
terms of multilateral trade obligations.
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trade law (surely, I am not considering whether the hypothetical state enacting such law
could have already prevented such discrimination by means of constitutional or domestic
law). A similar effect occurs when one “erases” article XI of the GATT. State “A” would
be able to impose at the border a ban on imported goods “P” without further legal
concerns of compliance with international law.
The NT and article XI clauses come into play to curtail, at different moments
(internally and at the border) the original regulatory autonomy of state “A.” Again, it is
worth remembering that “restrained regulatory authority” equals “restrained regulatory
jurisdiction.” In addition, restrained regulatory jurisdiction means that allocation of
regulatory jurisdiction occurred. Originally, states had unrestricted discretion in relation
to national treatment and quantitative restrictions. Now, governments have this power
restrained, giving it away to the WTO regime (or, as one can envision, giving it away to
the international system because of the reciprocal restrained behavior expected from
other members).213
213

Though I above exemplified ARJ in the context of negative rules of trade in goods, trade in
services bears similar analogies. In the area of educational services, for instance, this author researched the
restraining effects of the GATS in relation to the Brazilian educational regulatory framework. Some of the
alleged restraining effects of GATS referred to the impact on the ability of states to keep a publicly funded
system only to national institutions in the light of foreign educational providers, since the GATS contains a
national treatment obligation. However, in that context, because of particularities of the GATS, I concluded
that the restraining effects were less worrisome. In that work, I did not explicitly used the ARJ terminology,
but regulatory space concepts. See Gustavo F. Ribeiro, Please Enlighten Me: What Does the World Trade
Organization Have to Do with the Liberalization of Higher Education? (Jan. 15, 2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096589 (“[o]ne government can conclude that (i) no level of liberalization is
desirable for its higher education; or (ii) that a certain degree of liberalization can produce benefits; or (iii)
that total liberalization can bolster one's higher education system. In each of these cases, the GATS
accommodates the respective stands. This postulation does not mean that the legal flexibility of the
Agreement is the only main factor to inform the debate. It only conveys that this flexibility exists. It also
opens the space for other inputs from the education community about long-term concerns of the potential
liberalization of higher education through positive GATS commitments.”). In the context of health services,
see Lawrence O. Gastin & David P. Fidler, Biosecurity under the Rule of Law, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
437, 453 (2006-2007) (acknowledging the difficult task of equitable distribution of authority and resources
among nations. One of the reasons for such difficulty is the “abiding interest” of developed states to
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2.2 Positive Rules
Recall that positive rules are associated with the idea of constraining states to
regulate in a certain way. The most obvious example in the context of the WTO is
perhaps the TRIPS agreement.
Intellectual property rights (IPR) became covered by international trade with the
inclusion of the TRIPS during the Uruguay Round.214 The TRIPS creates minimum levels
of protection that governments have to confer to IPR.215 Many of the members did not
have those internal regulations before or provided less protective terms of IPR in their
legislations.
In the case of patents, for instance, the TRIPS demands that members make
patents available for any inventions in all fields of technology.216 Moreover, the TRIPS
requires member to protect IPR held by non-nationals, by means of a national treatment
clause. It can be said that the TRIPS Agreement obligates, mandates, or compels
members to adopt laws that conform to the international treaties on copyright, patents,
and trademarks, and to enforce these laws to the same extent in relation to protection of
foreigners.217

continue their economic vitality through free trade and investments agreements. On the other hand access
of the poor and vulnerable to essential medicines is the concern put by developing countries).
214

The GATT 1947 did not deal at all with IPRs.

215

Including the enactment of legislation on copyrights and related rights, trademarks,
geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layouts-designs of integrated circuits, and protection
of undisclosed information.
216

Provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.
See TRIPS art. 27.1. The term of protection is of at least twenty years. See TRIPS art. 33.
217

The TRIPS provides differential timeframes of legislation implementation, with more
flexibility for developing and LDCs. See TRIPS arts. 65-67.
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This is again another way to see how the TRIPS constrains regulatory jurisdiction;
consequently, the discretionary power of states to regulate are affected. By adopting
minimum levels of IPR protection, the TRIPS allocates regulatory jurisdiction in a very
specific way. Furthermore, it harmonizes minimum levels of IPR among the WTO
members.
The important thing at this point is to perceive the ARJ function of the covered
agreements. Either by negative or positive obligations, the WTO is performing ARJ.
3. The ARJ function of Human Rights Regimes
The types of existing obligations in human rights regimes can also be understood
as performing ARJ. To the same extent that the obligations, positive and negative, of the
WTO regime can be thought of in terms of ARJ, the types of state obligations arising
from human rights regimes can be understood as ARJ devices.218
Some specific examples may prove useful. Let me begin with the right to vote
found in ICCPR.219 The ‘obligation to respect’ derived from the right to vote means that
states must abstain from interfering with this right. This corresponds to the idea that the
regulatory autonomy of states to, for instance, prohibit voting cannot be exercised. The
‘obligation to protect’ means that states will have to protect individuals from other
individuals from interfering in this process. Moreover, the right to vote requires states to
provide, or fulfill, the essential “machinery” to the realization of a fair electoral process.

218

At this point, I am just trying to show that these regimes contain the same ARJ functionality as
the WTO regime.
219

ICCPR art. 25.
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This again is similar to the idea of a positive obligation by which states have to adopt
legislation.
The wording of those obligations does not always translate into specific
obligations. Consider, for instance, the right to food, housing and health care found in the
global regime.220 The parties to the ICESCR have the obligation to respect, protect, and
fulfill this right. But the ICESCR prescribes that the parties “undertake[] to take steps . . .
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively . . .
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”221 In this sense, the type of
legislation that should be enacted by states is not precisely specified.222 In spite of that,
the regulatory jurisdiction of states is being constrained by the ICESCR norms, though
with less precision.
It would be less useful to repeat the idea that restraints and constraints are
fundamentally ways to articulate that allocation of regulatory authority and ARJ is
occurring. States are obliged to enact or apply law (through the enactment of domestic
legislation, executive action, or judicial implementation) in accordance with the ARJ
created by the regime. The next section analyzes the types of ARJ in terms of TCs.

IV. STRATEGIES OF ARJ
As already mentioned, ARJ is a function of TCs in the adopted L&E model. What
does that exactly mean? The correlation is explained again by Trachtman. His point is to

220

ICESCR art. 11.

221

ICESCR art. 2(1)(emphasis added).

222

Domestic law implementing food stamps programmes, food subsidies, among others, can all
serve to fulfill the obligation, and there is much discretion left to states on that task.
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focus on the kind of TCs and circumstances involved in the adoption of a certain ARJ.
Then, one could assess the extent to which certain allocations or transactions may result
in greater efficiency.223 An efficient allocation would be an allocation in which authority
is allocated to those who would derive the most value from the allocation at the lowest
TC.224
A. STRATEGIES OF ARJ
In 2002, Trachtman elaborated on three strategies of ARJ that would achieve the
goal of efficient allocation. They are as follows:
Strategy Name

Initial TC

Subsequent TC

Anticipating Transactions

L

H

(2)

Clear Allocation

H

L

(3)

Muddy/Organizational Allocation

H

H

(1)

Table 7 – Three Types of Allocations225

The table could actually be reproduced as having an extra column and an extra
row. An extra column because Trachtman’s assertion goes to the point of suggesting what
type of rule (territorial, effects etc…) is the prescribed efficient outcome of an

223

Issues of efficiency and equity may arise in this type of discussion. They have specific
meanings. In economics, for instance, efficiency means the relationship between aggregated benefits and
costs of a situation while equity refers to the distribution of income among individuals. As Polinsky
simplifies, “efficiency corresponds to the ‘size of the pie,’ while equity has to do with how it is sliced.”
Polinsky, supra note 186, at 7.
224

Trachtman, supra note 202, at 645. The question of using efficiency or equity in allocation of
rights appeared early on in the Calabresi and Melamed’s paper. The authors points out that when deciding
on an initial allocation of entitlements, three reasons to substantiate the decision come up: (i) economic
efficiency, (ii) distributional preferences, and (iii) other justice considerations. While economic efficiency
corresponds to the bare notion of minimizing cost, they suggest that distributional goals involve situations
in which a society wishes to maximize the chances that individuals will have at least a minimum
endowment of particular goods – e.g., education, clothes or bodily integrity. Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 193, at 1100. They notice, however, that it is hard to know what content can be poured into that term
[justice considerations], at least given the very broad definitions of economic efficiency and distributional
goals that we have used. Is there, in other words, a reason which would influence a society's choice of
initial entitlements that cannot be comprehended in terms of efficiency and distribution? Id.
225

Joel Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending “Trade and . . .”, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 77,
83-84 (2002). See also, Trachtman, supra note 197, at 33.
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allocation.226 An extra row because, in a later paper, Trachtman splits the third strategy
into two distinguishable (but intertwined) strategies: “muddy or solomonic entitlements”
and “organization solutions.”227 The split in a new form of strategy conveys the idea that
an “organizational solution” is a distinguishable strategy itself, to the extent that a kind of
shared ownership (such as the WTO or any other form of international cooperation) with
a governance mechanism is now part of the allocation process. Thus, Trachtman’s final
elaboration of ARJ strategies is depicted as follows:
Strategy
Name

Initial
TC

Subsequent
TC

(1)

Anticipate
Transactions

L

H

(2)

Clear
Entitlements

H

L

(3)

Muddy or
Solomonic
Entitlements

H

H

(4)

Organizational
Solutions

H

H

Table 8 – Four Types of Allocations228

Translated to the WTO context, for instance, Trachtman exemplifies the types of
TCs in which a particular strategy of ARJ might best achieve the goal of efficient
allocation. The allocation is given to those most greatly affected at the lowest transaction
cost. The WTO anticipates transactions because it leaves authority over areas considered
to be “sovereign” of states, presumably leaving authority in the hands of those who value
it most. A clear entitlement, on the other hand, takes place when the WTO minimizes
TCs by providing clear and complete property rights that are agreed to be transferrable.
226

See Trachtman, supra note 225, at 83, 84. I do not consider this point here and this is why I do
not expand the column table.
227

See Trachtman, supra note 202, at 645-46.

228

Id.
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For instance, every member has the right to set their schedule of tariffs, but the WTO
creates a structure by which theses tariffs are negotiated and normally reduced.229 A
muddy, or solomonic entitlement, corresponds to open questions such as whether states
have the authority to block imports of goods based on the way that they are produced.230
Finally, the WTO itself would represent an organizational solution to certain cooperation
problems.
The existence of different strategies of allocation as a function of variables has
been also noted by Goldsmith and Posner. They explain that the elements of GATT/WTO
that have flourished generally solve coordination problems. They use this assessment,
however, to bring up a criticism about the fragility of international law: “when states are
coordinating policies but do not know what the future will bring . . . they will not agree to
specific rules;”231 and that “GATT/WTO rules are vague because states will not agree to
anything more.”232 Arguably, what the authors call “coordination” would match strategies
of anticipation or clear entitlements, whereas “agree not to agree” would go with a
muddy or organizational entitlement.
B. TRANSACTION COSTS (TCS)

229

See GATT art. II. See also sub-paragraph 7: “The Schedules annexed to this Agreement
[negotiations of tariffs] are hereby made an integral part of Part I of this Agreement.”
230

“Solomonic” solution here is an allusion to the biblical episode (Kings 3:16-28) about the
quarrel of two women arguing as being the mother of a baby. When the contention was brought to King
Solomon, Solomon threatened to cut the baby in half in order to reveal who was the true mother. The idea
must be transposed to the international context to the extent that a muddy or solomonic solution may lead
states to the negotiating table by causing them to reveal to one another their valuations of a certain
allocation. See Trachtman, supra note 225, at 83-4.
231

JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Oxford

232

Id. at 161-62.

2005).
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Another relevant concept in this methodology relates to the role of transactions
costs (TC) influencing ARJ. Generally, TCs are defined as “costs other than the money
price that are incurred in trading goods or services [the transactions].”233 The definition
has to be understood in light of the adopted methodology. Recall that the transactions in
my case are transactions in regulatory jurisdiction, not “goods or services.”
Generally, in L&E, TCs are captured in terms of information costs, bargaining
costs, decision costs, and enforcement costs.234 These costs also manifest in the
international setting involving ARJ. As Trachtman recalls, the world is beset by TCs.235
For instance, imagine the negotiation of a treaty and thus the creation of a new
ARJ. States may underestimate the number of interested parties in the transaction
(information costs); states may convene in diplomatic meetings or conferences that have
costs (bargaining costs in forms of currency disbursements); there are costs originating
from the ARJ itself since this means more or less power, and costs can attach to the
enforcement of the transaction itself (enforcement/monitoring costs).

233

PAUL M. JOHNSON, A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY TERMS (2005), online edition,
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/transaction_costs.
234

Id (exemplifying costs in typical trading contexts. For a transaction to occur, there are a number
of activities involving opportunity costs in terms of time, energy and money. If the transaction is
technically complicated, negotiations for such a detailed contract may itself be prolonged and very costly in
terms of time, travel expenses, lawyers' fees, and so on. After a trade has been agreed upon, there may also
be significant costs involved in monitoring or policing the other party to make sure he is honoring the terms
of the agreement). See also Polinsky, supra note 186, at 14 (illustrating TCs: costs of identifying the parties
related to the transaction, costs of getting together, the costs of bargaining process, and the costs of
enforcing the bargain itself). TCs are also generally categorized in “search and information costs,”
“bargaining and contracting costs,” and “policing and enforcement costs.”
235

Trachtman, supra note 197, at 24 (recognizing that because of those TCs, the Coase theorem in a zero transaction cost world, allocation of prescriptive jurisdiction would have no effect on efficiency,
although it would have distributive consequences – does not apply to the problem.) For the Coase theorem,
see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). For a summary, see Robert D.
Cooter, The Coase Theorem, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 457 (1987). See also
R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 4-5 (1990).
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In addition, recall that the concerned issue, by definition, is “extraterritorial” ARJ
and two regimes with different subject matters are involved (trade and human rights). It
seems plausible to anticipate that any transaction of this sort will be inherently costly.
The challenge, however, is to capture the nuances of these TCs and how they can be
observed.

V. HIGHLIGHTED TRANSACTION COSTS (TCS)
There are two categories of TCs that I propose as leading ones to inform my
analysis: (1) sovereignty costs; and (2) cognitive costs. Sovereignty costs are prominent
in the type of ARJ involved in the extraterritorial jurisdiction. Cognitive costs attach to
these transactions because of the different policy domains involved (trade and human
rights regimes).
A. SOVEREIGNTY COSTS
Sovereignty has a plurality of meanings and it is an evolving concept.236 A
common articulation of the concept refers the exercise of power over a defined territory.
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Krasner’s typology of four types of sovereignty translates accurate observations in terms of the
existence of different types of sovereignty. See STEVEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY (1999). The Institute of International Studies of the University of California, Berkeley has
made available an interview with Krasner exploring in detail the contents of the book. See Institute of
International Studies, UC Berkeley, Conversation with History: System Change or More of the Same
(2007), http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Krasner/krasner-con3.html. Krasner identifies: (1)
international legal sovereignty, which is about rules to recognize an independent territorial entity; (2)
interdependence sovereignty, which is the idea associated with globalization eroding sovereignty (the
notion that states are losing their ability to control movements across their own borders). As Krasner
explains, this definition is not a rule, it’s just a statement about empirical fact; (3) domestic sovereignty,
which is the standard definition, refers to both domestic authority structures and how effective they are; and
(4) Westphalian sovereignty, which refers to the notion that states have the right to autonomously
determine their own domestic authority structures. Krasner claims that the four notions of sovereignty need
not be connected. For instance, “Somalia today, it doesn’t have effective domestic sovereignty. It does have
international legal sovereignty. It doesn’t have interdependence sovereignty. It doesn’t control much. But it
actually has Vattelian-Westphalian sovereignty, because people aren't bothering with it anymore.” The
members of the European Union, in turn, are no longer a Westphalian or Vattelian-Westphalian sovereigns.
They have voluntarily agreed to subject themselves to supranational institutions like the European Court

98

Michael Kelly tracks the historic definition of sovereignty in Bodin, explaining that, as
embedded in the abstract political concept known as “state,” the end of the Thirty Years
War changed the medieval notions of sovereignty derived from religious authority:
[the end of the Thirty years War leading to] Westphalia created the political
equilibrium that was “a necessary condition for the existence of the Law of
Nations . . . Westphalia began the process of pulling the concept of sovereignty
out of the person of the ruler . . . after Westphalia, a generalized “sovereignty
package” can be said to have emerged, that each state enjoyed and which
operated to form an interconnecting network of collectively shared expectations
and presumptions.237

The notion has been challenged throughout history.238 The Colonialism period,
the League of Nations schemes of guardianship, the post-colonialism era, the
establishment of the United Nations system, post Cold-War questions of humanitarian
intervention, and, more recently, threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
have all been episodes prompting new theories of sovereignty.
The question turns out to be: how the fluid concept of sovereignty can be thought
of as TCs? As Kenneth Abbott explains, the term sovereignty costs is actually not new:
sovereignty costs may arise for psychological or symbolic reasons, or they may
have a material basis where supranational decisions could be detrimental to
national interests . . . but thinking of limitations on sovereignty as a cost leads us
to focus on situations in which the costs may vary, suggesting at least a partial

and to what they call “pooled sovereignty,” which is qualified majority voting. Krasner employs VattelianWestphalian because he claims that the notion of nonintervention was actually developed by Emmerich de
Vattel, a Swiss jurist.
Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiver”―
Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L. &
FOR. AFF. 361, 373-74 (2005)(suggesting, as well, that after Westphalia, a generalized “sovereignty
package” can be said to have emerged. Each state enjoyed and operated to form an interconnecting network
of collectively shared expectations and presumptions, where the notion of sovereignty included: equality of
states within the international community; general prohibition on foreign interference with internal affairs;
territorial integrity of the nation-state; inviolability of international borders; sovereign immunity of the state
engaged in state action; and sovereign immunity of the head of state or government. Id. at 375-76.
237
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Though, as demonstrated in the first chapter, in terms of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction
the concept seems to be well preserved.
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explanation for the varieties of legalization [wide range of normative and
institutional arrangements].239

To focus on situations in which the costs may vary is precisely the distinction that
I want to advance in this section. Arguably, transactions on extraterritorial jurisdiction
carry, in a scale of sovereignty costs, higher costs.240 This is because the affected state
(e.g., the exporter) is abdicating part of his regulatory authority to another state that can
be interpreted as intervention in the internal affairs of another country.
Most of the substantive norms of international law impose sovereignty costs on
states. But states do transact regulatory jurisdiction by accepting constraints and restraints
in their regulatory jurisdiction. This is observable in the trade and the human rights
regimes (though the motivations to ratify these categories of conventions are probably
different).241
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Kenneth W. Abbott, The Many Faces of International Legalization, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 57, 62 (1998)(emphasis added). Abbott suggests two initial variables affecting sovereignty costs: (1)
the subject issue and (2) – what I would call – the leverage of the concerned state involved. As to the
subject issue, costs of sovereignty “are especially high in areas affecting national security . . ., moderate in
areas such as economics and environmental protection, and low in technical areas where national interests
of participating states are closely aligned.” As to the leverage of the concerned state, “[s]mall states would
seem to have low sovereignty costs on average, since they already have less autonomy than large states . . .
Large states would seem to have less need for legalization, though in fact they might seek it as an efficient
way to structure governance where they can dictate the rules and exert political control over their
implementation.” Laurence Helfer also makes use of sovereignty costs in the context of human rights.
Helfer indicates that “[t]he substantive provisions of these treaties create sovereignty costs for their member
states by restricting how they treat individuals and groups located in territories subject to their jurisdiction.
See Laurence Helfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 1 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 86 (2008).
240

I employ the notion of “scale of sovereignty” from private international law analysis. As
Camara explains, “States’ settings of private international law can be placed along a scale of sovereignty
stretching from complete abdication of adjudicative functions (an abandonment of any claim to the right to
set the rules, regardless of whether state ends would thereby be advanced) to a complete assumption of
legislative functions (a claim to the right to set the rules under all circumstances).” See K. A. D. Camara,
Costs of Sovereignty, 107 WEST VA. L. REV. 385, 412 (2005).
241

Joining the WTO means a trade-off between sovereignty (cost) and the formal enjoyment of
guarantees of non-discriminatory trade imposed on all members (benefit). As to the motivations to join the
human rights regimes, see Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in 4
COLLECTED COURSES OF HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 208 (Hague Academy ed.,
1989)(asserting that even the human rights literature questions whether international human rights actions
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It is a different thing, however, that states will accept that other states may
directly and unilaterally interfere in one state’s regulatory jurisdiction. Voluntarily
accepting such a transaction would be, perhaps, equivalent to accept, ex-ante, that one
government is prone not to accomplish its own obligations. Therefore, extraterritorial
transactions are said not to have a very “liquid market” per se and it is quite an
extraordinary situation when states agree on matters of extraterritorial jurisdiction.242
Heightened TCs, in form of sovereignty costs, inform these transactions. In other words,
the extraterritorial nature of these allocations escalates concerns over sovereignty and
undue intervention in internal affairs, making this type of allocation costly, and therefore,
exceptional.

were truly sensitized by altruistic human rights motivations. As noted by Henkin, one can see that the
human rights idea of protection of foreigners abroad has a good deal to do with powerful states’ interests in
protecting their “assets” abroad; the establishment of the ILO, grounded on the protection of international
human right in labor, could be read as capitalism’s attempt to bar socialism.). Another interesting analysis,
not concerning contemporary regimes but the abolition of slavery, is explored by Martinez. See Jenny S.
Martinez, Anti-Slavery Courts and the Dawn of International Human Rights Law, 117 YALE L.J. 550
(2008)(contending that the slavery abolition story can be seen through different lenses: realists and neo–
realists tend to focus on the material self-interest of Britain; institutionalism will likely see the treaties and
the court system to abolishment as an utility-maximizing mechanisms for cooperation; constructivist would
see in the way in which states interests were constructed and reconstructed by their interaction. She
concludes that each of these theories have some truth.)
242

And as components of power, Trachtman points out that, unsurprisingly, this market is not very
“liquid.” See Trachtman, supra note 197, at 11-12. I understand that Trachtman is referring here to
international law that specifically addresses jurisdiction to prescribe as the core element of the transaction.
The concept of liquidity generally means how easy it is to buy and sell something. And this lack of
liquidity on treaties with extraterritorial application is also noted by Bianchi. See commentaries from
Andrea Bianchi in Harold G. Maier, Jurisdictional Rules in Customary International Law in
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 64 (Meessen ed. 1996)(criticizing the
contention advanced by several authors that resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction should be pursued by
means of international agreements. Maier recalls that “practice shows that is quite extraordinary that states
reach agreement on the matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction.” But he also recognizes that international
agreement may usefully serve to attract disputes into institutionalized mechanisms of dispute settlement
agreed on by that treaty).
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B. COGNITIVE COSTS
Generally, the very idea of regimes expresses distinguishable domains of
knowledge, or of discrete communities with particular beliefs and lexicons.243 Keohane
and Nye employ the term “club model” to describe the institutional origin of these
distinct domains of regimes:
[i]nternational institutions have facilitated cooperation by reducing the costs of
making agreements, through established rules and practices, and by providing
information, particularly about the extent to which governments were following
these rules. Beginning with the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, key regimes
for governance operated like “clubs.” Cabinet ministers or the equivalent,
working in the same issue-area, initially from a relatively small number of
relatively rich countries, got together to make rules. Trade ministers dominated
GATT; finance ministers ran the IMF; defense and foreign ministers met at
NATO; central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).244

Consequently, these international regimes organized and developed themselves in
terms of issue-areas, cluster-areas, operating without close links to other regimes in other
issue-areas.245 They are sparsely connected, but not without costs.
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Ruggie’s comparison of regimes and languages are indicative of this idea. For Ruggie, like any
social institution, international regimes limit the discretion of their constituents units to decide and act on
issue that fall within the regime’s domain. Regimes are akin to language and have their own generative
grammar. John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the
Postwar Economic Order, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 195, 196 (Stephen Krasner ed. 1983).
244

Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy (John Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper n. 4, 2001),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/visions/publication/keohane_nye.pdf.
245

Surely, this is a generalization. Regimes are sparsely interconnected in different degrees. The
case of the intellectual property regime is symptomatic. The WTO regime embraced the intellectual
property regime through the TRIPS. And even a regional human rights regime (such as in Europe) has been
faced with the protection of intellectual property under the human rights banner. As to the case of
intellectual property, as Alvarez posits, “from one perspective, intellectual property protections were
successfully linked to the trade regime because the United States and its allies refused to budge on their
position that Uruguay Round agreements had to be accepted in their totality and that there could be no à la
carte shopping as between trade agreements, which had occurred at the Tokyo Round. From a more
practical standpoint, this effort at linkage worked because there was a draft TRIPS Agreement on the table,
drawn up by an expert group, as the final package deal was being struck; the GATT Secretariat was able to
use this draft to craft a composite text that was ultimately incorporated into the version offered by the
GATT’s director-general as part of a final compromise (the “Dunkel Draft”). But the success of intellectual
property linkage might be attributed to credible hegemonic threats: principally U.S. threats to initiate
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Drawing from organizational theory, Lang explains that the current integration of
these different domains of knowledge is potentially barred, among other things, by the
cognitive and epistemological frameworks that can be deeply embedded and highly
resistant to change.246 Sarfaty indicates similar patterns of obstacles that functionallyoriented regimes create. Using an anthropological approach in a case study concerning
the internalization of indigenous human rights in the World Bank policies, Sarfaty
highlights how internal factors of an organization (such as powers relations within the
institution, lack of technical expertise, and disciplinary departmentalization) are relevant
factors affecting the circumstances of internalization of one regime in another.247 Finally,
Haas, a “cognitive theorist,” draws from many disciplines to show that
the combination of prior belief systems, operational codes, and cognitive maps
shapes decision makers responses not only by influencing the ways in which they
interpret the world but also by erecting barriers to the types of information that
they consider valuable.248

“Special 301.” See Jose E. Alvarez, WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146-48 (2002). See
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 73049 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). In this case, an American company
(Anheuser-Busch) disputed with a Czech company the right to distribute beer under the brand of
“Budweiser” and other variations. The case was adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). As Helfer posits, “one might reasonably ask what an international human rights court and the
human rights treaty it interprets has to do with intellectual property. The answer is the right of property,
which appears in the European Convention together with more widely recognized civil and political
liberties such as the prohibitions of slavery and torture, due process rights, and freedom of expression. Yet
the protection of “the peaceful enjoyment of . . . possessions” in Article 1 of Protocol 1 (Article “1”) has
long been considered among the weakest rights in the Convention system, affording governments broad
discretion to regulate private property in the public interest.” See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation
Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of Human Rights, 49(1) HARV. INT’L L.J. (2008).
246

Lang draws from organizational theory (Bo Hedberg’s work). See Lang, supra note 3, at 402,

405.
247

Galit A. Sarfaty, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms, 114
YALE L. J. 1791, 1794, 1804 (2008).
248

See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46(1) INT’L ORG. 1, 29 (1992). The term “cognitive theorist” is employed by Kenneth
Abbott to indicate Ernst Haas as a leading “cognitive” theorist. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335, n19 339
(1989). It should be noted that Haas is credited elsewhere in the literature for the introduction of the role of
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In addition to the above points, my research experience at the WTO suggested the
existence of cognitive costs since, generally speaking, when WTO officers asked me
about my dissertation topic, and I mentioned the words “human rights” as part of it,
immediate barriers of communication were erected. This may be a generalization but
seems to be also revealing of this particular type of TCs.
Therefore, what I want to capture by cognitive costs refers to the obstacles
identified above that seems to be created by the very specialization of regimes and the
formation of cognitive communities.249 Though I have not found this particular source of

“epistemic communities” in international politics. Epistemic communities is “a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area defined as are one possible provider of this sort of
information and advice.” As demands for their specialized information arise, “networks or communities of
specialists capable of producing and providing the information emerge and proliferate. The members of a
prevailing community become strong actors at the national and transnational level as decision makers
solicit their information and delegate responsibility to them. A community's advice, though, is informed by
its own broader worldview. To the extent to which an epistemic community consolidates bureaucratic
power within national administrations and international secretariats, it stands to institutionalize its influence
and insinuate its views into broader international politics.” Id. at 3. See also Emanuel Adler & Peter M.
Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research
Program, 46(1) INT’L ORG. 367 (1992).
249

Cognitive means “relating to, being, or involving cognition” and cognition is broadly defined
as “the act or process of knowing.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 446 (1981). I guess I should
distinguish the quality of being “cognitive” from two other terms that may cause some confusion: (1)
cognizable; and (2) cognoscibility. The first one is used in the legal jargon in a very specific sense: for
instance, to be capable of being known or recognized for purposes of establishing standing, a plaintiff must
allege a judicially cognizable injury; American Indians qualify as a cognizable group for jury selection
purposes because they are capable of being identified as a group with common characteristic or interest that
cannot be represented by others; yet, to be cognizable means to be capable of being judicially tried or
examined before a designated tribunal. Black’s Law Dictionary, at 276. The concept of cognoscibility, in
turn, can be traced in Bentham in the context that the law should be capable of being understandable by
people (it should be understood by everyone: “popular cognoscibility”). For those interested in that
terminology, as one commentator affirms, the “Benthamite principle of achieving popular ‘cognoscibility’
disappeared. Not knowing the law is not an excuse to comply with it. See Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of
the Criminal Law: Wechslers Predecessors 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1126 (1978). Bentham’s notion of
cognoscibility was also directly related with his insistence upon the necessity of codification of law, since
judge made law was “dog-law.” See Dean Jr. Alfange, Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 55 (1969-1970).
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cost expressed as “cognitive cost” under the legal or international relations literature, my
case studies will try to disclose that these costs exist.
Finally, it may be helpful to highlight other aspects related to cognitive costs. It
appears that cognitive costs are a category of information costs. The latter is a more
common usage of the “costs” language associated with searching, deciphering, and
interpreting information. However, cognitive costs also transmit the idea that they are
generated by this peculiar specialization of regimes in cognitive frameworks, making
them somewhat different from purely information costs.
This is a certain paradox because regimes are essentially a form of reducing
information costs. This is an elementary aspect of institutionalism theory:
[t]he value of regimes is the ability to reduce the uncertainty and transaction
costs that inhibit effective cooperation. Once up and running, regimes narrow the
range of anticipated behavior, thus encouraging compliance with common norms.
In economic terms, once a regime has been established, the marginal costs of
dealing with each additional issue will be lower that it would be without a
regime.250

Now, with the main aspects of the L&E approach devised, the next section
explores some limitations of this framework. Mitigation factors are also presented.

VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE ADOPTED FRAMEWORK
A. STATE-CENTRIC MODEL
A potential critique to the L&E methodology is that it focuses on a classic model
of international law: state and regulatory jurisdiction. One could ask where I take into

250

This passage is about Keohane making use of the transaction costs language, and the new
institutional economics of Douglas North, as a rationale for cooperation. See Benjamin J. Cohen,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 105 (2008).
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account the increasing participation of non-state actors in international law, such as
global initiatives dealing with the trade and human rights linkage.
This point deserves at least two remarks. First, the analysis that I make about the
state-centric model serves to reveal the heightened sovereignty and cognitive costs of that
model. New global initiatives can be explained as not incurring the TCs identified in the
public international law system. That is to say, the type of accountability that human
rights actors are looking for in the trade and human rights linkage is finding expressions
outside of that model because of lower sovereignty and cognitive costs. The same
methodology that I employ to explain why trade sanctions are not supported by a
palatable doctrine serves to explain why TNG initiatives are gaining ground, as Chapter 4
will explore.
Second, non-state actors are undoubtedly participants of international law: in
certain regimes, individuals are subjects of international law and they are granted rights,
and sometimes locus standi to seek redress in international courts. Similarly, NGOs are
granted different degrees of participation in government decision-making processes and
courts (for instance, through amicus curiae). In addition, corporations are also core
participants: their interests at the WTO have already led to the characterization of the
WTO as a producer-driven organization, rather than a member-driven organization.
Nonetheless, these participations are not sufficient to declare that non-state actors are, at
the current state of affairs, “makers” of international law (in either treaty-making, CIL or
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international courts).251 Accordingly, even though the participation of non-state actors is
greatly acknowledged elsewhere in the process of making of international law, it does not
follow that they are not technically “makers” of international law. Thus, the criticism
does not invalidate the state-centric model adopted here.
B. CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW V. NON-COMPLIANCE
I assume that a fundamental function of international law is the performance of
ARJ by restraining and constraining authority. But as one knows, in practice, compliance
with the obligations established by those allocations does not always happen.
Lawyers call it a breach, a violation of international law. International relations
analysts often describe it as defection. Indeed, to assume that regimes allocate regulatory
jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that compliance occurs. Realism points to
countless non-compliance situations.
For me, this is equivalent to acknowledge that regimes suffer deviations of
compliance just as as domestic law “regimes” does, but this does not surprise people
most of the time. The discussion is classic and has been iconized very early by Henkin:
“almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of
their obligations almost all of the time.”252
The point to make, though, is that non-compliance does not destroy the
assumption that international law is a device of ARJ. The formation of a certain ARJ in
terms of TCs and non-compliance with a certain ARJ are two different aspects of ARJ.
251

But see Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and Customary International Law, 48 VA. J. INT. L.
119, 182-84 (2007)(discussing, among other things, the potentiality of individuals as “makers” of
international law).
252

LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 42 (1968). See also Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law? 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997).
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Repeated non-compliance or recurrent defection can lead to new forms of allocation (or
new international law). Yet, a theory would have to be established to understand the
process of formation and modification of international law because of repeated noncompliance. This is not explored here.

VII. CASE STUDIES USING THE ARJ AND TCS METHODOLOGY
At this point, the ARJ and TCs framework have been delineated and entirely
introduced. The following case studies concern the application of the framework: (i) the
powers of the UN-SC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; (ii) the WTO Diamond
Waiver; and (iii) the trade-labor linkage discussion.
A. UN-SC POWERS UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER
In the first chapter, through legal analysis, I noted that the UN-SC powers under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was one of the few examples in which restrictive trade
measures addressing human rights violations abroad was clearly a lawful entitlement. The
first case study serves, therefore, to explain why this happens in terms of sovereignty
costs. The case does not discuss cognitive costs since, arguably, that allocation does not
involve potential cognitive costs arising from distinct policy domains or communities,
(i.e., trade and human rights).
The question deserving attention is why states agreed and transacted such an
allocation in the case of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, since heightened sovereignty
costs are presumably involved in any extraterritorial ARJ?
The most obvious reason is that the ARJ contained in Chapter VII was transacted
after World War II. Obstructing sovereignty costs were probably off-set in the very
peculiar moment of the history by a combination of factors: meeting of the minds, since
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the early 1940s, against the common enemy of Nazism; idealism towards the preservation
of peace and the avoidance of the catastrophic events of the war; the possibilities of using
the UN as a central instrument of foreign policy (by the WWII winners), among others.
For instance, Thomas Franck highlights the strength of the wartime cooperation among
allied powers in the following manner:
The drafters of the Charter - those same allied powers - decided, in their planning
for a new global system, not even to try to define what might constitute a “threat
to, or breach of the peace” or act of aggression. Instead, they assumed that this
could be left safely to future case-by-case interpretations by a willing and able
Council.253

In sum, the elaboration of Chapter VII does not disprove the idea of high TCs in
extraterritorial ARJ. Rather, it corresponds to a very peculiar allocation in a time when
these costs were lowered following such catastrophic events.
Certainly, another piece of evidence for the high cost profile of the Chapter VII
allocation is the innumerable reform proposals to change the UN-SC composition; i.e., to
change or enlarge the permanent member composition or to alter the veto power today.254
Yet, a question may arise: isn’t Chapter VII, instead of a clear entitlement, a
muddy/organizational type of ARJ, since any action depends on the deliberation of the
permanent members of the UN-SC? Arguably, the entitlement is clear to the extent that
the law is precise. If the UN-SC authorizes action, states have the duty to act
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Thomas Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security
Council Authorization? 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 50, 51 (2001). The literature on the Security Council is
huge (a point of departure for this literature is the link of UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/scbib.htm). For the historic context (the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the
Yalta Conference, and the San Francisco Conference), see ANDREW BOYD, FIFTEEN MEN ON POWDER KEG:
A HISTORY OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (1971). For an interesting discussion about the reforms of the
Council, see David Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 552 (1993).
254
This point would deserve, as well, voluminous references to literature. But as this matter is not
central to the dissertation, I do not develop it here.
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extraterritoriality in accordance with the respective resolution. What is left to the UN-SC
is not to define the possibility (or not) of an extraterritorial action, but to decide ex post
the terms of, for instance, extraterritorial economic embargo, like the time, place, and
means. The UN-SC has only to trigger the application of an existing rule and ARJ.
B. DIAMOND WAIVER
The second case study demonstrates that the WTO Diamond Waiver is not
counterfactual in proving that it is an allocation that has overcome sovereignty and
cognitive costs (though the waiver allows members to deviate from WTO obligations
because of extraterritorial human rights violations).
The complexity entailing “blood” diamonds and the waiver is enormous. For my
purpose, it is sufficient to mention that in the 1990s, a mix of internal and cross-border
wars occurred in Sierra Leone and Angola in which rebel forces used revenue from the
trade of diamonds to acquire weapons, finance their military activities, and commit
human rights violations.255
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Later on, the government of Liberia and the Republic of Congo were also involved in different
manners in the trade of conflict diamonds: in 2000, the UN alleged that Liberia supported the insurgency in
Sierra Leone with weapons and training in exchange for diamonds; in 2004, the UN found that the
Republic of Congo exported large quantities of diamonds without the required certification of origin.
Besides the evidence that the trade of diamonds was linked with the financing of insurgencies and rebel
groups, the most shocking aspect of the conflict diamonds is the horrendous human rights violations and
the exploitation of poverty related to the diamond industry. In general, the circumstances surrounding the
trade of diamonds and human rights violations were presented to the public in movies, such as Blood
Diamonds (2006) and Bling (2007). Business magazines, such as Fortune, acknowledged the disparity
between the long lasting exploration of diamond mining in Africa (130 years) and the low standards of life,
for instance, in Sierra Leone: an average man earns USD 220 a year and dies at age of 39. See Vivienne
Walt, Diamonds are Diamonds, Fortune (Dec. 11, 2006) at 50, 52.

110

Response to conflict diamonds occurred gradually and at many levels.256 From the
1990s on, the UN-SC adopted resolutions under Chapter VII establishing trade sanctions
to stop the trade in conflict diamonds.257 Second, the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme for Rough Diamonds (KPCS), an international mechanism of cooperation to
tackle the human rights violations occurring in connection with trade in diamonds, was
established in 2000.258 Finally, the WTO waived in 2003 certain member obligations for
those participating in the diamonds embargo established by the KPCS. The waiver allows
members to deviate from WTO obligations. The MFN obligation (article I of the GATT)
and the prohibition on quantitative restrictions (article XI of the GATT) are, among
others, waived. The extraterritoriality nature of the problem is clear, since the human
rights issue is taking place in the territory of the diamond exporters.
The decision of the WTO expressly recognized
the extraordinary humanitarian nature of [the conflict diamonds] and the
devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the
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For instance, NGOs and the media raised consumer awareness and pressured governments and
international organizations to act.
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In 1998, the SC adopted Resolution 1173, placing Angola under sanctions forbidding countries
from buying diamonds. See S.C. Res. 1173, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3891st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173
(1998), ¶ 12(b): “All States shall take the necessary measures ... to prohibit the direct or indirect import
from Angola to their territory of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin
regime of the GURN.” In 2000, the SC adopted Resolution 1306, putting a ban on the direct or indirect
importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone not controlled by the Government of Sierra Leone
through a certificate of origin. See S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4168th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1306 (2000). Later on in 2001, the UN applied sanctions on the Liberian diamond trade. See
Liberia: S.C. Res. 1343, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4287th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (2001). By
Resolution 1643(2005), the SC imposed an embargo on the import of all rough diamonds from Côte
d’Ivoire. S.C. Res. 1643, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5327th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1643 (2005), ¶ 6.
(“Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the import of all rough diamonds from
Côte d’Ivoire to their territory”).
258

Kimberley
Process
Certification
Scheme
[hereinafter
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (follow “Read the official KPCS document”).
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KPCS],

peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the systematic and
gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts.259

As said, the reading of the waiver could suggest that the Diamond Waiver is
counterfactual to the ARJ approach. How could the “waiver” transaction occur in light of
alleged heightened TCs? Nonetheless, what appears to be counterfactual evidence
actually reinforces the ARJ approach; the “waiver” transaction is not a clear entitlement
but an example of no allocation, or at best, a muddy or organizational strategy.
1. Sovereignty Costs
The waiver expressly recalls the “relevant resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.” It also specifically
refers to “United Nations Security Council resolution S/RES/1459(2003) that supports
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.”260
Therefore, the waiver does not overcome sovereignty costs. The waiver is just an
act in conformity with a preexisting decision concerning extraterritorial measures taken
by the UN-SC, under the powers of the UN Charter.261 As Pauwelyn criticizes, there is
actually no need to reconfirm in the WTO what was already decided in other fora.
Pauwelyn points out a certain “superiority complex” in vogue at the WTO.262 In other

259

General Council, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough
Diamonds, WT/L/518 (May 27, 2003), pmbl (emphasis added)[hereinafter Diamond Waiver]. See also
General Council, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds,
WT/L/676 (Dec. 15, 2006), ¶ 1 (extending the waiver until December 31, 2012).
260

Diamond Waiver, pmbl.

261

In the extreme, if the WTO actually “denied” a decision of those types of waiver, the WTO
would be violating international law. At the same time, strictly speaking, the WTO did not have to produce
any waiver in the referred case.
262

See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO
Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”, 24(4) MICH. J. INT’L L. 1177, 1198, 1205 (2003).
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words, the waiver is a decision that merely reproduces these obligations (whose
corresponding TCs were analyzed in the previous section).
2. Cognitive Costs
Is the waiver overcoming the allegedly high costs of recognizing human rights in
the WTO when it mentions “gross violations of human rights”? Should human rights
proponents welcome the waiver as evidence of the WTO’s seemingly openness to human
rights? Once again, it appears that the human rights language of the waiver is misleading.
The first thing to notice is the similarity (in italics) of the relevant provisions of
the waiver mentioning “human rights” and the document explaining the KPCS, as
follows:
First
Paragraph
of the
Preamble

Second
Paragraph
of the
Preamble

KPCS
WTO Diamond Waiver
Recognizing that the trade in conflict diamonds is a Recognizing that the trade in conflict diamonds is
matter of serious international concern, which can a matter of serious international concern, which
be directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, can be directly linked to the fuelling of armed
the activities of rebel movements aimed at conflict, the activities of rebel movements aimed
undermining
or
overthrowing
legitimate at undermining or overthrowing legitimate
governments, and the illicit traffic in, and governments, and the illicit traffic in, and
proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms
and light weapons.
and light weapons.
[r]ecognizing the extraordinary humanitarian nature Further recognizing the devastating impact of
of this issue and the devastating impact of conflicts conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds
fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the on the peace, safety and security of people in
peace, safety and security of people in affected affected countries and the systematic and gross
countries and the systematic and gross human human rights violations that have been
rights violations that have been perpetrated in such perpetrated in such conflicts
conflicts
Table 9 – Comparison of the KPCS and Diamond Waiver Language

This is a clear indication that the waiver is not an elaboration of the WTO bodies
concerning any “human rights” analysis. Surely, there is not even mandate for that, but
the point to make is that the waiver cannot be read as getting around the cognitive costs
of “human rights” language in the WTO.
One could even inquire whether the waiver was actually a low-cost decision
expressing a collaborative approach of the WTO towards the human rights regime. This
critique has been captured by the remarks of Krista Schefer, though not in terms of TCs.
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Schefer affirms that the waiver is in reality “chilling” the progress on the trade and
human rights dialogue.263 Since the waiver mentions “human rights,” it eliminates further
need of discussing the problem. Schefer suggests that the basic tension between the
measures used and WTO rules is no longer a reason to engage in exchanges of views
between the trade and human rights communities.264
The Diamond Waiver reflects a type of strategy that is simply mirrors the analysis
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Although the waiver can induce the reader to think
that it overcame sovereignty and cognitive costs, the waiver, rather, confirms the
hypothesis of heightened TCs.
Finally, another interesting aspect of the case is its reference to the KPCS scheme.
The KPCS regime is a regulatory scheme entailing working groups, committees, and
annual plenary meetings convening governments, industry representatives and civil
society members. As a TNG initiative, Chapter 4 will analyze it.
C. TRADE AND LABOR LINKAGE
The linkage between international trade and labor standards is far from a recent
development.265 Aside from earlier developments of the linkage in the ILO context (see
analysis under sovereignty costs), in the GATT context, it should be noted that the

263

See Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, Chilling the Protection of Human Rights: What the
Kimberley Process Waiver Can Tell Us About the WTO's Effect on International Law 1, 22-23 (NCCR
Trade Regulation Working Paper No. 2007/03, Jan. 01, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094619.
264

Id. at 22.

265

Steve Charnovitz, The (Neglected) Employment Dimension of the World Trade Organization,
in 125, 136 SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 157 (Leary & Warner eds.,
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006)(noting that on a multilateral basis, action to regulate trade for social reasons began
in the early twentieth century with conventions to restrict trade in sexual services of woman – 1904 – and
trade in toxic phosphorus matches – 1906).
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Havana Charter contained a provision on “fair labour standards”266 that could have
provided an initial linkage, and formal allocation of regulatory jurisdiction, between the
ILO regime and the GATT 1947. The linkage in the Havana Charter was never made
concrete.
Since then, other attempts to include labor rights in the trade regime have taken
place, but the next “relevant” outcome of the “WTO and labour rights saga,” as suggested
by Howse, came almost fifty years later with the 1996 Singapore Ministerial.267 Finally,
the latest episode came with the 1998 ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work.268
Similar to the analysis developed aboce, all of these developments, despite
appearing to be counterfactual evidence against the ARJ framework, are proof of the
heightened sovereignty and cognitive costs as applied to the trade and labor linkage.
1. Sovereignty Costs
The first evidence of sovereignty costs can be inferred from the following passage
by Laurence Helfer about the history of the ILO. He acknowledges that
[t]he [ILO] Constitution of 1919 expressly authorized “measures of an economic
character” in response to a state’s failure to implement a Commission’s findings.
But the organization never exercised its power to impose trade sanctions, and the
266

Havana Charter art. 7. The official title of the ITO Charter is Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization. The official text of the never-ratified instrument is found in U.N. Doc.
E/Conf. 2/78 (March, 24 1948). For those interested in the GATT 1947 history and explanations of the
political context that led to the failure of the ITO, see Jackson, supra note 142, at 31-43. See also DOUGLAS
A. IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT 98 (2008).
267

Robert Howse et al., The World Trade Organization and Labour Rights: Man Bites Dog, in 157
SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 157, 179 (Leary & Warner eds.,
Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).
268

ILO, ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work [hereinafter 1998 ILO
Declaration], in 2 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCES 86TH SESSION RECORDED OF PROCEEDINGS 20
(1998).
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1946 revision of the constitution removed this language and substituted a more
ambiguous mandate for the ILO Conference to take “such action as it may deem
wise and expedient to secure compliance.” In practice, therefore, trade sanctions
had remained politically and legally out of bounds since the ILO’s founding.269

In the Havana Charter context, as Jackson notes, though that instrument was
several times submitted to the U.S. Congress and extensive hearing were held, the
Congress composition had shifted to a stance less liberal on trade matters and less
internationally oriented.270 Arguably, what Helfer identifies as “political” (in the context
of the ILO), and what Jackson identifies as “less liberal and less internationally oriented”
can be associated with the idea of sovereignty costs so far developed.
It should be acknowledged, however, that it is hard to tell exactly whether these
are sovereignty costs or are also some sort of purely economic costs. A widely accepted
account is that, in the view of developing countries, any attempt to restrict exports from
low-wage countries was an attempt to repeal comparative advantage and protect domestic
industries in developed countries. On the other hand, minimum-wage and payment of
overtime work are only a few of the labor standards with direct impact on comparative
advantage.271 The protection of labor rights is much more comprehensive. The 1998 ILO
Declaration enumerates four universally accepted workplace human rights as core labor
rights:
(a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor;
(c) the effective abolition of child labour; and
269

Laurence R. Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and
Innovation in the ILO, 59(3) VANDERBILT L. R. 649, 712 (2006)(emphasis added).
270

Jackson et al, supra note 13, at 213.

271

I make this assertion intuitively, without analyzing whether or not other core labor rights affect
comparative advantage.
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(d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.272

Therefore, it seems plausible to assert that the costs attaching to the trade and
labor linkage are a mix of sovereignty and economic costs. I also infer this “blend” of
costs from Jackson’s assessment that “developing countries are adamantly opposed [to
the linkage] because they fear . . . restrictive measures based on cultural and political
consideration [sovereign concern] within the large industrial countries – to the detriment
of developing low-wage countries [economic concern].”273
Though I focused on these initial developments to make sovereignty costs more
explicit, I focus on the later developments of the linkage as evidence of cognitive costs.
2. Cognitive Costs
Are the Singapore Ministerial and the 1998 ILO Declaration evidence that
cognitive costs have been overcome? I submit here that what appears to be a change is
more of the same.
Paragraph 4 of the Singapore Declaration posits that
[w]e [states] renew our commitment to the observance of internationally
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO)
is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our
support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and
development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization
contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour
standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of
countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put
into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will
continue their existing collaboration.274

As Howse observes,
272

1998 ILO Declaration, ¶ 2.

273

Jackson, supra note 142, at 245.

274

World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC
[hereinafter Singapore Declaration], at ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
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[t]he most important point of the Singapore Declarations rests on its insistence
upon a segregation of competences between the ILO and the WTO . . . the
Singapore Declaration at once established the trade and labour link, takes a
strong stand on one aspect of it, but then denies and declines any competence
regarding the issue it has just pronounced (if only in a one sided manner) upon,
and closes the door (institutionally and legally speaking) to a possible WTO
role.275

The 1998 ILO Declaration, in turn, asserts that
[l]abour standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes and that
nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used
for such purposes; in addition, the comparative advantage of any country should
in no way be called in question by this Declaration and its follow-up.276

As with the wording analysis developed in the Diamond Waiver context, one
cannot abstain from comparing the above phrasing with the developments of the Doha
Ministerial:
Singapore Declaration
(1996), ¶ 4

1998 ILO Declaration, ¶ 5

Doha Declaration (2001), ¶ 8

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal
with these standards . . . We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist
purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly lowwage developing countries, must in no way be put into question.
Whereas the ILO is the constitutionally mandated international organization and the
competent body to set and deal with international labour standards . . . Labour
standards should not be used for protectionist trade purposes and that nothing in this
Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked or otherwise used for such purposes; in
addition, the comparative advantage of any country should in no way be called in
question by this Declaration and its follow-up.
We reaffirm our declaration made at the Singapore Ministerial Conference regarding
internationally recognized core labour standards. We take note of work under way in
the International Labour Organization (ILO) on the social dimension of globalization .

Table 10 – Comparison of the Declaration Referring to Trade and Labour Linkages

As Howse asserts, “what we see in both [the Singapore Declaration and the ILO
1998 Declaration] is an effort to establish a link in order to deny, wrongly, that is ever
appropriate to notice or act upon it. That is deeply disturbing. . . It fails to recognize that

275

Howse, supra note 267, at 181 (emphasis added).

276

It should be noted that paragraph 8 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration merely reproduces the
Singapore Ministerial. That is to say, it recalls the commitment to comply with internationally recognized
CLS and designates the ILO as the organization responsible for developing and promoting these standards.
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the “comparative advantage” argument, regards as an absolute, can be overextended to
justify violations of covered rights.277
In sum, Howse’s observations about the high degree of segregation between the
WTO and other regimes, and the rigid dividing line between labor and human rights, in
my understanding, are symptomatic of the high cognitive costs involved in trade and
labor rights linkages. It should be observed, though, that further research is probably
required to tell apart with more precision the delineation of cognitive, sovereignty and
economic costs in relation to this case.

277

Id. at 188.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
The task in this chapter was to investigate the reasons that one simply does not
find much support that any of the relevant bodies of international law (general, trade and
human rights) embrace any robust doctrine of restrictive trade measures addressing
extraterritorial human rights violations.
Drawing from a model of L&E that pairs property rights and regulatory
jurisdiction, an analogy was devised to explain that the different regimes of international
law (general and specialized) are devices of ARJ. In addition, ARJ occurs as a function of
TCs. This means that the different categories of ARJ (anticipation, clear, muddy, and
organizational allocations) depend on the TCs involved. The two categories of TCs to
inform the examined transactions were sovereignty and cognitive costs because the first
is expected to arise in extraterritorial allocations, and the second is expected to emerge
when two distinct policy domain are involved.
The case studies confirm the model of analysis. The clear entitlement concerning
extraterritorial jurisdiction found in Chapter VII is an exceptional type of allocation that
happened in the very peculiar moment of the history where sovereignty costs were
lowered.
The other two cases, though apparently serving as counterfactuals to the model,
actually confirm it. Essentially, the efforts to establish linkages in the Diamond Waiver
and the trade and labor linkages are less than real linkages. In the case of the Diamond
Waiver, the real ARJ is a reproduction of the ARJ found in Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Potential cognitive costs are not off-set, since the language of the waiver is
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merely a reproduction of language found in other instruments. As to the trade and labor
rights debate, it was also noted that, together with sovereignty and cognitive costs,
economic costs (loss of comparative advantage) is a fundamental blocking factor for any
ARJ.
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Ch4 Transnational New Governance: Overcoming
Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs

INTRODUCTION
Recall the earlier assessment: high TCs, in the form of sovereignty and cognitive
costs, explain the lack of a vigorous doctrine to justify restrictive trade measures
addressing human rights violations abroad.
But human rights initiatives tackling problems associated with those violations
have not decreased; just the opposite. In this chapter, the main proposition is that these
initiatives have gone in a direction that involve lower or no significant amount of
sovereignty and cognitive costs.
First, I will introduce the abundance of initiatives and present an existing
taxonomy to group them (i.e., Abbott and Snidal’s triangle). Second, by referring to some
of these initiatives – the UN-GC (voluntary code), SA 8000 (social certification),
fairtrade (social labeling), the KPCS, and other recent developments –, I aim at
supporting the above proposition. The chapter also tries to expand the explanation to
indicate that these initiatives bear their own costs, but not sovereignty and cognitive
costs. Finally, based on the overall analysis, this chapter pinpoints a potential research
agenda for the future.
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I. THE PLETHORA OF TNG INITIATIVES
A. A NOTE ON ACRONYMS
Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal identify the emergence of a new kind of
international regulatory system that they name transnational new governance (TNG), as
follows:
TNG is emerging spontaneously, largely out of dissatisfaction with the failure of
international “Old Governance” (OG) – acting through treaties and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) – to adequately regulate international
business. NGOs, business firms and other actors, singly and in novel
combinations, are creating a plethora of innovative institutions to apply
transnational norms to business, especially on worker rights, environmental
protection and human rights.278

Abbott and Snidal name these initiatives regulatory standard setting (RSS) and
explain that TNG demands a broader view of “regulation” and a more nuanced view of
the state as regulator.279 It should be noted that RSS is just one of the many acronyms
found in the literature to describe these initiatives. Bernstein and Hannah, for instance,
point out that the proliferation of transnational non-state mechanisms – usually in the
form of producer certification and product labeling systems – are a sub-set of the broader
“corporate social responsibility” (CSR) category.280 Moreover, they indicate that scholars
in law, political science, and business have also employed the labels “transnational
278

Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through
“Transnational New Governance” (2008), http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_abbott/1 (forthcoming).
279

Id. at 3-4.

280

Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy
and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 1 (2008). For a definition of CSR, see JENNIFER
A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (2006) (noting the difficulties in defining CSR, but proposing that CSR “refers
to the notion that each business enterprise, as a member of the society, has a responsibility to operate
ethically and in accordance with its legal obligation and to strive to minimise any adverse effects of its
operations and activities on the environment, society and human health”).
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regulatory systems,” “non-state market driven (NSMD) governance systems,” and “civil
regulation.”281 Yet, other authors make use of “private governance system” to designate
them.282 Putting aside the competition of acronyms, I will use TNG initiatives or
initiatives (without any sort of prejudice concerning other nomenclature).
B. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
Abbott and Snidal identify four central elements of new governance, each
reflecting a modification of the state’s traditional role. In the new paradigm, the state:
1.

2.
3.

4.

incorporates a decentralized range of actors and institutions,
public and private, into the regulatory system, for example by
negotiating standards with regulatory targets, encouraging and
supervising
self-regulation,
or
sponsoring
voluntary
environmental management systems;
relies on this range of actors for regulatory expertise;
modifies its regulatory responsibilities to emphasize
orchestration of diverse public and private actors and institutions
rather than direct promulgation and enforcement of rules; and
utilizes “soft law” to complement or substitute for mandatory
“hard law.”283

It should be noted that, along their work, Abbott and Snidal remind us that states
are “jealous of their sovereignty and freedom of action” and are reluctant to delegate
authority to international institutions.284 Mostly important, in their conclusions, they state
that TNG “allows states to participate in international regulation and delegate limited
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Bernstein & Erin Hannah, supra note 280, at 2. They also acknowledge that NSMD, although
slightly awkward, has been widely cited and has generated the most detailed and distinct categorization of
these mechanisms. Id.
282

This last usage appears in the context of forest certification. See BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL.,
GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE
AUTHORITY 4 (2004)(calling these arrangements one of the most innovative and startling institutional
designs of the past fifty years.).
283

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 5.

284

Id. at 24.
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authority without incurring significant sovereignty costs.”285 Moreover, TNG allows
“IGOs to pursue their regulatory goals with less resistance from states and greater
collaboration with private actors.”286
Yet, one cannot disregard the technological factors that made possible this
transformation. Though Abbott and Snidal do not elaborate on this factor, David Fidler
credits technological developments as one of the fundamental changes to explain the
increasing role of non-state actors in international relations over the past two decades:
technological developments concerning the means of transportation, production,
weaponization, and communication [such as the internet] have allowed non-State
actors . . . to increase their material capabilities for engaging in world affairs.287

These technological transformations significantly lowered the barriers to entry for
non-state actors to access and affect directly and independently the condition of anarchy
that characterizes international relations.288 Fidler observes, however, that the impact of
this growth in material capabilities is not uniform across non-state actors. That is to say,
increased participation and louder voices do not necessarily translate into greater impact
on the outcome of decisions states make in international relations. However, the general
285

Id. at 61. See also Fidler, supra note 198, at 283 (2008)(assessing that “States, particularly the
great powers, are notoriously reticent to consent to meaningful systems of international governance that
crimp their sovereignty and freedom of action.”)
286

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 61.

287

Fidler, supra note 198, at 274.
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Id. at 275. It should be noted that Fidler employs this explanation in the context of a theoretical
framework developed by him called “open-source” anarchy. In that framework, “the State-centric,
Westphalian approach to anarchy [no hierarchical authority among states] resembles an oligopolistic
market in which a small number of great powers determine supply and demand for power and ideas in
anarchy. Great powers dominate in oligopolistic anarchy because they have achieved economies of scale in
the production and use of material capabilities . . . To change oligopolistic anarchy to allow non-State
actors to affect anarchy directly requires significantly altering the material conditions of competition among
actors.” Fidler then credit the emergence of the United States after the Cold War as a hegemon that greatly
reduced competition among States for power (i.e., the United States after the Cold War) and the
technological transformations acknowledged above. Id. at 274. Anarchy is employed here in the technical
sense of international relations. Id. at 262.
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assessment about the increase of non-state influence in international relations as a
function of the technological revolution remains a valid one.289 It seems sufficient to
remember that the internet, particularly, makes possible massive campaigns and lobbying
and has the power to mobilize the general public concerning international issues.
C. CLASSIFICATION OF INITIATIVES BASED ON THE SHARE OF ACTORS’ PARTICIPATION
As said, it is not my purpose to present a comprehensive list of TNG initiatives.
Nonetheless, as a way of categorizing them, I will make use of the illuminating taxonomy
that Abbott and Snidal portray in the shape of a “governance triangle.”290 The triangle
works as follows:
•

The dots dispersed on the triangle represent individual initiatives. To clear the
aspect of the triangle, I kept the original dots, but I left only the names of the few
initiatives that will be developed (UN-GC, SAI, FLO, among others);

•

The division of the triangle in seven zones represents situations in which one
(Zones 1-3), two (Zones 4-6) or three (Zone 7) actor groups dominate the
initiative. That is to say, the dots are located in accordance with their relative
“shares” that companies, NGOs, and states participate in the governance scheme.
For instance, an initiative located in zone 6 means that NGOs and companies are
the main actors. An initiative located in zone 7 suggests the participation of three
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Fidler, supra note 198, at 277-78. Fidler also reminds that the increase of material capabilities
of non-state actors is for good and for bad. Non-state actors that are not engaged in constructing better ways
of governance, such as terrorist groups and organized crime syndicates, are also empowered by these
technologies. Id. at 283.
290

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 7, 63.
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actors. The closer to the vertice of the triangle, the bigger the share of a singleactor. 291

Figure 2 – The New Governance Triangle (Simplified) 292

D. TYPE OF MECHANISMS EMPLOYED BY THE INITIATIVES
TNG initiatives are diverse and encompass the adoption of voluntary codes of
conduct, certification strategies, or merely reporting requirements. These mechanisms can
also be combined. Generally, the employment of the standards, accreditation,
certification, and labeling terminology has been greatly associated with TNG initiatives.
It should be noted that they have specific meaning, though their usage is not always made
with much precision in the literature.
For my purposes, standards are defined by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) as “documented agreements containing technical specifications or
291

Abbott & Snidal, supra note 278, at 8.

292

This is a simplified version of the triangle found in Abbott and Snidal, with only some of the
forty initiatives depicted. I also employed “companies” in the right lower vertices of the triangle, instead of
“firms,” in the original triangle.

127

other precise criteria to be used consistently as rules, guidelines or definitions, to ensure
that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.”293
Certification, in turn,
is a procedure by which a third party gives written assurance that a product,
process or service is in conformity with certain standards. Certification can be
seen as a form of communication along the supply chain.294

To ensure that the certification bodies have the capacity to carry out certification,
they are evaluated and accredited by an authoritative body. Certification bodies may have
to be accredited by a governmental or a “para-statal” institute.295
Finally, labeling (or labelling) refers to initiatives to put distinctive logos on
products produced in a manner that meets certain standards, informing consumers of
these facts. While the certificate is a form of communication between seller and buyer,
the label is a form of communication with the end consumer.296
In the case studies that follow, I will indicate what type of mechanism the
initiative involves.
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International Organization for Standardization, ISO Guide 2 (1996).
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Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Environmental And Social
Standards, Certification And Labelling For Cash Crops 8 (2003)[hereinafter FAO Report](“The certificate
demonstrates to the buyer that the supplier complies with certain standards, which might be more
convincing than if the supplier itself provided the assurance.”) Id. at 8. It should be noted that an
organization setting standards and a certification body (the organization performing the certification) are
not necessarily the same. For instance, though the ISO sets standards, the ISO itself does not certify.
295

Id. at 8.
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Id. at 8-9.
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II. CASE STUDIES ON SELECTED TNG INITIATIVES
This section elaborates on the case studies as follows: (i) a background on the
initiative and the reason it was selected for scrutiny; (ii) why the concerned initiative does
not incur sovereignty and cognitive costs; and (iii) criticisms about the initiatives.
A. VOLUNTARY CODES OF CONDUCT: THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT
1. Background
The UN-GC corresponds to a TNG initiative first envisaged by former UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999. The UN-GC describes itself as “the world's
largest, global corporate citizenship initiative.”297 Corroborating this estimate, a report
released in 2004 affirms that,
[w]ith more than 1,100 companies formally committed to the Global Compact,
the Global Compact is by far the world’s largest voluntary corporate citizenship
network, dwarfing other similar, voluntary initiatives, such as the Global
Reporting Initiative (387 participants) and SA 8000 (353 participants).298

The UN-GC provides a framework for businesses that are committed to aligning
their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of
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For general information on the initiative, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/.

298

McKinsey & Co., Assessing the Global Compact's Impact 1, 10 (May 11, 2004),
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/9.1_news_archives/2004_06_09/imp_ass.pdf.
The
report was released by the Global Compact Office – the coordination office - and was undertaken by
McKinsey & Company. The governments of Brazil, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and United
Kingdom funded the impact assessment. Id. As to McKinsey, it self-description affirms that: “We are the
trusted advisor and counselor to many of the most influential businesses and institutions in the world. We
serve more than 70 percent of Fortune magazine’s most admired list of companies.” See
http://www.mckinsey.com/aboutus/whoweare/. It should be noted that recent accounts of these figures
indicate significant increases. As of November of 2008, the UN-GC includes over 4,700 businesses
(http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html). The SAI, in turn, as of mid
2006,
reports
1,038
participants.
See
http://www.isealalliance.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=513&parentID=486&grandpar
entID=486&nodeID=1.
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human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption, thus mainstreaming these
principles in business activities around the world.
The UN-GC tackles the trade and human rights linkage by asking companies to
embrace, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the
areas of human rights (principles 1-2) and labor standards (principles 3-6):
Principle 1:
Principle 2:
Principle 3:
Principle 4:
Principle 5:
Principle 6:

Businesses should support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights; and
make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
the effective abolition of child labour; and
the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.299

Though it is true that the UN-GC was not meant to specifically address the trade
and human rights linkage, if a company that trades in the international market adopts the
code, the initiative ends up dealing with the linkage. Furthermore, because it is the largest
initiative of voluntary codes, it is worth mentioning and analyzing.
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs?
The UN-GC is situated in zone 4 of Abbott and Snidal’s triangle. This localization
indicates that states and companies are the main actors of the initiative. However, as
explained, the UN-GC is not a treaty (it does not involve an allocation of regulatory
jurisdiction) but a set of principles that companies embrace.
Sovereignty costs do not attach directly to states, as they do not have any legal
obligation under the UN-GC (the principles are phrased as “businesses should do
something”). As Hurd explains, one of the features of the initiative is the code of conduct
299

See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (follow “Principles”).
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approach, borrowing the principle of voluntarism and generating the subsidiary effect of
skipping all state-based authority.300
Interestingly, the another feature mentioned by Hurd is useful to highlight,
specifically, its lower cognitive costs. Hurd comments that
from the WTO, [the UN-GC] borrows the notion that monitoring can or should
be performed by those with an interest in finding violations. And from the ILO, it
inherits the set of pre-established and (arguably) universal conventions which
give it content. This amalgam is an interesting piece of constitutional design,
particularly for the way that it takes advantage of the coincidence between the
self-interests of the participants and the legitimacy of the UN.301

Translated into the lexicon of this dissertation, by borrowing and inheriting
principles from other IGOs, the UN-GC arguably circumvents the cognitive costs that
would otherwise attach if the WTO straightforwardly adopted the ILO conventions or the
ILO directly enforced trade sanctions.
3. Criticisms
One commentator, despite acknowledging that the initiative “paved the way for
the United Nation’s engagement with key non-state actors to tackle pressing challenges
of the twenty-first century,” notes that the UN-GC principles are general and vague.302
Moreover, no monitoring and verification mechanisms exist except for dialogue with

300

Ian Hurd, Labor Standards through International Organizations: The Global Compact in
Comparative Perspective 1, 17 (2001).
301

Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).

302

See Surya Deva, Global Compact: A Critique of the U.N.'s “Public-Private” Partnership for
Promoting Corporate Citizenship, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 107, 111, 149-50 (2006).
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business.303 Similarly, another commentator argues that the UN-GC is inadequate
because it offers mere moral suasion to the business community.304
Interestingly, by being totally out of the traditional forms of governance and
making use of rhetoric suasion, the UN-GC reveals its weakness. At the same time, as
will be further explored, the initiative has been engaged in dialogues with a new initiative
(ISO 26000) that may offer new developments.
B. SOCIAL CERTIFICATION: SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNATIONAL (SAI) AND SA 8000
1. Background
Social Accountability International (SAI) – a NGO based in New York developed the SA 8000 standard in 1998.305 The SA 8000 is in its third edition and
specifically focuses on the working conditions of employees in supply chains.306 SAI is
under the umbrella of the International Social and Environmental Accreditation and
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Id. at 146.

304

Evaristus Oshionebo, The U.N. Global Compact and Accountability of Transnational
Corporations: Separating Myth from Realities, 19 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 38 (2007).
305

See Social Accountability International, Social Accountability 8000 (2008)[hereinafter SA
8000], www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf. SAI describes itself as “a
non-governmental, international, multi-stakeholder organization dedicated to improving workplaces and
communities by developing and implementing socially responsible standards. SAI convenes key
stakeholders to develop consensus-based voluntary standards, conducts cost-benefit research, accredits
auditors, provides training and technical assistance, and assists corporations in improving social
compliance in their supply chains.” For more information in the initiative, see http://www.saintl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=490&parentID=472. In accordance with the FAO
Report “SAI was founded by the Council on Economic Priorities, a corporate social responsibility research
institute based in the United States of America, that operated from 1969 to 2001. In 1996, SAI convened an
international multi-stakeholder Advisory Board to develop the SA 8000 standard. The SAI Advisory Board
includes experts from trade unions, businesses and NGOs. See FAO Report (2003), at 24.
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The third version of the SA 8000 has been released in 2008. The normative elements of this
standard are based on national law, international human rights norms and the ILO conventions. See the
standard at http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf
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Labeling Alliance (ISEAL).307 The initiatives encompassed by the ISEAL have been
described as the most relevant example of NSMD system.308 Currently, the initiative has
more than one thousand certified companies.
In relation to the distinction previously made (between standards, certification,
accreditation, and labeling), it should be noted that: (i) SAI is a standard-setting body that
draws its standards from the ILO conventions and human rights treaties; (ii) SAI’s
accreditation services are managed by another organization called Social Accountability
Accreditation Services (SAAS);309 and (iii) the SA 8000 label is not used on products;
that is to say, the certification is given directly on companies, informing the supply chain
of that fact.
Most of the SA 8000 certified companies pertain to supply chains involved in
international trade. SAI website refers to case studies regarding the implementation of the
SA 8000 in companies in Vietnam (glass industry), Thailand (apparel industry), Central
America (garment manufacturing), and China (in general), among others.310
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs?

307

ISEAL convenes eight members aiming to set social and environmental standards in sectors
ranging from forestry and agriculture to fisheries, manufacturing, and textiles. For general information, see
http://www.isealalliance.org/ . The ISEAL full members are: the Fairtrade Labeling Organization
International (FLO), the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the International Organic Accreditation Service
(IOAS), the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM), the Marine Aquarium
Council (MAC), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), the Rainforest Alliance, and the Social
Accountability International (SAI).
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Bernstein and Hannah, supra note 280, at 7.
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This is a recent development, since “SAAS began work in 1997 as an accreditation agency as
part of Social Accountability International (SAI) and was formally established as its own independent, notfor-profit affiliate in 2007. SAAS is now an independent decision-making agency, linked to SAI only
through contractual arrangements.” See http://www.saasaccreditation.org/faqanswers.htm#saasrelationship.
310

See in general, http://www.sa-intl.org. Companies as Dole (the largest producer and distributor
of fresh fruit in the world) and Chiquita Banana are SA 8000 certified.
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As a first remark, in Abbott and Snidal’s triangle, SAI is located in zone 6, which
indicates that NGOs and companies are the main actors involved in the initiative. Second,
it should be observed that SA 8000 requires that, besides the obligations of companies to
comply with national and all other applicable laws where it operates, companies shall
respect the enumerated principles of sixteen ILO conventions and six human rights
conventions.311
That language shows the way the initiative directly targets companies and refrains
from using the regulatory framework of governments and international organizations, at
least, directly. Clearly, sovereignty and cognitive costs are immediately circumvented by
the modus operandi of the initiative. SA 8000 is neither about member “A” telling
member “B” that the latter cannot export to member “A,” because member “B” does not
comply with ILO conventions and human rights treaties that member “B” has ratified;
nor is it about the WTO adopting, as a covered agreement or in a decision, ILO and
human rights conventions. SA 8000 is a standard developed by a NGO. To be certified by
SAI, companies in member “B” need to comply with prescriptions contained in ILO and
human rights conventions.
Finally, an interesting question that it is part of an open-ended debate refers to the
extent that certification initiatives are indeed outside of the traditional state and IGOs
governance structures and, thus, not incurring on sovereignty and cognitive costs. The
discussion arises in connection with the TBT agreement, since that agreement covers not

311

SA 8000 (2008), at 2.
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only technical regulations – mandatory regulations – but also voluntary standards (such
as the SA 8000).312
Generally, as far as these initiatives are not characterized as technical regulations,
they are outside the realm of states and WTO scrutiny. Yet, the TBT agreement imposes
obligations on states regarding voluntary standards. This means that members have
obligations to take reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure that local
government and non-governmental standardization bodies comply with a Code of Good
Practice, contained in Annex 3 of the TBT agreement.313
The Code of Good Practice contains, for instance, classic clauses of nondiscrimination similar to those found in the context of state-to-state relations.314 In
addition, the Code of Good Practice obligates individual standard-setting bodies within a
member to harmonize and coordinate their efforts to the extent possible and to use
relevant international standards.315
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The TBT defines standards as “document approved by a recognized body [which is not
defined], that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or
related processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or
deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling [sic] requirements as they
apply to a product, process or production method.” TBT Annex 1, art. 2.
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TBT art. 4.1.
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TBT Annex 3, Code of Good Practice: “D. In respect of standards, the standardizing body shall
accord treatment to products originating in the territory of any other Member of the WTO no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating in any
other country [analogous to the NT and MFN obligation];” Id. “E. The standardizing body shall ensure that
standards are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade.” Id.
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TBT Annex 3, Code of Good Practice: “F. Where international standards exist or their
completion is imminent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for
the standards it develops, except where such international standards or relevant parts would be ineffective
or inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of protection or fundamental climatic or
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.”
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Though the obligations above begins with hortatory language (“reasonable
measures as may be available),” as Howse summarizes,
[t]hese provisions have potentially quite important implications for nongovernmental social labeling initiatives – they appear to place some positive
obligation on governments to oversee such initiatives with a view to ensuring
their conformity with the Code of Conduct.316

Although the WTO and its members have not yet officially spoken on the
relationship between its rules and voluntary initiatives,317 in light of these potential
intersections, some commentators have suggested that the WTO should avoid any
interference.318 Bernstein and Hannah remind us that “simple prudence suggests
governments and the WTO secretariat should avoid allowing the institution to be thrust
further into the position of having to adjudicate social regulation.”319
3. Criticisms
A criticism of accreditation procedures comes from NGOs. Though NGOs could
be accredited by SAI to become auditors, up to 2004, only large commercial quality
control and traditional financial auditing firms (e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers) perform
SA 8000 audits.320 Therefore, civil society organizations have questioned the competence
of commercial auditors to perform social audits and the final quality of the reports, which
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require different competences.321 This criticism is also important because it reminds us
that social certification and labeling is itself a business niche (and a growing one)
operating under the powerful language of human and labor rights.
From the point of view of companies, because there is not an extensive network
of local certification bodies in some countries, certifications can increase costs of
production and not having a certain certification can mean to be out of the market. From
the point of view of consumers, because the initiative deals with communication between
the wholesale and buyer, they cannot always make conscious choices for these products.
The certification attaches to companies, not products.322
C. SOCIAL CERTIFICATION AND LABELING: FLO AND FAIR TRADE
1. Background
Fair trade are not one but many initiatives aiming at providing better market
access and better trading conditions for small-scale farmers.323 This includes a price
premium for producers to be invested in social and environmental improvements.324 For
larger production units an additional aim is to improve the conditions of workers.325
The Fairtrade Labeling Organization International (FLO) – also a member of the
ISEAL – has developed standards encompassing labor; farmer associations and
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cooperatives; and trade standards, including minimum prices, for licensed traders. The
FLO is the owner of the fairtrade certification mark.326
In relation to the distinction previously made between standards, certification,
accreditation, and labeling, it should be noted that: (i) the FLO is a standard-setting body;
(ii) the certification is done by an independent international certification company, FLOCERT Gmbh;327 and (iii) though one normally associates fairtrade with labeling in
products, the FLO-CERT certifies, essentially, producers. The use of the fairtrade label is
governed by a license contract between the FLO and producers and the label is issued in
accordance with specific procedures.328
Similarly to the SAI, FLO standards follow certain internationally recognized
standards and conventions, especially those of the ILO concerning labor standards. The
Generic Fairtrade Standards for Small Farmers' Organizations, for instance, explicitly
follows ILO Conventions 29, 105, 138 and 182 regarding child labor and forced labor.329
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs?
The analysis to be conducted here would essentially follow the points made on the
previous section concerning the SAI-SA 800). Labeling, as explained, is just one of the
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The FLO is also an umbrella organization convening twenty labeling initiatives in twenty one
countries and producer networks representing Fairtrade Certified Producer Organizations in Latin America,
Africa and Asia. For an overview of the FLO, see http://www.fairtrade.net/introduction.html.
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many forms of certification attaching to the final traded product and informing the
consumer about the certification.
3. Criticisms
Even when labeling is attached to products, Howse explains that
[u]nless she [the consumer] can be sure that most other consumers will do
likewise, the individual consumer may well not consider it rational to avoid
buying the product in question.330

Another key issue that appears in social-labeling refers to questions of credible
monitoring to ensure that claims made in association with the label are not fraudulent.331
Finally, economically speaking, the whole idea of fairtrade inherently bears an
economic cost. In the case of the fairtrade label governed by the FLO, The Economist
published an article criticizing the economic basis of fairtrade schemes. The British
magazine, despite acknowledging that “such food [labeled fair] allows shoppers to
express their political opinions, from concern for the environment to support for poor
farmers,” pointed out that fair trade is in some respects deleterious.332 For instance, by
encouraging a greater supply of coffee, fair trade contributes to a further decrease in the
world price of coffee. Thus, maintaining artificially high prices may leave the majority of
coffee producers worse off.333
D. A HYBRID INITIATIVE: THE KPCS
1. Background
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The contextualization of the diamond conflict has already been made. There, I
called the attention to the Diamond Waiver and the KPCS. Here, I develop the analysis
on the latter.
As to its origins, a first meeting to discuss the certification was held at Kimberley,
South Africa, in May 2000. In December 2000, the UN-GA adopted Resolution 55/56
which expressed the concern over the problem of conflict diamonds fuelling conflicts in a
number of countries and the devastating impact of these conflicts on peace, safety and
security for people in affected countries, as rebel movements finance their military
activities through the trade of diamonds. The resolution also supported the creation and
implementation of a purportedly simple and workable international certification scheme
for rough diamonds. In November 2002, these efforts led to the creation of the KPCS.
Eventually, the KPCS was adopted in November 2002 and launched in January 2003.334
In 2006, The KPCS counted at some forty-six participants, or seventy countries
(the EU-25 being represented by the EC as a participant).335 The diamond trade is
represented by the World Diamond Council and the civil society by NGOs (Global
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada).336 A variety of international organizations
participate on an ad hoc basis.337
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Though I summarized a lot of the information found in the KPCS website, further details can
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As to the classification of the KPCS as a voluntary code, certification or labeling,
the initiative seems to be sui generis. It does not label or certify individual diamonds or
companies as free from conflicts. Rather, it certifies an entire shipment of rough
diamonds.338 Moreover, in parallel, KPCS relies on a self-regulation mechanism of the
diamond industry.339
2. Why the Initiative Does not Incur Sovereignty and Cognitive Costs?
The KPCS is located in zone 7 of Abbott and Snidal’s triangle. This localization
suggests that the initiative is a sort of hybrid type of regulation, with states, NGOs and
companies sharing governance.
But like others TNG initiatives, KPCS is not a treaty, but soft law. Surely, among
the TNG initiatives, KPCS is the only in which, to be a participant, a government must
develop a certification process for diamonds. This certification process must follow
minimum requirements contained in the KPCS and governments’ customs officials have
to inspect these certifications. The requirements for participation are outlined in Sections
II, V(a) and VI(8,9) of the KPCS. However, as Schefer reckons, the requirements
surrounding the certificate are a balance between “maintaining effective control over
diamond trading activities and not overburdening the participants (private and public)
with either sovereignty-threatening international oversight or costly administrative
paperwork requirements.”340 Cognitive costs, it is submitted here, are also low because,
338
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as other TNG initiatives, the KPSC does not involve the elaboration of human rights
normative linkages at the WTO. As showed before, the Diamond Waiver does not
perform this linkage.
3. Criticisms
Despite the international and national efforts tackling the conflict diamond, NGOs
and the media point out the weakness of the system. Amnesty International has been
drawing attention to the lack of government monitoring and verification over the
diamond industry as it is main flaw. In 2006, Amnesty reported that the system of
internal controls is a patchy and uneven set of measures and controls that vary in their
effectiveness from country to country.341 Equally, Schefer suggests that the main
criticism over the process is the lack of regular, independent monitoring of the
participants’ implementation of their certification schemes.342
Fortune reported a far grimmer assessment of the KPCS: if on one hand,
diamond producers frequently promote Sierra Leone as a KPCS success story, since its
official exports soared from near zero in 1999 to about USD 142 million in 2005 –
suggesting that smuggling has plummeted, on the other hand, illegally mined diamonds
are easily mixed in.343 Indeed, Oshionebo suggests that “once shipped out of Africa to
diamond-cutting centers in Europe, Tel-Aviv and other places, the so-called ‘conflict
diamonds’ are mixed with legitimate diamonds from around the world; and, because they
341
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are unlabelled, it becomes difficult if not impossible for the consuming public to know
their country of origin or their corporate producer.”344
E. LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
1. Government Procurement
As Christopher McCrudden indicates, there is actually a lengthy history of
making public procurement a mechanism for the achievement of ‘non-economic’ goals,
such as social policies, in what might be thought of as domestic human rights purposes.345
McCrudden enumerates the United States (from where many prominent examples come),
Canada, South Africa, and several European countries as making use of these types of
mechanisms.346
But despite this historical record, I chose government procurement as latest
development to highlight the increased popularity and new variations of these measures.
As Aaronson notes, “[a] growing number of WTO Member States want to use the market
power of government to promote globally responsible practices, but they are unsure
whether their strategies distort trade.”347
Indeed, government procurement appears to be mixing more and more with the
TNG initiatives above described. Aaronson points out, for instance, that some provinces
344
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of Italy use the SA 8000 certification discussed before to award public procurement.348
The UN-GC has set up a working group with other UN agencies and IGOs to examine
how to integrate social and environmental sustainability into procurement practices on an
international basis.349 Bernstein and Hannah affirm that initiatives under the ISEAL are
beginning to target governments to adopt their standards in their procurement policies.350
They explain that this move is especially notable given the ability of large states to affect
markets through their buying power.351 They also reveal that, based on interviews with
officials involved in TNG initiatives,
once confident their standards could constitute “international” standards,
[initiatives’ officials] plan to ramp up efforts to encourage market uptake. Some,
for example, are planning advocacy campaigns to encourage governments to
reference [TNG] NSMD standards when developing legislation, regulatory
mechanisms, or procurement policies.352

The entanglement of TNG and government procurement deserves at least two
comments. First, as these initiatives become increasingly intertwined in governmental
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measures (and have potential deleterious extraterritorial trade effects), affected members
would have the choice to challenge these measures under the WTO covered agreements;
especially in the cases involving the signatories of the Governmental Procurement
Agreement (GPA).353 Second, and as a consequence of the first comment, it would be
interesting to observe whether the willingness of human rights activism to intertwine
TNG initiatives in more rigid forms of governmental regulation will backfire at some
point.
I have focused on explaining how sovereignty and cognitive costs substantially
drove human rights activism out of the public international law system. This new surge of
government procurement initiatives may reinvigorate governments as active actors.
Depending on how individual members and the WTO handle it, questions of sovereignty
and cognitive costs may blossom again, this time with different costs in both the
sovereignty and cognitive areas, as a result of the TNG activities.
2. ISO 26000
Finally, it should be highlighted that the ISO will be for the first time dealing with
social responsibility in an initiative named ISO 26000 (to be published in 2010). As
Bernstein and Hannah indicate, while
ISO’s principal activity and distinct expertise is the development of technical
standards, market demand (the guiding principle of ISO’s work) has prompted it
353

The GPA is a plurilateral treaty; the GPA binds only Members who expressly adopt it, and
Members can opt in or out. Currently, it is in force for thirty-nine members. For an updated list of the
signatories
of
the
GPA,
see
WTO
–
Government
Procurement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm. Government procurement provisions were
explicitly excluded from the GATT 1947 framework, and an agreement was possible only during the
Tokyo Round, the 1979 GPA. For the historic context of the GPA, see Annet Blank & Gabrielle Marceau,
A History of Multilateral Negotiations on Procurement: from ITO to WTO, in LAW AND POLICY IN PUBLIC
PURCHASING: THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 31, 32-36 (Bernard M. Hoekman &
Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 1997).

145

to enter into new areas such as quality management principles (ISO 9000 series),
environmental management systems (ISO 14000 series), and food safety
management systems (ISO 2200 series). Most recently, ISO launched a “social
responsibility” initiative, to be published in 2010 as ISO 26000, aimed at
developing a series of guidelines and recommendations to help corporations
streamline their response to pressures from ethical rating agencies.354

Though the details of the ISO 26000 are still under development, an already
observable feature of the standard is the multiplicity of stakeholders in its elaboration.
ISO 26000 draws on best practices developed by existing public and private sector social
responsibility initiatives. As to its normative basis,
[i]t will be consistent with and complement relevant declarations and conventions
by the United Nations and its constituents, notably the International Labour
Organization (ILO), with whom ISO has established a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) to ensure consistency with ILO labour standards. ISO has
also signed an MoU with the United Nations Global Compact Office (UNGCO)
to enhance their cooperation on the development of ISO 26000 and with the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to ensure
consistency with OECD guidelines.355

Representatives of six stakeholder groups participate in the working group
drafting ISO 26000: industry; government; labor; consumers; nongovernmental
organizations; and service, support, research and others. Two experts from each
stakeholder category – one from a developed country and one from a developing country
take part in the integrated drafting group.356 ISO 26000 drafting working group operates
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Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 280, at 24.
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ISO, Executive Summary: ISO and Social Responsibility (SR) (2008), at 3, www.iso.org/sr
(follow “Press and News,” then “Publications”). Though not developed in this work, the OECD revised and
adopted new guidelines for the operation of multinational enterprises in 2000. The OECD Guidelines
establish voluntary recommendations relating to human rights, responsible supply chain management, labor
relations, environmental, consumer protection, and bribery issues. The OECD is an international
organization established in 1961 and currently comprises a membership of thirty countries committed to
democracy and the market economy from around the world. For more information on the organization, see
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org/.
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Press Release, ISO, Stakeholder consensus enables ISO 26000 on social responsibility to move
up in development status (Sep. 18, 2008), http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1158.
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under the joint leadership of the ISO members for Brazil (Brazilian Association of
Technical Norms - ABNT) and Sweden (Swedish Standards Institute - SIS).357
In addition, one should stress the close relationship between ISO and the WTO.
Reference to terms and definitions of ISO are found in Annex 1 of the TBT. References
to notification procedures in relation to ISO are found in Annex 3 of the TBT (Code of
Good Practice). In one WTO jurisprudence case, the definition of standards found in the
TBT (and reflecting the ISO definition) was acknowledged and developed to some
extent.358
For all these relevant points, ISO 26000 seems to be very important as a future
linkage between trade and human and labor rights among the TNG initiatives.

III. POINTS FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA
The advent of TNG initiatives is an implicit recognition that prior international
and multilateral regulatory initiatives were inadequate because of the sovereignty and
cognitive costs attached to them. Consequently a research agenda may encompass the
following points:
•

How will TNG initiatives continue to develop? Will they entangle with the
“old” governance model? The expansion of government procurement
policies referencing private standards is illustrative of this latter point. Can
this entanglement in reality backfire against the human rights impetus of
enlarging these initiatives more and more? It is worth remembering that

357

Id.

358

See EC-Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, ¶ 220, 224-225.
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some authors, maybe predicting this outcome, have suggested that the
WTO should just “get out of the way” in case this entanglement eventually
happens. Thus, will the public international law system get out of the way
or finally address the trade and human rights linkage?
•

Are the TNG initiatives already changing the calculation of costs that
rational states make and thus, modifying the perception of sovereignty and
cognitive costs? Constructivism theory, in particular, refers to the impact
of non-state actors in the social construction of international relations. Is
the proliferation of government procurement domestic laws making
references to social standards and the elaboration of ISO 26000 evidence
of this change?

•

Will ISO 26000 be “the” critical initiative in channeling a linkage? The
setting of ISO 26000 gathers a vast mix of actors, including the leadership
of developed and developing countries, IGOs, and non-state actors to deal
with international social standards. Like SA 8000 and fairtrade,
sovereignty costs are avoided to the extent that ISO 26000 does not
establish any hard law of public international law. Cognitive costs are also
passed since ISO 26000 does not represent a direct adoption of social and
labor standards by the WTO. At the same time, a close normative
connection between the WTO and the ISO exists through the TBT.

•

What other forms of linkages are being created? Though not explored
here, bilateral and regional agreements have been used as alternative
avenues of trade, human rights and labor rights linkages (e.g. NAFTA, the
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FTA between the U.S. and Chile, Singapore, and Jordan; the pending
agreements between the US and Colombia, Panama, and Korea).
Naturally, because of the much smaller number of participants, an
agreement can be easier to produce. But are the norms of these agreements
real attempts to provide linkages or do they reflect, in reality, transactions
with very little novelty, just like the analysis of the Diamond Waiver and
the ILO-WTO linkages proved to be;
•

Will the current financial crisis re-orient the debate in any way? In time of
economic strain, it has been historically observed that countries adopt
protectionist policies.359 Will the disparities in human rights and labor
standards be a “scapegoat” for protectionist policies in light of the world
economic crisis? Or will it be just the opposite, a world crisis with major
magnitude and effects that creates momentum to reform the international
trade system?

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The proposition in this chapter requiring proof was that TNG initiatives incur
different sovereignty and cognitive costs. The chapter began by actually presenting the
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As Hoeckman and Kostecki call attention to, it can be that, economically speaking, such a
decision is a mistake (it is more costly to the consumer after all), but nevertheless is “good politics”
towards well-organized groups that would be hurt by competition. See BERNARD M. HOECKMAN & MICHEL
M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 120 (2d, 2001). “Good politics”
is a term borrowed from “public choice theory,” an interdisciplinary field of economics and political
science. In public choice the values exchanged are political welfare of politicians, which are calculated, for
instance, in terms of votes and campaign contributions. For the classic discussion, see JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
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vast nomenclature by which these initiatives have been described (RSS, NSMD, among
others) and, as well, by explaining a useful taxonomy developed by Abbott and Snidal.
Then, I analyzed four of these initiatives: the UN-GC (voluntary code of conduct),
SA 8000 (social certification), fairtrade (labeling), and the KPCS (hybrid initiative). All
of these initiatives can be understood to deal with the trade and human rights linkage and
the notion of extraterritoriality. In terms of sovereignty and cognitive costs, because they
do not represent typical examples of allocation of rights and obligations found in
international law, sovereignty costs are avoided. Moreover, because they do not represent
attempts to mainstream human rights and labor at the WTO (or vice versa), cognitive
costs appear not to significantly occur in these transactions. It should be noted that TNG
initiatives are not without their own TCs and criticisms were noted for each of the
analyzed initiatives.
One way to interpret this analysis is that these initiatives overcome potential TCs
found in the public international law system by simply moving away from it. However, it
seems that this generalization falls short at some point, to the extent that some recent
developments (e.g. government procurement and ISO 26000) have the potential to mix
elements of the old and new governance.
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Ch5 Conclusion: The Rational Structure of
International Law in an Irrational World

Is there a right (or a duty) in international law by which states are allowed (or
obligated) to impose restrictive trade measures because of violations of human rights
occurring outside their territory? While exploring this question, my argument has been
divided into three distinct parts.
First, using legal analysis, the overall conclusion (as developed in Chapter 2) is
the lack of a vigorous doctrine supporting the lawful recourse to unilateral or collective
trade sanctions addressing human rights violations. Is it an obvious assessment? Probably
not; the assessment actually demystifies common sense perceptions about rights and
duties that international law prescribes.
For instance, some have argued that the protection of human rights, especially in
case of gross violations of peremptory norms (jus cogens), would justify trade sanctions.
Others have argued that such justification exists as provided by CIL. However, after
analyzing some of the sources purportedly justifying those measures, the conclusion
points in the opposite direction: general international law, trade law (i.e., WTO law), and
human rights law simply do not embrace such a doctrine.
The norms of these branches that allegedly support the legality of trade sanctions
rely in weak sources: for instance, obiter dictum in Lotus, obiter dictum in Barcelona
Traction, Restatement Third, which is not a formal source of international law and
potentially reflects US aspirations, the DASR, which is unclear about the issue and is also
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soft law, humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect, which is highly
controversial and significantly refuted, US-Tuna II (unadopted report), US-Shrimps
(circumvented the extraterritorial issue), among others. Perhaps the only case of lawful
resort to trade sanctions is situations falling under the UN-SC powers of Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, the classic and most well-known model of extraterritoriality.
Since rules are pretty hostile to the exercise of extraterritorial legal powers in any
context, the natural question demanding response is why that is the case. This explanation
was the inquiry addressed in Chapter 3.
Among the tools that one could employ for explanatory purposes, I found this
possibility in terms of L&E theory and lexicon. As noted, L&E has been a recent and
increasing tool as applied to international law.
In the adopted L&E approach, preference was given to a positive approach; i.e., to
explain the legal system as it is, rather than to recommend changes. I began with a prequestion: what is the function of international law? In one strong sense, international law
is law that allocates, shifts, and transfers authority. This means that international law
performs ARJ; that international law is a device of ARJ; that international law is a
mechanism of ARJ. In addition, in the L&E model, ARJ is a function of TCs. If TCs are
high, allocations may not even occur and, when occurring, allocations are muddy or
organizational solutions to decide something ex-post are provided. The main types of TCs
involved were (i) sovereignty and (ii) cognitive costs.
Sovereignty costs are a type of cost acknowledged in the literature. Purportedly,
escalated sovereignty costs emerge in connection with extraterritorial jurisdiction
concerns. Cognitive costs, in turn, relate partially from my own observations, in situs, as
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a visiting researcher in IGOs, and also from literature remarks about the isolation,
compartmentalization, and resistance to change of communities with different policy
domains and expectations (in this case, trade and human rights). It should be noted that
cognitive cost is probably a type of information cost and that the “cognitive costs”
terminology is not acknowledged as such in the literature.
After developing the framework, I proposed its application on three case studies.
The common underlying hypothesis was the presence of escalated TCs in each of them
(sovereignty, cognitive, or both). The first case was about the exceptional ARJ found in
international law: Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The point was that, though one could
argue that that Chapter VII is counterfactual to the model, Chapter VII emerged in a very
peculiar moment of the world history when sovereignty costs were most likely lowered.
The second case study concerned the so-called WTO Diamond Waiver. The point was
that, while one could argue that the waiver refutes the model, the waiver is in reality not
illustrative as overcoming sovereignty or cognitive costs. The waiver is, in fact, a mirror
of the type of allocation found in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, the language
of the waiver is simply a reproduction of language found elsewhere and not an
elaboration of the WTO on human rights issues. The third case study dealt with trade and
labor rights linkages. Similarly to the analysis of the waiver, alleged linkages, the 1919
ILO constitution, the Havana Charter, the Singapore Declaration, and the 1998 ILO
Declaration) were deemed again as “false” linkages that are not instructive in denying the
hypothesis of heightened TCs.
Chapter 4 focused on the exploration of how human rights advocates are
attempting to advance the trade and human rights linkages through TNG initiatives. The
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main proposition requiring proof in that chapter was the lower level (or absence) of
sovereignty and cognitive costs.
I began by recalling that TNG has been acknowledged in the literature with
significant variations, though they all refer to the same phenomena. It was useful to rely
on an existing taxonomy to identify the TNG initiatives in terms of a governance triangle
in which TNG initiates are situated in accordance with the share of participation of three
main actors: states, NGOs, and companies. Moreover, it was indispensable to note that
these initiatives have been materially empowered and made operational by recent
technological innovations.
I chose four relevant examples of TNG initiatives to demonstrate the lower level
of sovereignty and cognitive costs: (i) the UN-GC (a voluntary code of conduct), since it
represents the largest initiative; (ii) the SA 8000 (a social certification), because it deals
with supply chain and human rights; (iii) fairtrade (a social certification/labeling) as also
dealing with supply chain and part of the ISEAL system; (iv) and the KPCS, as part of
the broader discussion of conflict diamonds. As a common denominator, it was possible
to envisage how states are basically accessory to them (providing general support or
moral suasion), rather than being required to adhere to any formal obligation. The only
exception to this “accessoriness” is perhaps the KPCS, in which states are responsible to
develop a certification scheme, to certify and inspect shipments, and to monitor
compliance (though disclaimers were made about the KPCS nature as soft law and
criticisms were recalled over the different commitment of governments).
Furthermore, by referring to international standards found in human rights and
labor rights conventions that companies must adopt, these initiatives move away from the
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WTO as a locus to formally enshrine human and labor standards, thereby avoiding
cognitive costs; They also move away from the ILO to formally encompass trade
sanction, avoiding cognitive and sovereignty costs. In addition to the above case studies,
attention was given to very recent developments in the area of government procurement
and the global social standard (ISO 26000) being developed under the auspices of ISO.
As further research, the main points indicate the need: (i) to keep track on the
evolution of TNG initiatives and potential manifestations of the WTO regime bodies in
relation to it; (ii) to investigate the extent to which these initiatives are already altering
the calculation of states’ interests; (iii) to analyze whether bilateral and regional dealing
with social linkages are indeed linkages or merely false inducements (as the Diamond
Waiver and the WTO-labor linkages proved to be); and (iv) to observe if the economic
crisis will change anything in this debate; for instance, a potential outcome, in times of
economic strain, is the use of human rights and labor rights languages to justify trade
restrictive measures with real protectionism intent. This would be, however, a very
unfortunate outcome since it is neither economically sound nor helps to shape a rational
trade system more free of human rights and labor rights violations.
In sum, the recognition that states are lawfully entitled to or have a duty to act by
imposing restrictive trade measures based on extraterritorial human rights consideration
is an unlikely type of ARJ because of the high TCs involved. This is not to say that
powerful states will always refrain from resorting to them in practice. But in general, it is
expected that future developments will be based on variations of TNG initiatives. These
initiatives may also prompt new developments that may result in even more elaborate
forms of trade and human rights linkages.
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Finally, it should be reinforced that I do not stand against the basic premise that
trade liberalization generates economic growth and better standards of living, a
proposition widely supported by economic research. In an even broader perspective, it is
a project about peace and stability that has been associated with the quotation credited to
Frederic Bastiat, a French economist of the eighteenth century: “[i]f goods don’t cross
borders, armies will.360”
But I also recognize, while returning to remarks made in the introductory chapter,
that collision and tension occur between the trade system and the protection of human
rights and labor rights. The whole point, nevertheless, is how to handle eventual tension.
As demonstrated, the public international law system (in any branch: general, trade, and
human rights) reflects a rational correlation between lawfulness and sovereignty and
cognitive costs. This legal design, so far, has blocked the “internalization” of allocations
dealing with extraterritorial violations of human rights and labor rights in public
international law. It has also redirected efforts of the human rights community towards
new types of TNG initiatives.

360

As Dean Russell explains, that exact quotation does not appear in any of Bastiat’s writings, but
the idea was clearly endorsed by Bastiat in several passages. See DEAN RUSSELL, FREDERIC BASTIAT:
IDEAS AND INFLUENCE 7 (1965).
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Domestic Legislation
Short Form

Bluebook

Helms-Burton Act

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C.
§ 6021 (1996).
Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in
Burma (Myanmar), Annotated Laws of Massachussets ch. 7 § 22G-22M (Lexis
1998).
Council Regulation 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 [2005] OJ L169/1.

The MassachusettsBurma Act
CR 980/2005

Other
Short Form

Bluebook

KPCS

Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/
(follow “Read the official KPCS document”).
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Third Year Review, Submitted by
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Review of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (Nov. 2006),
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/documents/third_year_view_en.html.
Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, Conversation with History:
System Change or More of the Same (2007),
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Krasner/krasner-con3.html
Workshop on Financial Globalization and Human Rights: Defining the
Research Agenda (Ginsburg, Ochoa, and Keenan – Orgs. - University of
Chicago Law School, Feb.16.2008).
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ACRONYMS
AB
ABNT
ALI
ATCA
CIL
CSR
DSB
DSU
EC
ECHR
ECJ
ECOSOC
EU
FLO
FSC
FTA
GATS
GATT
GPA
GSP
ICCPR
ICESCR
ICJ
IGO
ILO
IOAS
IPR
ISEAL
ISO
ITO
KPCS
LDC
MFN
MMPA
NGO
npr-PPM
NSMD
NT
NTB

Appellate Body
Brazilian Association of Technical Norms
American Law Institute
Alien Torts Claim Act
Customary International Law
Corporate Social Responsibility
Dispute Settlement Body
Dispute Settlement Understanding
European Communities
European Convention on Human Rights
European Court of Justice
United Nations Economic Social Council
European Union
Fairtrade Labeling Organization International
Forest Stwerdship Council
Free Trade Agreement
General Agreement of Trade in Tariffs
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Governmental Procurement Agreement
General System of Preferences
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
International Court of Justice
Intergovernmental Organization
International Labour Organization
International Organic Accreditation Service
Intellectual Property Rights
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling Alliance
International Organization for Standardization
International Trade Organization
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds
Least Developed Country
Most Favoured Nation
Marine Mammal Protection Act
Non-Governmental Organization
Non-Product-Related Processes and Production Method
Non-State Market Driven
National Treatment
Non-Tariff Barriers
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OECD
OG
OHCHR
PCIJ
PICT
PR-PPM
RSS
SA 8000
SAI
SG
SIS
SPS
SWF
TBT
TNG
TPRM
TRIPS
UDHR
UN
UNCTAD
UN-GA
UN-GC
UN-SC
VCLT
WTO

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Old Governance
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
Permanent Court of International Justice
Project on International Courts and Tribunal
Product-Related Processes and Production Method
Regulatory Standard Setting
Social Accountability 8000
Social Accountability International
Secretary General
Swedish Standards Institute
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Sovereignty Wealth Funds
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Transnational New Governance
Trade Policy Review Mechanism
Agreement On Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Universal Declaration on Human Rights
United Nations
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
General Assembly of the United Nations
United Nations Global Compact
United Nations Security Council
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
World Trade Organization
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